Displaying items by tag: Emissions Trading Scheme

It's been an expensive few weeks for Holcim. First, the Venuezuelan state-run outfit Corporación Socialista Del Cemento failed to pay its last instalment of US$97.5m in compensation for its forced nationalisation in 2008. Then the European Court of Justice dismissed Holcim's lawsuit against the European Commission over the theft of 1.6 million emissions allowances in 2010. Here we concentrate on the second story.

Holcim Romania's CO2 accounts held within the Romanian National Registry for Greenhouse Gases were illegally accessed by hackers in November 2010. 1,000,000 CO2 allowances were transferred to an account in Liechtenstein. Another 600,000 CO2 allowances were transferred to a company in Italy, which had account registries in Italy and the UK. Parts were then transferred to accounts in the Czech Republic, the UK and France before being sold on to emissions exchanges in Paris and Amsterdam.

Holcim then tried to sue the Commission, which administers the bloc's electronic emissions trading network, in 2012 for failing to freeze the accounts containing the stolen units, for not returning them and for allowing other companies to turn them in for compliance under the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS). The multinational building materials producer tried to force the commission to pay it Euro17.6m for damages associated with the theft. The amount was equivalent to the 905,000 allowances that remain unaccounted for at a spot price of Euro14.6/unit and an interest rate of 8%.

Other registries were also targeted in early 2011. As much as Euro30m in carbon allowances were stolen at the time, leading to exchanges having to stop trading temporarily.

Although this is a relatively small amount for a multinational company that reported net sales of over Euro16bn in 2013, it feels harsh. If a personal investor had assets stolen from a bank or investment scheme they would expect some sort of compensation.

It should be noted though that it is unclear how the hackers gained entry to Holcim's account details. Successful 'phishing' for account logins via fake emails and the like might suggest lax security on Holcim's side. Or a more conventional hack on the registry server might suggest loose security on the registry's side. Add to this the fact that the price of carbon allowances has fallen since 2010. Reuters estimated that the outstanding allowances would be worth Euro5.1m today.

Hopefully the thefts in late 2010 and early 2011 can be marked down as teething problems. Yet the European Union Emission Trading Scheme is compulsory for 11,000 power stations and manufacturing plants. Any European company that may be less keen on the scheme is unlikely to have its fears settled by high profile cases of carbon credit thefts or the current low price of trading.

Meanwhile, companies and investors involved with China's Guangdong Province carbon emission trading scheme, the world's second biggest such scheme after Europe, may well be watching what happens in Europe closely.

Industrial energy consumers in Romania have succeeded in extracting concessions from the government's green certificates scheme this week. Cement producers, including Lafarge, Holcim and local HeidelbergCement subsidiary CarpatCement Holding, will benefit now from a 10-year facility to acquire the certificates and they will be allowed to buy up to 85% fewer certificates than at present.

The Romanian government reckons the change will save industry Euro750m. It will be good news for the cement producers and aluminium producer Alro Slatina, one of the chief lobbyists for the change which paid Euro39m for the certificates in 2013, reported losses of Euro17m and threatened production closures.

The debacle strikes a chord with other government-led attempts to nudge society towards lower-carbon emitting energy sources. First a national or international scheme offers economic incentives toward some sort of carbon reduction. Then major industrial users either complain that the system 'unfairly' penalises them or they find a way to play the system. The latest example of the adjustments in Romania is an example of the former, as is the current Australian government's intention to remove its carbon tax. Multinational companies surrendering carbon offsets into the European Union's (EU) emissions trading scheme (ETS) is an example of the latter.

In defence of government-industry negotiation, the EU ETS is now in its third phase of trying to make the scheme work as the EU tries to reach its target of a 20% cut in emissions compared to 1990 levels by 2020. In late 2013 environmental group Sandbag accused the target of containing a loophole that allows for a much smaller cut in emissions due to a slack in carbon budgets, of potentially 2% of 1990 levels. However, the EU confirmed in early June 2014 that it is on track to beat its target and cut down total emissions by 24.5% by 2020.

Alongside all of this arguing, overall energy costs have steadily risen over the last decade, as have the rates of co-processing at European cement plants. As a secondary major fuels consumer, behind energy generation and transportation, the cement industry is particularly susceptible to energy prices being jolted around behind various market trends, such as increases in natural gas supply in the US market. In effect the cement industry hops between different 'next best' options, after the leading energy consumers have taken the premium fuels. The interplay between legislators and heavy industry over carbon taxes prompts the following question: what encourages cement producers more to move to reduce their carbon emissions – legislation or fuel prices?

