Displaying items by tag: Ukraine

The second quarter of 2025 saw Russian GDP growth slow to 1.1% year-on-year, with a revised full-year growth forecast of 0.9%.¹ An economy bulked up on injections of military spending (budgeted at 33% of GDP in 2025)² since the invasion of Ukraine may slowly be keeling over. Faced with this eventuality, the Russian cement industry will likely be reviewing strategies not to be dragged down with the rest of the economy.

Prior to the release of the latest economic data, Russian construction had been forecast to grow at a CAGR of 2.5% in 2026 – 2029. Drivers included anticipated investments in oil and gas, transport, airports and renewable energy.

Purely in cement terms, the data no longer appear to corroborate this outlook. Market leader Cemros expects total domestic demand to drop from 67Mt in 2024, by 10 – 15% year-on-year, to 57 – 60.3Mt in 2025. In the first half of the year, Russia consumed 28.4Mt of cement, just 4% above production volumes of 27.2Mt in the same period. Cemros cited ‘declining cement consumption’ to account for its upcoming instigation of a four-day working week at its plants across Russia from October 2025.

On 12 August 2025, Cemros spoke out about a threat to the interests of the domestic industry: increased imports from Belarus. It said that Belarus’ three-plant industry is supplying Russia with cement at a rate equivalent to the combined production volumes of two-to-three cement plants. Time to cap them, it told the government, suggesting a ceiling of 1.5Mt/yr.
The producer may have received a shock on 18 August 2025, when Belarus-based Krasnoselskstroymaterialy announced an upcoming US$100m upgrade to its 700,000t/yr Vaŭkavysk cement plant in Grobno Oblast, Belarus.

By that time, the Russian cement association, Soyuzcement, had already called for an anti-dumping investigation into all cement imports. It expects that import volumes of 3.74Mt in 2024 may rise to 5Mt/yr ‘in the near-term future.’

Lingering behind these discussions is the fact of high operating costs, partly precipitated by Russia’s continuing burden of international sanctions.

Here, the cement sector’s hopes are riding on a very particular marketing campaign: that of President Vladimir Putin on the global diplomatic circuit. He must sell his war (or peace on his terms) in a way that fends off increased international sanctions or support for Ukraine. Existing sanctions were on show at the Alaska Summit in Anchorage, US, on 15 August 2025, where the Russian leader made his pitch to US President Donald Trump – including a request for de-sanctioning, alongside various proposed punishment measures against Ukraine. Before travelling back to Moscow, the Russian delegation reportedly had to offer to pay cash for aeroplane fuel.³

Though President Trump did not secure a ceasefire, he nonetheless held back from making good on threatened new sanctions, and rated the Alaska Summit ‘10/10.’⁴ Putin might be equally pleased with the inconclusive outcome as precisely the goal of all his obfuscations. For Russia’s cement producers, costs won’t suddenly rise, but nor will they come down any time soon.

Far from sitting idly by, the industry is seeking new ways to actualise the value of its product. On 20 August 2025, Soyuzcement hosted a meeting of nine producers and four retail chains to strategise ways to increase sales of bagged cement. It will be subject to mandatory digital labelling from 1 October 2025. Discussions included the possibility of batch labelling of bags on the pallet for ease of scanning at retail outlets.

For now, producers’ online media spaces give the impression of work continuing as usual. On 18 August 2025, Cemros announced a US$186,000 renovation of buildings at its Mikhailovsk building materials plant in Volgograd Oblast.

The cement business in Russia is big, established and diffuse. Transformation has been its defining feature in the 33 years since the fall of the USSR, including in the relatively stable latter decades of that period. Should macroeconomic or geopolitical events overtake it once again, we can expect some shapeshifting – but also survival.

