Displaying items by tag: Cemex

Jamaica: Peter Donkersloot Ponce has been appointed as the general manager of Caribbean Cement Company with effect from 7 November 2016. He replaces Alejandro Varés Leal who was originally appointed in May 2015 subject to an agreement between Caribbean Cement’s owner Trinidad Cement and Cemex. However, Varés Leal has taken up a promotion with Cemex. In accordance with the Agreement, Ponce was proposed by Cemex to replace Varés Leal.

The European Commission’s decision to investigate Duna-Dráva Cement’s (DDC) purchase of Cemex Croatia sticks out in a busy news week. There have been a few noteworthy news stories this week from the Indonesian government making preparations to fight overcapacity, LafargeHolcim retreating from Chile, Cemex restructuring its management in Colombia after investigations into a land deal and the announcement of merger plans between two of the larger refractory manufacturers. Yet the commission’s probe is a response to what may be in effect a ‘land grab’ by DDC. How on earth did HeidelbergCement and Schwenk, the joint-owners of DDC, think they were going to pass this one past the relevant competition bodies?!

As the commissions describes it, the “proposed transaction would combine Cemex Croatia, the largest producer in the area, and DDC, the largest importer.” So far, so bad. Then add the observation that Cemex Croatia and LafargeHolcim control all the cement terminals in ports along the Croatian coast. Cemex has three cement plants in the south of the country with no nearby competition. Giving the owners of DDC those assets ties up the market southern Croatia nicely. Understandably, the European Commission has concerns.

Croatia has five cement plants. LafargeHolcim runs a 0.45Mt/yr plant at Koromačno and Nasicecement run a 0.6Mt/yr plant at Nasice. Cemex’s three plants are all in the south near Split within about 10km of each other. When Global Cement visited in late 2014 Cemex Croatia told us that the plants were so close together that the company considered them as one plant. The sites also share one quarry for their raw materials. Only one of three plants, Sv Juraj the largest, has a bagging unit and Sv 10 Kolovoz was mothballed due to poor market demand. Together the plants have a cement production capacity of 1.92Mt/yr. This gives Cemex 65% of the market by production capacity.

Describing the three plants as one certainly makes sense for a company that might have been considering selling them. However, it is a fair comment given the close proximity of the plants to each other and the joint-capacity below that of some of the larger single site multi-kiln plants around the world. In this sense, the real questions for the European Commission will be how much of a dent to competition will it make to hand over the area’s main importer to the area’s main producer?

Graph 1: Cement consumption in Croatia, 2011 - 2015 (Mt). Source: Croatian Bureau of Statistics.

Looking at the national cement market since 2011 in Graph 1 using data from the Croatian Bureau of Statistics, sales volumes fell to a low in 2013 and have picked up since then, although not to the same levels. Prior to this cement sales halved from 2008 to 2013. Under these kinds of conditions Nexe Grupa, the owner of Nasicecement, filed with pre-bankruptcy settlements in 2013. HeidelbergCement expressed interest in the cement assets around this time, although nothing eventually happened. Imports of cement grew by 11% year-on-year to 312,000t in 2015 from 280,000t in 2014. This compares to a 1% increase to 2.36Mt in domestic cement sales in 2015.

As the commission suggests, combining the region’s biggest producer and its biggest importer seems like a recipe for reduced competition and inflated prices. This could be mitigated, in theory, if DDC decided to flood the region with imports from HeidelbergCement’s new assets from Italcementi once it completes its purchase of that company. Although a dominant player in a region undercutting its own prices seems far fetched. Theoreticals aside, it seems very unlikely that the European Commission will let the purchase go ahead without taking some sort of action.

LafargeHolcim was the last major European cement producer to release its second quarter financial results last week. The collective picture is confused. Cement sales volumes have risen but sales revenue have fallen.

Most of the producers have blamed negative currency effects for their falls in revenue during the first half of 2016. Holding a mixed geographical portfolio of building materials production assets has kept these companies afloat over the last decade but this has come with a price. The recent appreciation of the Euro versus currencies in various key markets, such as in Egypt, has hit balance sheets, since the majority of these firms are based in Europe and mostly use the Euro for their accounting. Meanwhile, sales volumes of cement have mostly risen for the companies we have examined making currency effects a major contributor.