In other news this week, the chief executive of African producer Bamburi Cement, Hussein Mansi, has announced his plans to move on to Lafarge Egypt. In his memo to staff he mentioned, '...five very interesting years leading the Kenya – Uganda business.' Telling words perhaps given the Kenyan government's attention on Bamburi Cement and the East Africa Portland Cement Company, a producer minority-owned by Lafarge. Of course Mansi may discover that 'interesting' is relative in Egypt, a country on the other side of the energy subsidy spectrum to Europe and its carbon taxes.

In late November 2013 Guangdong province in China announced that it will be launching its carbon emissions trading scheme (ETS) in December 2013. Together with six other pilot projects in China the scheme will be the second largest carbon market in the world after the European Union (EU) when fully operational. Yet with the EU ETS floundering from excess carbon permits, with a resulting low price of permits and large cement producers such as a Lafarge reported as stockpiling permits, what are the Chinese schemes planning to do differently to avoid these pitfalls?

Overall, China has announced that it intends to cut its carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP by up to 45% by 2020 compared to 2005. In Guangdong, emissions from 202 companies will be capped at 350Mt for 2013, according to the local Development and Reform Commission. As shown in an article in the December 2013 issue of Global Cement Magazine, Guangdong province has a cement production capacity of 132.7Mt/yr, the second highest in the country after Anhui province.

From the perspective of the cement industry, Chunfang Wang from Huaxin Cement spoke about the importance of monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) at an International Emissions Trading Association (IETA) workshop that took place in Guangzhou, Guangdong in early 2013. From Wang's perspective, emission assessment standards were at a 'developmental' stage in China and 'smooth' carbon trading would depend on consistent standards being adopted everywhere. Although at the time the particulars of the Guangdong scheme were unknown, participants at the IETA event advised cooperation with scheme planners to ensure emission producers and purchasers remained part of the decision process. Sliding carbon prices in the EU ETS may have been beneficial for permit buyers but once the government planners become involved to revive the market they might lose out.

As the Economist pointed out the summer of 2013, an ETS is a cap-and-trade scheme. Since China appears to have no definite cap to carbon emissions, how can the trading work? The Chinese schemes cap carbon per unit of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Yet since GDP is dependent on production, any ETS run in this way would have to include adjustments at the end of trading. This would give central planners of the scheme plenty of wiggle room to rig the scheme. Worse yet, analysts Thomson Reuters Point Carbon have pointed out that the Chinese schemes face over-allocation of permits, the same issue that sank EU carbon prices. Additionally, one of the criticisms of the Guangdong Emissions Trading Scheme (GETS) pilot scheme was that the carbon prices may have been higher than expected due to market collusion.

The Chinese ETS projects face issues over their openness. If traders don't know accurately how much carbon dioxide is being produced by industry, such as cement production, then the scheme may be undermined. Similarly, over-allocating carbon permits may make it easier for producers to meet targets but it will cause problems in the trading price of carbon. However, given that a carbon emissions cap is an artificial mechanism to encourage markets to cut emissions, should any of these concerns really matter? The main question for Chinese citizens is whether or not China can cut its overall emissions and clear the air in its smog filled mega-cities.

Specifically for cement producers, it seems likely that large producers will be able to cope with the scheme best, from having more carbon permits to sell, to rolling out unified emissions assessment protocols, to liaising better with scheme planners. In Europe smaller cement producers, like Ecocem, have criticised the EU ETS for slowing a transition to a low carbon economy by subsidising the larger producers' emissions through over-allocation. In China, with its self-declared intention to consolidate an over-producing cement industry, whatever else happens it seems likely that smaller cement producers may become lost in the haze.

This week Donal O'Riain, the Irish chief executive of Ecocem, cried out for an 80% tax on cement producers in Ireland. His reason? In his words, Irish producers are making profits from an over-allocation in the European Union (EU) Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) despite demand dropping in the Irish industry. The tax was his suggestion to address this 'anomaly' and give the Irish Exchequer a boost.

The timing of his comments are interesting given that the EU ETS entered its third phase at the start of 2013. Towards the end of 2012 environmental campaign group Sandbag questioned in a report whether the scheme was actually helping the environment or not. As Sandbag pointed out generally, not just for the cement industry, carbon prices in the scheme had remained low due to an excess supply in the market. Due to the oversupply, prices were so low that the EU ETS has ceased to function.

