It won't surprise anyone to know that cement sales have fallen in the west African countries that are suffering from the on-going Ebola outbreak. However the scale may yet be instructive for this and other crises that may affect the cement industry in the future. The local data that follows mostly comes from a report by the World Bank published in early October 2014 looking at short and medium term economic impacts, as well as Global Cement research conducted towards the Global Cement Directory 2015.

All three of the principal countries involved – Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea – have low gross domestic products (GDP). They do not have cement kilns but they do have grinding plants and cement import infrastructure run by both local and international firms. They also lack readily accessible limestone deposits. In the short term (in 2014) a health crisis is expected to hit manufacturing through transportation and market disruptions stemming from both direct health implications and behavioural responses.

Liberia's cement sales fell by 60% in the third quarter of 2014, a drop the World Bank attributed to causes other than the rainy season. Quarterly cement sales more than tripled in 2013 from around 10,000t to over 25,000t marking the commissioning of a new mill at the Liberia Cement Corporation (HeidelbergCement) grinding plant. Dangote also has an import terminal in the country and is building its own grinding plant. The drop in cement sales since June 2014 has nearly undone all this production growth.

Neighbouring Sierra Leone has seen a steady fall in weekly cement sales since June 2014. Similar to Liberia, it has a HeidelbergCement-run grinding plant with Dangote planning expansion soon. Guinea, which had about a sixth of the notified cases of Ebola in mid-October 2014, has seen its cement imports fall by 50% in the year so far compared to 2013.

Before readers become too depressed though, it should be considered that Nigeria has been declared Ebola free by the World Health Organisation after six weeks with no new cases. It may have been relatively expensive to contain Ebola through public health measures but the alternatives for the regional economies could have been worse. More cases are expected to arrive in Nigeria but the country has shown that Ebola can be stopped.

Immediate cement operators threatened by the epidemic include HeidelbergCement with its five grinding plants in west Africa. How an uncontrolled or high case Ebola epidemic affects Dangote's expansion plans in its 'backyard' will also be hard to predict. West Africa is the obvious place for the Nigerian cement giant to build itself up before it tackles other markets in sub-Saharan Africa that have stronger competition like South Africa's PPC. Take this market stability away and Dangote faces a direct economic threat to its growth beyond the humanitarian horror of the epidemic. What also has implications for the cement industry in Senegal, the second biggest cement producer in the region, where there are two integrated plants.

The World Bank report concludes that Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea could lose US$129m in GDP in a low case scenario or up to US$815m in a high case scenario. To give this some context, Sierra Leone's GDP was US$2.7bn in 2013. In a high case situation it could lose US$439m or an amount equivalent to 16% of its GDP in 2013. If and when the fight against Ebola turns, this still leaves a severe economic recession for the survivors in what is already one of the poorest countries in Africa. Cement, one of the indicators of a country's economic and industrial development, is intricately bound up in this.

It's been an expensive few weeks for Holcim. First, the Venuezuelan state-run outfit Corporación Socialista Del Cemento failed to pay its last instalment of US$97.5m in compensation for its forced nationalisation in 2008. Then the European Court of Justice dismissed Holcim's lawsuit against the European Commission over the theft of 1.6 million emissions allowances in 2010. Here we concentrate on the second story.

Holcim Romania's CO2 accounts held within the Romanian National Registry for Greenhouse Gases were illegally accessed by hackers in November 2010. 1,000,000 CO2 allowances were transferred to an account in Liechtenstein. Another 600,000 CO2 allowances were transferred to a company in Italy, which had account registries in Italy and the UK. Parts were then transferred to accounts in the Czech Republic, the UK and France before being sold on to emissions exchanges in Paris and Amsterdam.

Holcim then tried to sue the Commission, which administers the bloc's electronic emissions trading network, in 2012 for failing to freeze the accounts containing the stolen units, for not returning them and for allowing other companies to turn them in for compliance under the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS). The multinational building materials producer tried to force the commission to pay it Euro17.6m for damages associated with the theft. The amount was equivalent to the 905,000 allowances that remain unaccounted for at a spot price of Euro14.6/unit and an interest rate of 8%.

Other registries were also targeted in early 2011. As much as Euro30m in carbon allowances were stolen at the time, leading to exchanges having to stop trading temporarily.

Although this is a relatively small amount for a multinational company that reported net sales of over Euro16bn in 2013, it feels harsh. If a personal investor had assets stolen from a bank or investment scheme they would expect some sort of compensation.

It should be noted though that it is unclear how the hackers gained entry to Holcim's account details. Successful 'phishing' for account logins via fake emails and the like might suggest lax security on Holcim's side. Or a more conventional hack on the registry server might suggest loose security on the registry's side. Add to this the fact that the price of carbon allowances has fallen since 2010. Reuters estimated that the outstanding allowances would be worth Euro5.1m today.