Graph 1 - Changes in cement sales volumes for major non-Chinese cement producers in the first half of 2016 compared to the first half of 2015 (%). Data labels are the volumes reported in 2016. Source: Company reports.

As can be seen in Graph 1, sales volumes have risen for most of the producers, with the exception of LafargeHolcim. Despite blaming shortages of gas in Nigeria for hitting its operating income, LafargeHolcim actually saw its biggest drop in sales volumes in Latin America by 13.2% year-on-year to 11.8Mt. The other surprise here was that its North American region reported a 2.7% fall to 8.8Mt with Canada the likely cause. Vicat deserves mention here for its giant boost in sales volumes due to recovery in France and good performance in Egypt and the US, amongst other territories.

Graph 2 - Changes in sales revenue for major non-Chinese cement producers in the first half of 2016 compared to the first half of 2015 (%). Data labels are the sales reported in 2016. Source: Company reports.

Overall sales revenue for these companies presents a gloomier scenario with the majority of them losing revenue in the first half of the year, with most of them blaming negative currency effects for this. Titan is included in this graph to show that it’s not all bad news. Its growth in revenue was supported by good performance in the US and Egypt. Likewise, good performance in Eastern Europe and the US helped Buzzi Unicem turn in a positive increase in its sales revenue. They remain, however, the exception.

Looking at sales revenue generated from cement offers one way to disentangle currency effects from performance. Unfortunately, only about half of the companies looked at here actually published this for the reporting period. Of these, LafargeHolcim reported a massive rise that was probably due to the accounting coping with the merger process that finalised in 2015. Of the rest - HeidelbergCement, Italcementi and Vicat – the sales revenue from each company’s cement businesses fell at a faster rate than overall sales. Like-for-like figures here would help clarify this situation.

Meanwhile, a mixed global patchwork of cement demand is focusing multinational attention on key countries with growing economies like Egypt and Nigeria. Both of these countries have undergone currency devaluation versus the Euro and are facing energy shortages for various reasons. The exposure of the multinational cement producers to such places may become clearer in the second half of the year.

Back in the May 2016 issue of Global Cement Magazine we asked key people at the Portland Cement Association how they thought the US presidential election might affect the local cement industry. Wisely, for an advocacy organisation with offices in Washington DC, no one would be drawn, citing a lack of information. At that point it was still unclear who was going to be on the final ticket. However, we all missed a trick because one candidate, Donald Trump, had been talking about building ‘a border fence like you have never seen before’ since at least mid-2014. And that fence could potentially require a lot of cement.

Researchers at market analysts Bernstein’s sent a note to clients last week ahead of the Republican National Convention looking at the implications of if Donald Trump became president of the US and actually set out to build his 40ft high concrete wall between the US and Mexico. The result would be a 2.4Mt boost in demand for cement from cement producers near to the border. In terms of market demand Bernstein concluded that this would add over 1% to cement demand in both 2018 and 2019, a healthy ‘shot in the arm’ to the already pepped-up US cement industry, which is currently growing at around 5%/yr.

Map 1: Map of cement and ready-mix concrete plants near to the US - Mexico border. Source: Bernstein Materials Blast. Note – Bernstein does not show the Capitol Cement plant in San Antonio.

Needless to say, Bernstein’s calculations pile-drive assumptions into assumptions, atop of Trump’s political rhetoric. It bases its calculations on a border wall similar to the Israeli West Bank barrier built out of precast concrete panels. It also tries to model how much concrete and cement would be required depending on the differing height’s Trump has trumpeted at his rallies.

The kicker to this tongue-in-cheek analysis is that the construction company that stands to benefit the most from this infrastructure project is Mexican!