References

1. Reuters, ‘Russia's GDP growth slows to 1.1% in Q2, says Rosstat,’ 13 August 2025, www.reuters.com/markets/europe/russias-gdp-growth-slows-11-q2-says-rosstat-2025-08-13/

2. Global Data, ‘Russia Construction Market Size,’ 30 June 2025, www.globaldata.com/store/report/russia-construction-market-analysis/

3. Spiegel, ‘Russen boten Rubio zufolge Barzahlung für Betankung ihrer Flugzeuge an,’ 18 August 2025, www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/trump-putin-gipfel-russen-boten-offensichtlich-barzahlung-fuer-betankung-ihrer-flugzeuge-an-a-fdd9303c-546a-43aa-89dd-4f746b8e9df3

4. Focus, ‘Jäger deutlich: "Putin verkauft Trump eine Illusion - und hat ihn jetzt in der Hand",’ 16 August 2025, www.focus.de/politik/ausland/jaeger-putin-braucht-trump-nicht-zu-fuerchten-er-hat-trump-jetzt-in-der-hand_67785013-a14b-485c-9a4a-51755ec483fa.html

Ukraine: Cement producers have warned of consequences for the industry due to a 67% rise in the marginal price of electricity, according to Lyudmila Krypka, executive director of Ukrcement. Due to high tariffs, the industry is reportedly only operating at 60-70% of capacity.

Krypka said “Export for us is a matter of survival.”

She said that the increase was unjustified and wartime conditions with limited energy market competition created additional risks. Ukrainian industry receives no compensation for energy costs, unlike in the EU. Ukrcement has proposed preferential electricity transmission tariffs for energy-intensive industries and technical and economic criteria for priority enterprises.

Poland: The Internal Affairs Ministry has announced sanctions on the Belarusian Cement Company (BCC). The Belarus-based company has been added to the List of Persons and Enterprises Subject to Sanctions, according to Interfax. The authorities will freeze funds connected to the company and exclude it from public procurement or tenders amongst other measures.

The government has taken this action as it believes that funds generated by BCC indirectly support serious human rights violations, repression against civil society and the democratic opposition, and its activities pose a serious threat to democracy or the rule of law in Belarus. It has also associated the company with actions that destabilise or undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.

The ministry said that BCC was a ‘significant’ supplier of cement to Poland in 2021 – 2022 but that these exports decreased significantly after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. However, it noted that that activities by the company outside of Belarus have grown since 2023 with the opening of a new subsidiary in Russia, BCK-Union Trading House, and mounting exports.

BCC has also been on the US sanctions list since late 2023. The EU imposed sanctions against cement industry as a whole in Belarus in mid-2022.

Poland: Holcim Polska has appointed Marek Michalski as Chief Operating Officer for Industry.

Michalski has worked for Holcim and related companies since 2000. He worked as the plant manager of Lafarge Canada’s Richmond cement plant from 2023 to 2025. Before this he was the plant manager of Holcim Polska’s Kujawy cement plant from 2018 to 2023. Michalski worked for Geocycle in 2017 and 2018. Prior to this he held positions with Lafarge, mostly in Poland, from 2000 to 2014. He notably became the plant manager of the Lwów cement plant in Ukraine in 2012 and 2013. Michalski holds a master’s degree in electrical and electronic engineering from the Bydgoszcz University of Science and Technology and a master’s in business administration qualification from the Warsaw University of Technology.

Ukraine: Renewable energy company Elementum Energy and Ukraine-based cement producer CEMARK, part of CRH, signed a one-year financial power purchase agreement to stabilise electricity prices, supplied from the 100MW Dniester Wind Farm to one of CEMARK’s plants.

It is the second such agreement signed by Elementum Energy, following a pilot deal in January 2025. CEMARK energy resources procurement manager Maryna Boyaryntseva said electricity costs are “one of the key components in the cost of cement and require constant attention and the introduction of new tools to influence price formation.”

Elementum Energy said one- to two-year price stabilisation tools are attractive to businesses in wartime, because they allow for a cost forecast and risk reduction without committing to a longer-term contract.

The Polish Cement Association (SPC) has taken a swing at mounting cement imports from outside of the European Union (EU) in recent weeks. Its ‘apocalyptic’ message was underlined by the name of a seminar it participated in at the European Parliament: “Is the end of cement production in the EU approaching?” The SPC’s primary target appeared to be imports from Ukraine. It said that, “...cement imports from Ukraine - only to Poland - have increased by almost 3000% over five years (2019 - 2024). (In 2024) it amounted to more than 650,000t, and forecasts for 2025 already indicate more than 1Mt.” However, it detailed other issues affecting the sector including high energy prices, the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) and decarbonisation costs such as carbon capture.

