In April 2016 the shareholders of BP voted against a pay package of US$20m for the company's chief executive officer (CEO) Bob Dudley. The vote was non-binding to BP but it clearly sent a message to the management. Subsequently, the chairman Carl-Henric Svanberg acknowledged the mood amongst the company's investors and stated in his speech at the annual general meeting that, "We hear you. We will sit down with our largest shareholders to make sure we understand their concerns and return to seek your support for a renewed policy."

The link to the cement industry here is that many of the world's major cement producers are public companies. Similar to BP they internally set CEO and leading executive pay and remuneration packages. Just like BP, cement companies too could run into similar complaints from their shareholders, for example, should the construction and cement markets have similar jolts that the oil industry has faced since mid-2014.

To be clear: this article is not attempting to pass judgement on how much these CEOs are being compensated. It is merely seeing how compensation compares amongst a selection of leading cement companies. LafargeHolcim's revenue in 2015 was greater than the gross domestic product of over 90 countries. Running companies of this size is a demanding job. What is interesting here is how it compares and what happens when it is perceived to have grown too high, as in the case of BP.

It should also be noted that this is an extremely rough comparison of the way CEO pay and wage bills for large companies are presented. For example, the CEO total salary includes incentives, shares and pension payments. The staff wage bills includes pension payments, social charges and suchlike.

Graph 1: Comparison of CEO total remuneration from selected cement companies in 2015. Source: Company annual reports. 

There isn't a great deal to comment here except that compared to the average wage these are high from a rank-and-file worker perspective! The total salary for Eric Olsen, the CEO of LafargeHolcim, is lower than HeidelbergCement and Italcementi, which seems odd given that LafargeHolcim is the bigger company. However, Olsen has only been in-post since mid-2015. By contrast, Bernd Scheifele became the chairman of the managing board of HeidelbergCement in 2005. Carlo Pesenti, CEO of Italcementi and part of the controlling family, took over in 2004. Albert Manifold, CEO of CRH, also sticks out with a relatively (!) low salary given the high revenue of the company.

Graph 2: Comparison of CEO remuneration to average staff cost and total company revenue in 2015. Source: Company annual reports. 

This starts to become more interesting. HeidelbergCement's higher CEO/staff and CEO/revenue ratios might be explained by Scheifele's longer tenure. Yet Italcementi definitely sticks out with a much higher CEO wage compared to both the average staff wage and the company's revenue. Again, CRH stands out with a much lower CEO/staff ratio. Dangote's CEO/staff ratio is low but its CEO/revenue ratio is in line with the other companies' figures.

Consider the figures for China Resources and this suggests that CEO/revenue ratio may be more important than the CEO/staff ratio. The implication being that the market will only tolerate a ratio of up to about 0.05%. Any higher and the CEO's family has to own the company. Which, of course, is the case with Carlo Pesenti and Italcementi. Until HeidelbergCement takes over later in 2016 that is.

That’s as far as this rough little study of CEO remuneration at cement companies will go. So, next time anybody reading this article from a cement company asks for a pay rise, consider how much your CEO is receiving.

Dalmia Cement (Bharat) threw a spanner in the works of the sale of Lafarge India this week. The cement producer, part of Dalmia Group, appealed against the Competition Commission of India’s (CCI) revised approval of the sale in February 2016. Dalmia challenged the CCI’s approval on procedural grounds querying both the revised and original order for the sale. Subsequently the sale has been delayed until a hearing in May 2016.

Dalmia’s objections concern how the CCI’s original approval in March 2015 interacts with the revised approval given in February 2016. Lafarge India was originally asked by the CCI in February 2015 to sell off 5.2Mt/yr of cement production capacity in Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand in eastern India. The request was a condition to allow the merger of Lafarge and Holcim in the country. Lafarge lined up Birla Corporation to buy the two cement plants but an ambiguous amendment to the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) (MMDR) Act killed the deal. Then Lafarge India, a subsidiary of LafargeHolcim, announced that is was selling all of its assets in India. This includes three cement plants and two grinding stations with a total capacity of around 11Mt/yr.

Dalmia’s appeal may be planned to slow down the sale of a rival in the Indian cement business. Dalmia Group is the fifth largest cement producer in India with a capacity of 14.5Mt/yr. Lafarge India is, to an extent, a lame duck rival whilst the legal wranglings drag on.

However, the appeal may have a more serious side. A statement from the lawyers representing Dalmia also mentioned a challenge against the purchase requirements from the original CCI approval in March 2015. Specifically that any purchaser, “shall not have (directly or indirectly) operational capacity exceeding 5% of the total installed capacity in the relevant geographic market.” The confusion here is where that ‘relevant’ area refers to.

Originally the CCI designated this as Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Jharkhand, Bihar and West Bengal. And unsurprisingly, Dalmia holds more than 5% of production capacity in that region. If the CCI expands the relevant geographic area to more regions of the country then Dalmia’s market share is likely to fall. Local media reported that a bid for the Lafarge India assets by private equity firm KKR, which holds equity in a Dalmia subsidiary, was denied by the CCI. Cue the legal challenge.

It seems unlikely that the appeal by Dalmia will slow the sale down too much. If it is accepted then the CCI will have to reissue its approval for a second time and the sale will be delayed by a few months. If it is denied then the sale will proceed after a delay of one month. Either way the affair demonstrates how prized the Lafarge India assets have become. Indian local media reported that at least nine bids were made. It will be fascinating to see the price the winning bid makes when it is released.