Cemex has significantly more cement plants and ready-mix concrete plants than any other company within a 200-mile zone either side of the border. Looking at integrated cement plants alone, it has six plants in the regions near to the proposed wall from the east and west coasts. Its nearest competitors, CalPortland with four plants and Grupo Cementos de Chihuahua with three plants, are more regionally based in the western US and Chihuahua state in Mexico. Clearly Cemex didn’t rate the chances of Donald Trump’s wall actually happening when it agreed to sell its Odessa cement plant to Grupo Cementos de Chihuahua in May 2016.

All of this goes to show that, wherever you stand on the Donald Trump presidency bid, if you manufacture cement near the US-Mexican border you might be working overtime if he (a) actually becomes president, (b) actually manages to start building his wall and (c) actually decides to make it using cement. Yet before anybody starts popping champagne corks consider this: there might also be unintended consequences for the cement sector. Restricting current legal and illegal migration trends from Mexico to the US might have a greater negative effect on the US cement industry, and the overall economy, than ordering one large infrastructure project. Working that one out is harder than a guesstimate of how much cement a border wall might consume. Probably best not to ask at this stage who might actually pay for the Great Wall of Donald Trump.

Cemex took a major step towards cutting its debts last week when it announced the sale of selected assets in the US for US$400m. Two cement plants in Odessa, Texas and Lyons, Colorado were included in the deal along with three cement terminals and businesses in El Paso, Texas and Las Cruces, New Mexico. Grupo Cementos de Chihuahua (GCC) was announced as the buyer.

Together the two plants being sold hold a cement production capacity of 1.5Mt/yr giving a rough cost of US$267/t for the assets. This compares to the cost of US$170/t that the European Cement Association (CEMBUREAU) estimates is required to build new capacity. Back in August 2015 when Taiheiyo Cement’s Californian subsidiary CalPortland purchased Martin Marietta Materials’ two cement plants in the state it paid US$181/t. Summit Materials paid far more at US$375/t in July 2015 when it purchased Lafarge’s cement plant in Davenport, Iowa, although that deal included seven cement terminals and a swap of a terminal. Other sales in 2014 to Martin Marietta Materials and Cementos Argos also hit values of around US$450/t involving lots of other assets including cement grinding plants and ready mix concrete plants.

Back on Cemex, the current sale to GCC maintains its position as the third largest cement producer in the US after the HeidelbergCement acquisition of Italcementi completes in July 2016 subject to Federal Trade Commission approval. However, it holds it with a reduced presence. Its cement production capacity will fall to 13Mt/yr from 14.5Mt/yr. It loses cement production presence in Colorado although it may retain distribution if it holds on to its terminal in Florence. In Texas it retains the Balcones cement plant near San Antonio and up to nine cement terminals depending on which ones it sells to GCC.

Selling assets in the US must be a tough decision for Cemex given that a quarter of its net sales came from the country in 2015. This was its single biggest territory for sales. This share has increased in the first quarter of 2016 as the US market for construction materials has continued to pick up.

Withdrawing from western Texas with its reliance on the oil industry makes sense. The plant it has retained in that state, the Balcones plant, is within the so-called Texas Triangle and so can hopefully continue to benefit from Texas’ demographic trends for continued housing starts and suchlike. Colorado is one of the middling US states in terms of population and likely to be a lower priority than other locations. The sales will see Cemex retrench its cement production base in southern and eastern parts of the country with the exception of the Victorville plant in California.

We’ve been watching Cemex keenly as other multinational cement producers have merged and laid out plans to merge in recent years. Saddled by debts, Cemex has appeared unable to either buy more assets itself and has remained distant from any talk of merger activity itself. The sales announcements in the US reinforce the image of a company taking action to relieve itself of its debts in 2016 following sales in Thailand, Bangladesh and the Philippines, and amended credit agreements and more borrowing. However, sales of cement plants in west Texas and Colorado outside of the strong markets in the US don’t quite suggest a company that has really committed yet to reducing its debt burden. Cemex continues to walk a tightrope between keeping the creditors at bay and riding the recovery in the US construction market.

This article was updated on 14 June 2016 with amended production capacity data for the Odessa cement plant

In April 2016 the shareholders of BP voted against a pay package of US$20m for the company's chief executive officer (CEO) Bob Dudley. The vote was non-binding to BP but it clearly sent a message to the management. Subsequently, the chairman Carl-Henric Svanberg acknowledged the mood amongst the company's investors and stated in his speech at the annual general meeting that, "We hear you. We will sit down with our largest shareholders to make sure we understand their concerns and return to seek your support for a renewed policy."