The SPC is clearly keen to find cross-country support in the EU. In its accompanying statement it said "The uncontrolled increase in imports - from Ukraine to Poland or Romania, and from Türkiye and Africa to Italy or Spain - is already directly threatening cement producers, and will only continue to rise until the full implementation of the CBAM. It shows that imports from outside the EU are not just a problem for Poland.” Representatives from the cement associations in the later countries - CIROM, AITEC and Oficemen - all added comments to the SPC statement.

The SPC has called for a customs quota on cement imports from Ukraine to Poland to be introduced. It also asked for the European Commission to extend the EU ETS indirect cost compensation scheme to include the cement sector in order to further hedge against rising energy bills. It argues that this measure is essential to keep the cement industry competitive both now and in the future. Future electricity consumption is expected to double as cement plants start to install carbon capture technology.

Graph 1: Domestic cement sales and imports in Poland, 2019 - 2024. Source: SPC, Eurostat. Note: 2024 sales estimated.

Data from the SPC suggests that domestic cement sales in Poland peaked at 19.4Mt in 2022. They fell by 12% year-on-year to 16.6Mt in 2023 and then appear to have grown to 17.1Mt in 2024 based on estimated data. It is hard to replicate the SPC’s methodology for determining cement imports into Poland based on Eurostat data. However, data in its Economic Impact Report published at the end of 2024 suggests that imports from Ukraine grew from 79,000t in 2019 to 332,000t in 2023. Any significant rise in imports of cement in 2024, as the local industry recovered from the decline in 2023, seems likely to have caused concern.

Polish concern at growing imports from Ukraine started to be expressed in the press from early 2024 onwards when the 2023 data became apparent. Germany had been the biggest source of imports from the mid-2010s. Yet Germany and Ukraine both supplied about 30% of total imports each in 2023. For example, SPC head Zbigniew Pilch noted in April 2024 that imports from Ukraine were growing steadily each month and represented nearly half of total imports in January 2024. He described these volumes as “deeply concerning.” The Association of Cement Producers in Ukraine (Ukrcement) later attempted to soothe Polish concerns in late 2024 looking at longer import trends and bringing up the challenges facing Ukraine-based producers operating in a warzone.

Concerns about imports from Ukraine in eastern countries in the EU go back decades but have been clouded by the war with Russia. This is now reasserting itself as import levels grow, the cost of decarbonising heavy industry becomes more urgent and the CBAM comes into force. That said , cement plants in Ukraine look unlikely to cope with the CBAM that well due to their relatively high emissions intensity. Yet, other exporting countries outside the EU with lower cement sector emissions intensities may simply displace their competitors. Hence, the SPC’s call for a quota. The kinds of arguments that the SPC is making about carbon leakage are likely to grow fiercer across the EU as the definitive stage of the CBAM, due to start in 2026, draws nearer. Will the current situation lead to ‘the end of cement production in the EU?’ Time will tell…

Ukraine: The Interdepartmental Commission on International Trade has extended anti-dumping duties on cement from Russia, Belarus and Moldova until 2030, according to Ukrainian News. The duties stand at 115% for Russian cement, 94% for Moldovan cement and 57% for Belarusian cement, following a review of measures first imposed in 2019.

Poland: Cement producers are calling on the European Commission to introduce quotas on imports from Ukraine, to limit their volumes to 0.36Mt/yr. This figure is almost half of the 2024 figure. Poland imported 0.1Mt of cement from Ukraine in 2022, but more than 0.65Mt in 2024. Forecasts for 2025 exceed 1.0Mt, a 10-fold increase in just three years. Ukraine exported 1.7Mt of cement to EU countries in 2024.

The Polish Association of Cement Producers (ACP) believes that the increase in imports is already harming local cement plants, which it says are forced to compete with Ukrainian suppliers on unequal terms. Wlodzimierz Choluy, a member of the ACP's board of directors, emphasised that the effects of imports were becoming particularly noticeable in the border regions of Podkarpacie and Lublin voivodeships.

