Displaying items by tag: Sanctions

The second quarter of 2025 saw Russian GDP growth slow to 1.1% year-on-year, with a revised full-year growth forecast of 0.9%.¹ An economy bulked up on injections of military spending (budgeted at 33% of GDP in 2025)² since the invasion of Ukraine may slowly be keeling over. Faced with this eventuality, the Russian cement industry will likely be reviewing strategies not to be dragged down with the rest of the economy.

Prior to the release of the latest economic data, Russian construction had been forecast to grow at a CAGR of 2.5% in 2026 – 2029. Drivers included anticipated investments in oil and gas, transport, airports and renewable energy.

Purely in cement terms, the data no longer appear to corroborate this outlook. Market leader Cemros expects total domestic demand to drop from 67Mt in 2024, by 10 – 15% year-on-year, to 57 – 60.3Mt in 2025. In the first half of the year, Russia consumed 28.4Mt of cement, just 4% above production volumes of 27.2Mt in the same period. Cemros cited ‘declining cement consumption’ to account for its upcoming instigation of a four-day working week at its plants across Russia from October 2025.

On 12 August 2025, Cemros spoke out about a threat to the interests of the domestic industry: increased imports from Belarus. It said that Belarus’ three-plant industry is supplying Russia with cement at a rate equivalent to the combined production volumes of two-to-three cement plants. Time to cap them, it told the government, suggesting a ceiling of 1.5Mt/yr.
The producer may have received a shock on 18 August 2025, when Belarus-based Krasnoselskstroymaterialy announced an upcoming US$100m upgrade to its 700,000t/yr Vaŭkavysk cement plant in Grobno Oblast, Belarus.

By that time, the Russian cement association, Soyuzcement, had already called for an anti-dumping investigation into all cement imports. It expects that import volumes of 3.74Mt in 2024 may rise to 5Mt/yr ‘in the near-term future.’

Lingering behind these discussions is the fact of high operating costs, partly precipitated by Russia’s continuing burden of international sanctions.

Here, the cement sector’s hopes are riding on a very particular marketing campaign: that of President Vladimir Putin on the global diplomatic circuit. He must sell his war (or peace on his terms) in a way that fends off increased international sanctions or support for Ukraine. Existing sanctions were on show at the Alaska Summit in Anchorage, US, on 15 August 2025, where the Russian leader made his pitch to US President Donald Trump – including a request for de-sanctioning, alongside various proposed punishment measures against Ukraine. Before travelling back to Moscow, the Russian delegation reportedly had to offer to pay cash for aeroplane fuel.³

Though President Trump did not secure a ceasefire, he nonetheless held back from making good on threatened new sanctions, and rated the Alaska Summit ‘10/10.’⁴ Putin might be equally pleased with the inconclusive outcome as precisely the goal of all his obfuscations. For Russia’s cement producers, costs won’t suddenly rise, but nor will they come down any time soon.

Far from sitting idly by, the industry is seeking new ways to actualise the value of its product. On 20 August 2025, Soyuzcement hosted a meeting of nine producers and four retail chains to strategise ways to increase sales of bagged cement. It will be subject to mandatory digital labelling from 1 October 2025. Discussions included the possibility of batch labelling of bags on the pallet for ease of scanning at retail outlets.

For now, producers’ online media spaces give the impression of work continuing as usual. On 18 August 2025, Cemros announced a US$186,000 renovation of buildings at its Mikhailovsk building materials plant in Volgograd Oblast.

The cement business in Russia is big, established and diffuse. Transformation has been its defining feature in the 33 years since the fall of the USSR, including in the relatively stable latter decades of that period. Should macroeconomic or geopolitical events overtake it once again, we can expect some shapeshifting – but also survival.

References

1. Reuters, ‘Russia's GDP growth slows to 1.1% in Q2, says Rosstat,’ 13 August 2025, www.reuters.com/markets/europe/russias-gdp-growth-slows-11-q2-says-rosstat-2025-08-13/

2. Global Data, ‘Russia Construction Market Size,’ 30 June 2025, www.globaldata.com/store/report/russia-construction-market-analysis/

3. Spiegel, ‘Russen boten Rubio zufolge Barzahlung für Betankung ihrer Flugzeuge an,’ 18 August 2025, www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/trump-putin-gipfel-russen-boten-offensichtlich-barzahlung-fuer-betankung-ihrer-flugzeuge-an-a-fdd9303c-546a-43aa-89dd-4f746b8e9df3