The link to the cement industry here is that many of the world's major cement producers are public companies. Similar to BP they internally set CEO and leading executive pay and remuneration packages. Just like BP, cement companies too could run into similar complaints from their shareholders, for example, should the construction and cement markets have similar jolts that the oil industry has faced since mid-2014.

To be clear: this article is not attempting to pass judgement on how much these CEOs are being compensated. It is merely seeing how compensation compares amongst a selection of leading cement companies. LafargeHolcim's revenue in 2015 was greater than the gross domestic product of over 90 countries. Running companies of this size is a demanding job. What is interesting here is how it compares and what happens when it is perceived to have grown too high, as in the case of BP.

It should also be noted that this is an extremely rough comparison of the way CEO pay and wage bills for large companies are presented. For example, the CEO total salary includes incentives, shares and pension payments. The staff wage bills includes pension payments, social charges and suchlike.

Graph 1: Comparison of CEO total remuneration from selected cement companies in 2015. Source: Company annual reports. 

There isn't a great deal to comment here except that compared to the average wage these are high from a rank-and-file worker perspective! The total salary for Eric Olsen, the CEO of LafargeHolcim, is lower than HeidelbergCement and Italcementi, which seems odd given that LafargeHolcim is the bigger company. However, Olsen has only been in-post since mid-2015. By contrast, Bernd Scheifele became the chairman of the managing board of HeidelbergCement in 2005. Carlo Pesenti, CEO of Italcementi and part of the controlling family, took over in 2004. Albert Manifold, CEO of CRH, also sticks out with a relatively (!) low salary given the high revenue of the company.

Graph 2: Comparison of CEO remuneration to average staff cost and total company revenue in 2015. Source: Company annual reports. 

This starts to become more interesting. HeidelbergCement's higher CEO/staff and CEO/revenue ratios might be explained by Scheifele's longer tenure. Yet Italcementi definitely sticks out with a much higher CEO wage compared to both the average staff wage and the company's revenue. Again, CRH stands out with a much lower CEO/staff ratio. Dangote's CEO/staff ratio is low but its CEO/revenue ratio is in line with the other companies' figures.

Consider the figures for China Resources and this suggests that CEO/revenue ratio may be more important than the CEO/staff ratio. The implication being that the market will only tolerate a ratio of up to about 0.05%. Any higher and the CEO's family has to own the company. Which, of course, is the case with Carlo Pesenti and Italcementi. Until HeidelbergCement takes over later in 2016 that is.

That’s as far as this rough little study of CEO remuneration at cement companies will go. So, next time anybody reading this article from a cement company asks for a pay rise, consider how much your CEO is receiving.

LafargeHolcim was the last of the major non-Chinese cement producers to report its annual financial results when it did so on 17 March 2016. With the full set in, as it were, Global Cement will compare the progress of the world’s largest multinational cement companies in 2015.

The first thing to note is that whilst cement production growth rates have hardly been inspiring in 2015, growth or holding the status quo is occurring. The emerging markets have faced challenges in 2015 following the prolonged depression in the construction sector in Europe since 2008. As Wolfgang Reitzle and Eric Olsen put it in the forward of the 2015 LafargeHolcim annual report, “…our share price has been significantly affected, mainly by the volatility associated with emerging markets.”

Figure 1: Cement & clinker sales volumes from five major cement producers, 2011 – 2015. Source: Annual reports. Note: Sales volumes are calculated for LafargeHolcim for 2011 – 2013.

Figure 1 shows cement and clinker sales volumes for the major cement producers from 2011 to 2015. This graph isn’t quite as depressing as it looks because it shows a drop in cement production for the major producers and it has started to show remedial action being taken. Where growth isn’t happening in a market, pressure builds to find it through mergers and acquisitions.