Hopefully the thefts in late 2010 and early 2011 can be marked down as teething problems. Yet the European Union Emission Trading Scheme is compulsory for 11,000 power stations and manufacturing plants. Any European company that may be less keen on the scheme is unlikely to have its fears settled by high profile cases of carbon credit thefts or the current low price of trading.

Meanwhile, companies and investors involved with China's Guangdong Province carbon emission trading scheme, the world's second biggest such scheme after Europe, may well be watching what happens in Europe closely.

Angola made similar noises to Nigeria this week when one of its government ministers declared that the country was self-sufficient in terms of cement production. The comments came from Industry minister Bernarda Martins at a visit by the Angolan president to the China International Fund Luanda Cement plant. Martins' words echoed those made by Joseph Makoju, Chairman of the Cement Manufacturing Association of Nigeria, who declared that his country was making more cement than it consumed back in 2012.

Claims of self-sufficiency are all about context. A major or fast growing economy such as Nigeria declaring self-sufficiency in cement could suggest a potential paradigm shift. A smaller economy might simply have risen from a low production base to a slightly higher one with little consequence. So what does this mean for Angola?

The southern African country has a population far smaller than Nigeria at 19 million. Yet, its gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, in purchasing power parity terms, was estimated to be US$6484 in 2014 by the International Monetary Fund, a figure slightly higher than Nigeria's. In nominal terms its GDP was the fifth biggest in Africa in 2013.

Global Cement Directory 2015 research (to be published in late 2014) gives Angola's four integrated cement plants with a total cement production capacity of just under 6Mt/yr. The plant the politicians have just visited has reportedly just increased its clinker capacity to 3.6Mt/yr and another 0.6Mt/yr capacity is planned to join the market when an InterCement plant expands in 2017. Together this places the country's production at around 8Mt/yr. Domestic cement demand was placed at 6.5Mt/yr in early 2014 giving the country a cement consumption of just under 350kg/capita.

Transnational African bank Ecobank declared than Angola was becoming Central Africa's cement production hub in a commodities report in July 2014. Out of the sub-Saharan countries it has become the fourth largest producer after Nigeria, South Africa and Ethiopia and the third largest consumer after Nigeria and South Africa. Angola too has restricted cement imports, like Nigeria. In 2014 the Ministry of the Economy, Industry, Commerce and Construction implemented a stoppage on imports in a phased manner under the auspices of its local cement association, the Association of Industrial Cement of Angola.

Where Angola is different to Nigeria is in the composition of the companies that produce its cement. There is no large local presence to rival Nigeria's Dangote. The former colonial links are there with a plant operated by Brazil's InterCement, who inheritied it from Portuguese company Cimpor. Of the rest, Chinese and South Korean investors figure prominently.

Finally, it is also worth noting that Angola has none of the main sub-Saharan players present including Dangote, PPC or Lafarge Africa. Roughly half-way between the African cement powerhouses of Nigeria and South Africa and with a handy coastline, Angola deserves further attention.

Energy costs for cement producers in India are set for volatility following the Supreme Court's decision this week to cancel the vast majority of allocated coal blocks. After ruling that the allocation process by the Indian government was illegal and arbitrary the court stopped 214 out of 218 coal blocks. The affected operators working on the blocks have six months until 31 March 2015 to wind down production. At this point the government intends to auction off the blocks.

The background to this decision lies in the so-called coal allocation scam or 'Coalgate.' Over 80% of coal in India is produced by the state owned company Coal India. Since 1993 though the Indian government has been allocating coal blocks or leases to mine coal for captive use by industries such as cement, steel and power generation.

However, the allocation process was accused of lacking transparency compared to an open bidding process. The Comptroller and Auditor General of India estimated the loss to the government was an incredible US$30bn. The allocation process received further scrutiny as Indian coal imports rose leading to accusations of inefficiency on the Coal India side and corruption on the coal block side. Meanwhile, major power cuts such as those in the summer of 2012 focused both domestic and industrial users' minds on the state of the country's coal industry.

Following the power cuts in 2012, an inter-ministerial panel recommended the de-allocation of two coal blocks held by five companies, including Gujarat Ambuja Cement, Grasim Industries and Lafarge India.

India's coal imports started to increase rapidly around 2009 with an annual growth rate of around 5% and a demand growth of 25% from 2009 – 2014. The majority of its imported coal comes from Indonesia, Australia and South Africa. In 2012 its coal imports were over 150Mt.

With Indian cement producers facing production overcapacity and falling profit margins in recent years, any disruption to input costs such as power is bad news. The growing import rates point to an increasing supply-demand mismatch. A more open process for the allocation of India's vast coal reserves should be good news for industrial users in the medium to long term. However, in the meantime they may face a jolt.