4. Focus, ‘Jäger deutlich: "Putin verkauft Trump eine Illusion - und hat ihn jetzt in der Hand",’ 16 August 2025, www.focus.de/politik/ausland/jaeger-putin-braucht-trump-nicht-zu-fuerchten-er-hat-trump-jetzt-in-der-hand_67785013-a14b-485c-9a4a-51755ec483fa.html

Poland: The Internal Affairs Ministry has announced sanctions on the Belarusian Cement Company (BCC). The Belarus-based company has been added to the List of Persons and Enterprises Subject to Sanctions, according to Interfax. The authorities will freeze funds connected to the company and exclude it from public procurement or tenders amongst other measures.

The government has taken this action as it believes that funds generated by BCC indirectly support serious human rights violations, repression against civil society and the democratic opposition, and its activities pose a serious threat to democracy or the rule of law in Belarus. It has also associated the company with actions that destabilise or undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.

The ministry said that BCC was a ‘significant’ supplier of cement to Poland in 2021 – 2022 but that these exports decreased significantly after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. However, it noted that that activities by the company outside of Belarus have grown since 2023 with the opening of a new subsidiary in Russia, BCK-Union Trading House, and mounting exports.

BCC has also been on the US sanctions list since late 2023. The EU imposed sanctions against cement industry as a whole in Belarus in mid-2022.

Zimbabwe: Khayah Cement has initiated corporate rescue proceedings due to the impacts of Western-imposed economic sanctions, which have created an ‘untenable’ business environment, according to The Chronicle. The company adopted a resolution on 20 December 2024 to start the rescue process under the Insolvency Act, to address its financial difficulties. The sanctions have reportedly hindered access to essential resources, affecting the company’s production capabilities. Khayah Cement said that further processes will be communicated to creditors and stakeholders.

Belarus: The US government sanctioned the management company of Belarusian Cement Company on 6 December 2023. PrimePress News has reported that 10 other Belarus-based companies and eight individuals were also added to the US sanctions list. This is the latest group of additions since the US and its allies began sanctioning Belarusian entities in connection to election rigging, human rights abuses and complicity in the on-going Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Russia/Uzbekistan: The US Department of State has imposed sanctions upon USM Holding including its subsidiaries Akkermann Cement and USM Cement in Russia, and Akhangarancement in Uzbekistan. The action is intended to target company owner Alisher Burhanovich Usmanov and his various business interests. Other USM companies in the iron, steel, copper, gold, telecommunications and real estate sectors are also affected.

The US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control noted that Usmanov was, “one of Russia’s wealthiest billionaires, with vast holdings across multiple sectors of the Russian Federation economy as well as internationally.” It added that he was linked to multiple senior Russian officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin as well as Dmitry Medvedev, current Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of Russia and former President and Prime Minister of Russia. Usmanov has also been sanctioned by Australia, Canada, the European Union (EU), Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland and the UK.

These latest US sanctions are in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Companies on the sanction list are forbidden to conduct business transactions with any US citizens.

Akkermann Cement operates two cement plants and a network of 12 terminals in Russia. It acquired a majority stake in Uzbekistan-based Akhangarancement in early 2022.

After the initial shocking coverage of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which began in February 2022, came announcements of the most extensive sanctions in history by the EU, G7 nations and others against Russia. In the EU, this effectively deconsolidated companies' Russian subsidiaries, leaving decision makers with the choice whether to sell up or hold out for better times.¹ Four Russian-facing EU cement producers - Buzzi Unicem, CRH, Heidelberg Materials and Holcim - finalised their strategic responses in March 2022.

One year on, on 15 March 2023, 666 (21%) of 3110 eligible multinationals have withdrawn from Russia, according to the KSE Institute.² Ireland-based CRH led the cement sector exit. It abandoned its Finland-based subsidiary Rudus' ready-mix concrete joint venture, LujaBetomix, on 2 March 2022. Switzerland-based Holcim took longer, but affected its exit on 14 December 2022, agreeing to sell Holcim Russia to local management. One condition of the sale was a rebrand (to Cementum, in February 2023) to withdraw the Holcim name from Russia. Unlike CRH, Holcim's Russian business included multiple cement plants - though the producer stated that it contributed less than 1% of group sales during 2021.