So, Lafarge and Holcim merged and the decision may be now starting to show promise with its sales volumes remaining static year-on-year in 2015 rather than falling. It should be noted here that the drop from 2013 to 2014 is due to the divestments Lafarge and Holcim both made before the merger to satisfy competition bodies and because the sales volumes were calculated here from the separate Lafarge and Holcim annual reports.

Even more so, HeidelbergCement’s plan to buy Italcementi may be a good idea here. Already it has been growing its cement production each year since 2013. The acquisition could potentially speed up the growth considerably. Elsewhere, both Cemex and Buzzi Unicem are showing signs of picking up cement production since 2013.

Figure 2: Earnings before interest and taxation (EBIT) for five major cement producers, 2011 – 2015. Source: Annual reports. Note: Cemex and LafargeHolcim figures have been converted from US Dollars and Swiss Francs respectively at current exchange rates.

Figure 2 shows one indicator of profitability for the major cement producers by comparing their earnings before interest and taxation (EBIT). This is less useful than cement sales volumes because it covers the producers’ entire businesses including aggregate and concrete sectors. However, it does show the problems Italcementi has faced and it offers one reason why the company might have allowed itself to be taken over. Note also how Cemex has continued to increase its EBIT despite its high levels of debts.

Returning to the LafargeHolcim comments about volatile emerging markets, most of the producers reported tough trading in their Asian territories in 2015. The exceptions were Cemex with its reliance on the Philippines booming market and Buzzi with its limited assets in the region. However, Cemex suffered in its own major emerging market in South and Central America. Despite these setbacks though all of the producers featured here benefitted from growing sales volumes in North America, particularly in the US.

Both LafargeHolcim and Cemex announced divestments promptly following their results announcements suggesting that they feel they need to do more to regain the profitability they once had. LafargeHolcim plans to sell assets in South Korea and Saudi Arabia. Cemex has agreed to sell cement plants in Bangladesh and Thailand and a minority stake in its business in the Philippines. This last decision may suggest how serious Cemex is about tackling its debts considering the strong market in that country at present. HeidelbergCement is due to complete its acquisition of Italcementi in the second half of 2016.

Finally, the major changes to the multinational cement producers will continue in 2016 as CRH asserts itself following its major acquisitions from Lafarge and Holcim in 2015. Already its Europe Heavyside Divison reported sales revenue of Euro3.61bn in 2015 surpassing that of Buzzi Unicem. Other international producers such as Eurocement, InterCement and Votorantim were also poised for continuing growing but poor domestic markets (Russia and Brazil) may cripple their ambitions in the short term.

Cemex has taken action towards its debts over the course of the last week. First, it announced that it had amended its credit agreements in order to delay the looming effects of consolidated financial leverage and coverage ratio limits by one year to March 2017 with other similar deadlines also delayed. Then it announced the pricing of US$1bn of Senior Secured Notes due in 2026, a form of secured borrowing. This was followed by confirmation of asset sales in Bangladesh and Thailand. Finally, it announced that it was seeking regulatory permission to sell a minority stake in its subsidiary in the Philippines.

This column has discussed the on-going financial travails at Cemex a few times, notably recently when the group released its fourth quarter results for 2015 and in the wake of HeidelbergCement’s announcement to buy Italcementi. Basically, it all comes down to debt, as the following graph shows.

Figure 1 - Cemex assets, debt and equity, 2006 - 2015

Cemex took on large amounts of debt following its acquisition of Rinker in 2007. Since then the value of its assets have been falling faster than it has been able to reduce its debts. However, its equity (assets minus debts) is looking like it might dip below its debts in 2016. Hence, action needs to be taken. Cemex appears to have attempted to do this over the last week. Will it be enough?

The credit amendment was probably the most pressing issue for the Cemex management given that the terms have been reliant on maintaining a leverage ratio (debt divided by assets) below a set limit. Cemex has extended the terms of the borrowing in its favour so it can keep the leverage ratio higher for longer without penalty from its creditors. Note that the leverage ratio here means the ratio between debt and operating earnings before interest, taxation, depreciation and amortisation (EBIDTA).