The European Commission conceded this failing of the EU ETS in November 2012 by announcing that it was taking steps to address the supply-demand imbalance of emission allowances in the scheme. Firstly 'back-loading' action volumes, revising the auction time profile and delay of the auctioning of 900 million allowances, came into effect from 1 January 2013. Secondly the Commission launched a debate on broad structural measures with a report on the carbon market.

Any emissions trading scheme can distort the market in unexpected ways. With regards to the cement industry, if O'Riain is correct, then parts of the Irish cement industry are making profit on carbon credits despite demand falling. Or, to put it as O'Riain did, the EU ETS may be subsidising environmentally-unfriendly plants at the expensive of more environmentally sensitive ones. Such as Ecocem we must presume. What would be really interesting here is to find out whether other European cement producing countries are also benefitting from over-allocation as demand falls, specifically in Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece.

Another distortion is that in the EU ETS, offsets generated from developing countries can be surrendered by companies in competing sectors in the EU, giving, in effect, a subsidy to competitors outside the EU. For example, as ETS schemes spread then staying outside of such regulation could prove profitable for cement exporters.

Koen Coppenholle the chief executive of CEMBUREAU, the European Cement Association, tackled this in his response to the European Commission's report, "It is essential that any further reduction of CO₂ emissions above the targets agreed should remain conditional upon the conclusion of an international agreement between all major greenhouse gas emitting countries. This should be undertaken with a view to establish a global crediting scheme, characterised by a comparable methodology to measure greenhouse gas emission reductions and equivalent monitoring and reduction efforts." Hence the interest in regional Chinese ETS schemes such as the emissions trading schemes that were launched in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangdong in 2012. China currently plans to introduce its own national scheme in 2015.

Despite the bureaucrats' efforts to improve emissions trading schemes, Petroleum Review summed up their effect in June 2012, "Carbon trading appears to have pulled off the noteworthy achievement of uniting oil and gas producers and environmentalists in their appraisal of its shortcomings." We could add cement producers to that list.

Today's report that cement producers from Taiwan are preparing for new Chinese NOx regulations is yet another reaction to several 'seismic' shifts of government-led change rocking the industry in China. These have included the closure of old, inefficient capacity and significant implementation of waste-heat recovery (WHR) systems. Last week's launch of the Guangdong Emissions Trading Scheme (GETS) is one more.

As reported by Reuters Point Carbon, GETS involves four cement plants from the start and it is the largest of seven such provincial schemes. It is as big and bold as the manufacturing hub that it covers. It includes over 800 manufacturing sites and will regulate the emissions from 42% of all power consumed in Guangdong and 63% of all its industrial emissions. It will be the fifth biggest ETS in the world after those in the EU, Australia, California and South Korea.

While GETS is large, the rate that it will be implemented will be more restrained. There will be three years of testing (2012-2015), an 'improvement period' (2016- 2020) and a proper market from 2020. The scheme's progress will be watched closely - its success or failure could determine the shape of emissions trading schemes (ETS) across China and the rest of Asia.

While the aims of ETS are laudable, they have met with 'mixed' reviews in other parts of the world. In Australia in 2011, there were dire warnings of the potential for job-losses and carbon-leakage, with China itself identified as a probable destination for both.

In Europe there is now a strong claim that the EU-ETS has been ineffective, with carbon prices slumping to under Euro10/credit (~US$13/credit), less than a quarter of projected levels for 2012. In the midst of the downturn Ireland's CRH 'earned' millions of Euros in unused credits. Security has also been a problem for the EU-ETS.

Even GETS, less than a month old, has drawn criticism. Unnamed commentators have suggested that the higher-than-expected prices, US$9.50/credit, (only slightly lower than in Europe), already look like the result of collusion in the market.

With all of these concerns, the immediate demand from the cement producers, China Resources Cement, Sinoma, Taipai and Yangchun Hailuo, looks a little strange. However, local media reports that there are advantages to be gained by buying early. All of the four producers have to buy credits for cement plant projects they are currently working on. They are gambling on the fact that carbon prices can only rise - something that is not expected by analysts.

In addition the producers can gain valuable experience of the scheme before it has to be used 'in anger,' which may give them an operational advantage over others. They also know that, unlike in other parts of the world, the government will not backtrack on its decision. Recent NOx regulations, closure of older capacity and implementation of WHR have all been imposed (or are being imposed) from above. They know that it is better to jump into the deep end than to be pushed.