A few news stories in recent weeks have emerged concerning falling cement sales in Central Asian countries. Steppe Cement reported in mid-April 2016 that its cement sales had fallen by 12% year-on-year to US$5.98m in the first quarter of 2016 from US$6.79m in the same period in 2015. The cement producer noted an overall drop of 16% in the cement market in Kazakhstan, with a slowing reduction in March 2016 compared to the preceding four months. It forecast that the domestic cement market would contract by 1.1Mt in 2016 to 8.5Mt. The country has a cement production capacity of 11.85Mt/yr according to Global Cement Directory 2016 data. So on average this would see a drop in the capacity utilisation rate to 72% from 81%.

Likewise, Italcementi reported a fall in cement consumption in the fourth quarter of 2015 although overall in 2015 it reported consumption up by 9%. It is currently upgrading its Shymkent cement plant to a dry kiln with testing planned for early 2016. Meanwhile, HeidelbergCement – the other multinational present in the country, reported cement sales growth of over 9% due in part to the ramp-up of its new CaspiCement cement plant. How this will turn out after HeidelbergCement takes control of Italcementi remains to be seen.

Then, Holcim Azerbaijan reported that its sales had fallen by 37% to US$56m in 2015. It blamed the resultant loss it made on not being able to cut its production costs fast enough to match the falling revenue. The parent company LafargeHolcim blamed it on a ‘significant’ decline in public and private construction. Elsewhere, the World Bank reported a 13% drop in the construction sector in the second half of 2015 as the government cut investment.

Tajikistan may have broken this pattern as it reported that its cement production volumes rose by 33% to 373,000t in the first quarter of 2016. Over half of this output came from the 1Mt/yr Huaksin Ghayyur Cement plant that was commissioned in March 2016. The same news source reported government estimates that local demand will be 3.5Mt/yr in 2016. Similarly, Turkmenistan reported growing cement production in 2015 due to the opening of the 1.4Mt/yr Polimeks cement plant in Lebap. Otherwise there has been little reported recently from the cement industries in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan although the World Bank has reported that their economies are in reasonable shape.

The multinational cement producers all noted the economic problems caused by low oil prices in the Central Asian countries in which they operate. In February 2016 this was reinforced by the International Monetary Fund after its latest visit to Azerbaijan. The World Bank also expects little growth in gross domestic product (GDP) in the region in 2016. Low oil prices have followed economic problems in Russia that have also impacted upon the region due to its economic ties with that country and membership of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

This is bad news for the local markets but it is especially bad news for the Chinese cement industry. As China has faced production overcapacity and falling prices at home, its suppliers and producers have sped off down the Silk Road to seek expansion prospects elsewhere. With this route blocked, the Chinese industry faces one fewer opportunity to avoid the crunch at home.

For more information of the cement industries in Central Asia read Global Cement's feature on the region from January 2016

HeidelbergCement released more detail on its plans to buy Italcementi last week. The main points were that Italcementi’s operations in Belgium will be sold, the Italcementi brand will be retained, its research and development (R&D) centre will assume responsibilities for the entire group and up to 260 job losses are expected in Bergamo. The integration plan is expected to be complete by 2020.

Following an update in HeidelbergCement’s preliminary financial results for 2015 in February 2016, this was more focused on the practicalities of taking over a company. Sales of assets in Belgium were expected from the moment the deal was announced in July 2015. Between them the two companies operate three of the country’s four cement plants, holding 73% of the market by cement production capacity. Selling up Italcementi’s Belgian subsidiary Compagnie des Ciments Belges will maintain the existing market balance. Once this is done, from a cement sector perspective, interaction from the European Commission on the deal should merely be a formality.

Interestingly, no plans to sell assets in the US were announced. This is more ambitious on HeidelbergCement’s part because the acquisition has far bigger implications in that country. Merging Italcementi’s Essroc subsidiary and HeidelbergCement’s Lehigh Hanson subsidiary will see HeidelbergCement become the new second largest cement producer in the US with around 16.4Mt/yr. LafargeHolcim had a relatively easy ride from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) having to sell two integrated cement plants, two slag grinding plants and a series of terminals. As HeidelbergCement will become the second largest cement producer it seems unlikely that the FTC will be too demanding. However, post-acquisition the cement producer will own cement plants within 75 miles of each other in Pennsylvania and in Maryland and West Virginia. The FTC may take exception to this but perhaps HeidelbergCement is trying their luck to see if it can get away with it.

The decision to retain Italcementi’s i.Lab R&D centre in Bergamo, Italy raises questions about what will happen to the Heidelberg Technology Centre (HTC) in Leimen, Germany. The focus here is on making Bergamo the ‘product’ R&D division for the entire group. i.Lab was opened in early 2012 to fanfare, based in a building designed by architect Richard Meier and it cost Euro40m to build. How this fits with HeidelbergCement’s existing Global R&D team at the HTC remains to be seen.

Job losses of up to 260 personnel at Bergamo are regrettable but hardly unexpected. It may not be much comfort for any staff members facing redundancy but this figure is well below the figures bandied about in the media in late 2015 of first around 1000 and then nearer 500. Another 170 personnel will also be offered relocation packages taking the impact of the reorganisation up to about 400 of Italcementi’s 2500 workforce in Italy.

Looking at the wider situation with the acquisition this week, HeidelbergCement announced a record contract for Norcem, its Norwegian subsidiary, to supply 280,000t of cement over three years for an infrastructure project. Then, Carlo Pesenti, the chief executive officer of Italcementi, was reported making comments about the business’ expansion plans in Thailand and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Projects in Myanmar and Cambodia look likely once the acquisition is complete. Finally, the ratings agency Moody’s was drumming up attention for a market report by pointing out the implications for the multinational cement producers in India if a proposed rise in infrastructure spending gets approved. In summary HeidelbergCement and Italcementi are unlikely to benefit due to their southern Indian spread of assets and local production overcapacity.

HeidelbergCement may not be getting it all its own way but the acquisition of Italcementi remains on track so far. All eyes will be on how the US FTC responds to the deal.