Selling assets and shares in Asia is the next step in cutting debt in the window the group has negotiated for itself. It holds minor cement production assets in Thailand and Bangladesh that it is selling to Siam City Cement for US$53m. These include a 0.8Mt/yr integrated cement plant in Saraburi, Thailand and a 0.52Mt/yr cement grinding plant in Madangonj, Bangladesh. Unfortunately for Cemex it purchased the Saraburi plant for US$77m in 2001 from Saraburi Cement making it a loss of at least US$24m.

A minority sale of shares in its Philippines assets is more promising. The group runs two integrated cement plants in the country, the Solid Cement Plant in Rizal and the APO Cement Plant in Cebu with a combined cement production capacity of 6.23Mt/yr and a new 1.5Mt/yr production line on the way at Solid Cement also. Local media estimate that the sale could earn Cemex as much as US$850m from the booming market. The Cement Manufacturer's Association of the Philippines reported that cement sales volumes grew by 14.3% to 24.4Mt in 2015 with more growth predicted for 2016.

The credit amendment and asset sales of US$0.9bn may give Cemex the breathing room it requires to keep the creditors at bay for a while longer. It originally refinanced its debts in 2009 at the height of the financial crisis to keep the business running until the markets picked up again. They haven’t. A question that might be legitimately asked at Cemex’s analyst day later this week, on 17 March 2016, is this: when is Cemex going to seriously tackle its debts? As the situation continues the group may end up devoting more time to managing its debts than it will to actually making cement and other building products.

Cemex trumpeted last week that it had returned to positive net income for the first time in six years in its fourth quarter results for 2015. In effect the multinational building materials company was saying it is putting its house in order following taking on too much debt in the late 2000s. Similar reassuring noises have repeatedly been made as it has cut its debts down since that time.

The figure Cemex was shouting about this time was its controlling interest net income or the net income attributable to the controlling shareholder. It has risen to a gain of US$75m after being negative, or in loss, since 2010. In that year the sting from the financial crash in 2008 caused havoc and net sales for the company hit a low of US$14bn, having been at over US$20bn in the boom times of 2007 and 2008.

Meanwhile, the company has been steadily whittling away at its total debt reducing it down to just US$15.3bn in 2015. This is a massive figure given that its total equity was US$9.5bn in 2015.

By comparison, Lafarge was reporting a net debt of Euro9.3bn in 2014 compared to a total equity of Euro17.3bn. Its debt-to-equity ratio was far smaller than Cemex’s despite being perceived as the weaker partner financially going into the merger with Holcim in 2015. Unsurprisingly, it was news in August 2015 when Cemex refinanced a bank loan agreement for a US$15bn debt that was previously renegotiated in 2009. Everyone is watching Cemex’s debts keenly.

Against this financial backdrop Cemex’s cement business has been steadily producing fairly static levels of cement since 2009. It 2015 it has reported that it produced 66Mt. However, net sales fell in 2015 by 8% year-on-year to US$14bn, a disappointing result following sales growth since 2012. Fernando A Gonzalez, Cemex’s Chief Executive Officer, blamed it on a ‘challenging’ macroeconomic environment.

Notably overall net sales have been down in Mexico, Northern Europe and Central and South America in 2015. Although Cemex hasn’t released cement sales volumes, volumes fell by 3% in Northern Europe, 2% in its Mediterranean region and 4% in Central and South America in 2015. Thankfully, growth continued to pick up the US, bolstered by housing and infrastructure spending. The Philippines has remained a powerhouse in cement consumption in Asia.

Reviewing Cemex’s expansion projects in 2015 suggest muted capital expenditure with a focus on upgrades and side projects rather than clinker production growth. Such announcements included projects in Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Colombia and Mexico. The exception was in the Philippines where a full-on US$300m project including a new 1.5Mt/yr plant was announced in May 2015. Given the surging cement volume sales in the country this is likely a safe investment.

As discussed previously in this column and elsewhere Cemex has suffered from high debts at exactly the time its major international rivals have started to merge. At the same time its Chinese rivals in terms of production capacity have undergone similar capacity consolidation as part of state mandated capacity reduction initiatives. This has left Cemex between the mega-cement producers like LafargeHoclim and HeidelbergCement and the up-and-comers such as Eurocement or Votorantim.