Polish manufacturers complain that Ukraine is not covered by the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), meaning that Polish-made cement is at a cost disadvantage. This is known as ‘carbon leakage.’

Ukraine: A court has reportedly invalidated the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine (AMCU)’s competition clearance for CRH Ukraine's acquisition of Buzzi subsidiary Dyckerhoff Cement Ukraine, completed in October 2024. Interfax-Ukraine News has reported that the court found that the clearance, granted in September 2024, was based on insufficient ‘clarification and evidence’ of details on the Ukrainian ready-to-use mortar mixes market situation.

The court allegedly also ruled that the Netherlands-based subsidiary of Ireland-based CRH had yet to meet certain commitments upon which the AMCU’s approval was conditional. Following the acquisition of Dyckerhoff Cement Ukraine, it was required to appoint executive, directorial or supervisory personnel to the company who did not already hold positions in CRH Ukraine-controlled entities. CRH clarified that it in fact appointed Mariusz Tomasz Bogacz on 11 October 2024, after his powers as a member of the supervisory board of Podilsky Cement had already been terminated, on 8 October 2024.

Building materials and property development company Kovalska Group mounted the successful legal challenge. The Kyiv Post newspaper has reported that the Kyiv-based company controls over 50% of the concrete market in Kyiv Oblast.

Dyckerhoff Cement Ukraine’s assets comprise two integrated cement plants, cement terminals and ready-mix concrete plants in Kyiv, Odessa and Mykolaiv. They entered Italy-based Buzzi’s control following the group’s progressive acquisition of Germany-based Dyckerhoff in 2001 – 2013. CRH and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development signed a mandate letter for the launch of a joint acquisition of the business in December 2023. The value of the deal was reportedly €100m.

The latest decision is currently under appeal by CRH.

This story was modified on 22 April 2025 to correct the inaccurate claim that the latest court ruling 'blocked' or ‘overturned' the completed acquisition and to add CRH's clarification regarding the effective appointment of Mariusz Tomasz Bogacz.

Ukraine: Ukrainian cement and concrete producers are ready to expand capacity to meet reconstruction demand, according to a survey by Consumer and Business Research Ukraine (CBR), despite reduced funding and limited state budget. Cement production dropped to 5.4Mt in 2022 from 11Mt in 2021 but stabilised at 7.4Mt in 2023 and 7.97Mt in 2024. CBR estimates that 8Mt/yr is feasible during wartime, rising to 12Mt/yr in the third or fourth year of reconstruction.

The Ukrainian Cement Association (UkrCement) head Pavlo Kachur said “Reconstruction will begin with demining, reinforcing the front lines and restoring energy infrastructure. Large-scale construction will likely not begin until the third or fourth year.”

At present, plant capacity utilisation varies across regions. Plants in western Ukraine are operating at higher capacity, while those in the south and east remain underutilised. In 2022, plants operated at a loss but retained staff. In 2023, volumes were sufficient to break even. Two-thirds of surveyed consumers increased production in 2023, though 2024 expectations were cautious.

Kachur said “Time will be needed for training, planning and securing financing—and cement producers will use that time to fill the market, primarily by investing in modernisation and capacity expansion. For example, two major projects to build new kilns are already ready in Kryvy Rih and Ivano-Frankivsk.”

The study notes that building brand new plants is unlikely, but modernising existing kilns can be accomplished within a year. It expects at least two plants to launch new kilns, increasing capacity by 2Mt/yr. For example, Kryvyi Rih Cement has obtained a permit to develop the Maryanske limestone deposit (60km from the plant) and plans to build a clinker kiln at the site.

CBR researcher Tetiana Sytnyk said “Cement companies are ready to make rapid investments in modernisation and to launch additional kilns once recovery begins. They’re waiting for clear signals to proceed – such as the allocation of reconstruction funds or a surge in demand to at least 9.5Mt/yr.”

Ukraine exported 1.7Mt of cement in 2024, up from 56,000t in 2021, with Kachur adding that exports have ‘saved’ the local industry during the war. Developed countries will be capable of meeting Ukraine’s reconstruction needs, though this could hurt local producers. Kachur added “During the recovery phase, Ukraine’s market must be as localised as possible with domestic products. Only countries that supported us during the war should have access.”