The KSE Institute uses the equivocal label of 'waiting' for companies which have paused investments, or scaled back operations, in Russia, while retaining their subsidiaries. This applies to 500 companies globally (16% of the pre-war total). Germany-based Heidelberg Materials acted swiftly to freeze further investments in HeidelbergCement Russia on 10 March 2022. At that time, its three cement plants were in winter shutdown. In terms of capacity, the 4.7Mt/yr-capacity Heidelberg Materials Russia constitutes 2.8% of Heidelberg Materials. In 2022, Heidelberg Materials suffered a Euro102m impairment on account of its Russian business. CEO Dominik von Achten, announcing the freeze, had described the subsidiary as a 'pure local business with no imports or exports.' Its website has since come offline, but the corporate structure presumably maintains in its frozen isolation.

1220 global multinationals - 39% of all those previously operating in Russia - are still 'continuing operations.' Among these is Buzzi Unicem. Having decided that 12 months was long enough, the Ukrainian National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption (NAPC) placed Italy-based Buzzi Unicem on its list of Russian war sponsors on 8 March 2023 for the actions of its subsidiary SLK Cement. A scathing denouncement accompanied the listing, in which the NAPC set out its main charges. It accused Buzzi Unicem of:

1. Expanding its business in Russia since the invasion;

2. Supplying its products to Russian state-owned businesses, including energy suppliers Rosatom and Rosneft;

3. Voicing support for the invasion via its social media presence.

The NAPC concluded “Buzzi Unicem's continued business in Russia means direct support and sponsorship of terrorism by Russia.”

Buzzi Unicem responded in no uncertain terms that these allegations are untrue: it has no business in Russia, and the entity bearing its logo on its (SLK Cement's) website is entirely independent in its decision-making and commercial actions.

This goes to the root of what it means to be a subsidiary of a corporation. Buzzi Unicem seeks to define the relationship as beginning and ending in operational involvement. Yet Buzzi Unicem and other corporations have invested large sums in businesses like SLK Cement. According to the NAPC, Buzzi Unicem paid Euro62m in taxes alone in Russia between 2016 and 2021. Whether they have elected to 'continue operations,' 'wait' or write in favourable buy-back options into sales contracts, as has happened in other industries, companies can be expected to seek to return to their investment.

As such, it is not entirely surprising that Buzzi Unicem should have followed up its rebuttal with a defence of SLK Cement. It stated "SLK Cement is a Russian domiciled entity operating exclusively in that country and therefore subject to domestic legislation. Payment of taxes and having employees being mobilised to the army are not discretionary decisions, rather legal obligations within the Russian jurisdiction."

In the decision to sell or hold, multinationals face the usual considerations: can they afford to yield their market share to other - less conscientious - competitors? Or, in this instance, those from Türkiye, India and China, whose potential investments are unrestrained by sanctions? Even as Holcim thrashed out its exit deal in October 2022, China-based West China Cement announced plans for a new US$260m, 1.2Mt/yr cement plant in Tatarstan, Volga Federal District. Meanwhile, Cemros (formerly Eurocement) is carrying out a Euro3m mill upgrade at its Lipetsk integrated cement plant in Central Federal District, which will increase the plant's capacity by 20% upon commissioning in early 2023. Between them, Central Federal District and Volga Federal District host four former Holcim cement plants.

12 months into the Russian invasion of Ukraine, an onslaught of withdrawals has shrunk, but not collapsed, the Russian economy.³ The Russian government insists that cement demand remains high (up by 2.1% year-on-year to 58.3Mt during the first 11 months of 2022, according to the Russian cement association Soyuzcement).⁴ The country has substituted new sources of imports for those lost since the beginning of the invasion, the government claims. It is even preparing for a cement shortage from 2024 onward by 'further developing domestic production capacities.'

Far from shrinking, Russian cement production rose by approximately 2.5% year-on-year to 60.7Mt in 2022.^{4, 5} The two aforementioned districts - Central Federal District and Volga Federal District - contributed a healthy 15.3Mt (25%) and 13.4Mt (22%) respectively. If the statistics are to be believed, the EU's recalled producers are missing out on a bonanza.

At the same time, all four EU-based producers face the parallel burden of increased costs in their key markets, as sanctions keep energy prices at an all-time high, and nowhere more so than in Europe. These sanctions purport to target Russian businesses and individuals, but their bite is far less discriminating. Companies may well wonder why they are being penalised by governments whose policies failed to prevent a Russian invasion of Ukraine in the first place.