Now, its reliance on markets in the Americas it hitting a roadblock from reducing growth south of the US as global commodity prices tumble and economies suffer. It couldn’t have happened at a worse time for the company. Bar the odd bright spot such as the US and the Philippines it seems that all Cemex can do is wait it out.

San Miguel Corporation has upped the pace of its capacity expansion this week to a US$1bn investment towards five new 2Mt/yr cement plants in the Philippines. The announcement builds on its previous plans to build two plants for US$800m. At that time construction had already begun at subsidiary Northern Cement's plant in Pangasinan and Quezon. Plants in Bulacan, Cebu and Davao have now joined the list for completion in 2017.

The scale of this expansion is vast considering that the Philippines has 17 active cement plants with a total integrated production capacity of 24.6Mt/yr. San Miguel president and COO Ramon Ang's comments to media that if there were an oversupply of cement the market would correct itself in a couple of years may sound flippant to anyone who isn't the head of a multi-billion dollar corporation. However, if achieved it will propel the San Miguel subsidiaries from the country's fourth largest cement producer to its largest.

However each of the other major producers also have their own expansion plan in various stages of completion. Holcim Philippines announced US$40m plans in May 2015 to expand its production capacity to 10Mt/yr by the end of 2016, mainly through reviving existing projects. Cemex announced plans in May 2015 to spend US$300m towards building a new 1.5Mt/yr integrated line at its Solid Plant. Lafarge Republic had plans in April 2015 to raise its cement output through the opening of grinding plants at its Rizal and Bulacan cement plants. The former was opened in April 2015 but this is the one plant that hasn't been acquired by CRH following the sale of Lafarge Republic in the run-up to the LafargeHolcim merger. The latter was last reported due for opening in December 2015.

The big change in the Philippine cement industry in 2015 has been the merger of Lafarge and Holcim to form LafargeHolcim. Given that Lafarge Republic and Holcim Philippines held over 55% of the country's production capacity before the merger, it was inevitable that they would be forced to sell off assets. In the end CRH picked up most of Lafarge Republic's cement assets bar the Teresa Plant in Rizal, which stayed with Holcim. The merger has skewed the market towards one clear leader, LafargeHolcim (9.5Mt/yr), followed by Cemex (4.73Mt/yr) and CRH (4.19Mt/yr) with similarly sized cement production bases. These producers are then chased by San Miguel (2.15Mt/yr) and the other smaller firms. If San Miguel succeeds in its expansion strategy then the market will change once again.

Cement sales rose by 11.1% to 11.9Mt in the first half of 2015 according to the Cement Manufacturers Association of the Philippines (CeMAP). They attributed this growth to strong construction activity helped by increases in government infrastructure spending. Alongside this, gross domestic product (GDP) is predicted to rise by 6% in 2015 and 6.3% in 2016 by the Asian Development Bank. Another promising sign for development came from a study by Antoinette Rosete of the University of Santo Tomas which forecast that cement demand would meet 27Mt/yr. Capacity utilisation rates rose to 85% from 68% in 2014 according to Department of Trade and Industry data.

With this kind of encouragement, no wonder San Miguel is betting on such a large expansion project. If Rosete's forecast and capacity utilisation rates hold then the Philippines might need a capacity base of around 36Mt/yr. San Miguel's growth will fill that gap.

Of course other players might have their own ideas about giving away market share. LafargeHolcim and Cemex are likely to be saddled with debt or existing projects. CRH meanwhile is the wildcard as its expansion strategy is opaque. In recent years it has seemed to focus on acquisitions over building its own projects. The Euro5.2bn the company has spent on buying Lafarge and Holcim assets this year seems likely to slow down investment on any internal development plans. However CRH is bringing in local partner Aboitiz in the Philipines to help with a US$400m loan.

The Philippines is clearly an exciting market for the cement industry at the moment. One consequence of the current situation is that it may signal what CRH's global intentions are following the LafargeHolcim merger. If it decides or is able to start building new capacity then it may reveal the start of a new phase for the Ireland-based multinational.