We have no idea what will happen in Ukraine and Russia in the rest of 2023, but we can be sure it will be uncertain territory for the two countries’ cement producers. Those with (former) assets in the Russian market will have to continue their delicate balancing act.

1. European Commission, 'Frequently Asked Questions,' 16 March 2022, https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2022/march/tradoc_160079.pdf

2. KSE Institute, 'Stop Doing Business with Russia,' 15 March 2023, https://leave-russia.org/leaving-companies?flt%5B147%5D%5Beq%5D%5B%5D=9062

3. European Council, 'Infographic - Impact of sanctions on the Russian economy ,' 9 March 2023, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/impact-sanctions-russian-economy/

4. Soyuzcement, 'Cement Review,' December 2022, https://soyuzcem.ru/documents/%D0%A6%D0%B5%D0%BC%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%82%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B5_%D0%BE%D0%B1%D0%BE%D0%B7%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B5_%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BA%D0%B0%D0%B1%D1%80%D1%8C%202022.pdf

5. BusinessStat, 'In 2022, 60.7 million tons of cement were produced in Russia,' 21 February 2023, https://marketing.rbc.ru/articles/14025/

Ukraine/Italy: The Ukrainian National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption (NAPC) has placed Italy-based Buzzi Unicem on its list of Russian war sponsors. Ukrinform has reported that the NAPC accuses Buzzi Unicem of expanding its business in Russia since the country's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, of supplying its products to Russian state-owned businesses including energy suppliers Rosatom and Rosneft, and of voicing support for the on-going invasion via its social media presence.

Between 2016 and 2021, Buzzi Unicem reportedly paid Euro62m-worth of taxes to Russia. In a statement, the NAPC said "For comparison, this is the cost of 206 Tochka U missiles." It concluded “Buzzi Unicem's continued business in Russia means direct support and sponsorship of terrorism by Russia.”

On 10 March 2023, Buzzi Unicem clarified that it has no business in Russia, calling the NAPC's listing 'defamatory.' The group explained that it has 'no involvement' in its Russian subsidiary SLK Cement's decision-making process related to local initiatives and commercial actions.

Buzzi Unicem said "Buzzi Unicem already clarified in its press release dated 12 May 2022 the decision to cease with immediate effect any operational involvement in the activities carried out by the subsidiary SLK Cement in Russia and to suspend all strategic initiatives and investments in the country." It defended the subsidiary, saying "SLK Cement is a Russian domiciled entity operating exclusively in that country and therefore subject to domestic legislation. Payment of taxes and having employees being mobilised to the army are not discretionary decisions, rather legal obligations within the Russian jurisdiction."

The group also voiced its support for Ukraine, saying "Despite significant financial losses incurred as a consequence of the Russian invasion, Buzzi Unicem did not stop operations in Ukraine, keeps supplying products to Ukrainian customers, paying taxes in Ukraine and providing job and humanitarian aid to its nearly 1000 employees and families in the country."

The English language release may be found here.

Afghanistan: Ghori Cement says that its Baghlan cement plants currently produce 600t/day of cement, corresponding to annual production of 0.22Mt/yr. The producer states that production is restricted by shortages of electricity and vehicles. With regular supply of these, it would increase its production by 33% to 800t/day (0.29Mt/yr), according to the company.

Production at the Baghlan cement plants was previously suspended for four months in mid-2022 due to high coal prices. This was resolved when the government began supplying the plants with coal at a pre-agreed price. The plants then reopened with a daily production of 520t/day (0.19Mt/yr), up by 49% from 350t/yr (0.13Mt/yr).

The provincial government said that an upgrade with equipment from China and Iran since increased production by 15% to its present 600t/day (0.22Mt/yr).

Uzbekistan: The government has ordered a partial transition of industries, including cement, to coal fuel from natural gas. The Turan Information Agency has reported that the ordinance, entitled Accelerating the Introduction of Renewable Energy Sources and Energy-Saving Technologies, will create an additional coal demand of 1.63Mt/yr and reduce national gas consumption by 926Mm²/yr. From 1 April 2023, the government will halve tariffs on coal imports, while the construction of new gas pipes to industrial facilities will be banned from 1 May 2023.

Russia: Holcim’s divested Russian business has rebranded as Cementum. Local management concluded a deal to buy the company from Switzerland-based Holcim in December 2022. The new ownership agreed to change the name upon completion of the transaction. Holcim Russia had been operating as a deconsolidated subsidiary of Holcim since March 2022, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.