What’s long, thin and has already exported more than 20Mt of cement in 2018? The answer is Vietnam, which reported this week that it exported 20.1Mt of cement between 1 January 2018 and 31 August 2018. That’s 106 - 112% of its annual ‘target’ in just eight months and around the same amount as it claims to have exported during the whole of 2017. Total cement production in Vietnam was 63.9Mt between January and August 2018, meaning that the country has exported 31.3% of the cement it made over this period. Vietnam itself consumed ‘just’ 43.8Mt. The government target for Vietnamese cement consumption during 2018 is around 65 - 66Mt. That’s basically the amount it has already made.

From a market-led mind-set these targets seem fairly large, huge even, especially the export target. Indeed the concept of such national targets is in itself an alien concept. In most of the world, imports and exports are results of market supply and demand trends, not drivers prescribed by the government.

The reasons behind this apparent desire to export these very large volumes of cement are, therefore, probably best understood from within Vietnam, and we won’t speculate too much on them here. However, Vietnam is clearly determined to continue to produce ever more cement than it can use. In what other country could a major government-owned producer export more than 70% of the cement it makes? In the first half of 2018 Vicem did just that, shipping 11.7Mt of cement overseas from the 14.2Mt that it made.

In 2017 Vietnam’s export target was 15Mt. It ended up smashing this to the tune of 5Mt, 33% more than the target. At the current rate the sector looks like it could overshoot even more spectacularly this year, perhaps hitting as much as 30Mt of cement exports in 2018. This is more than a big European country like Germany can produce! It certainly sounds like a lot but… is it really an exceptional number?

Looking at data from World’s Top Exports (WTEx), which we advise delving into, it seems that this would be a very high number indeed. It reports that a total of 166.6Mt of cement were exported internationally in 2017. It reports that the top exporter was not, as you may by this point have been primed to suggest, Vietnam. It wasn’t even China, as the former number one was bumped into second place (12.91Mt) by Thailand (13.03Mt). Turkey was third (12.79Mt), with Japan fourth (11.93Mt) and Vietnam was listed as fifth (9.53Mt).

All of these biggest exporters except Turkey are in the Far East, an area swamped with cheap cement. China’s average export selling price according to WTEx was US$45/t, against a global average of US$55/t. Thailand undercut it by US$3/t at US$42/t, perhaps explaining its rise to the top spot. Turkey’s average export price was also US$42/t, although it is located in a region that has a lot of saturated markets and others that are growing rapidly. Its average export distance was second only to China’s. Vietnam’s average cement export price was US$51/t, higher than the others. This does not tie in with the apparent rise in exports so far in 2018. This price may have since fallen. Surprisingly, Japan had the lowest export price of the top five exporters by volume at just US$30/t in 2017.

So, to re-answer the question posed two paragraphs above, 30Mt is a very high number indeed. But you’ll have spotted the large discrepancy between WTEx’s 9.53Mt figure for Vietnam, which relies on reciprocal import partner data, and the government’s official line of 21Mt for 2017. One is tempted to ask where the other 50% of the exports reported by the Vietnamese actually ended up, especially given that WTEx reports a US$1.5bn difference in the value of exports and imports across the year. Imports were valued at US$8.8bn but exports were valued at US$10.3bn.

The mystery destination of all that cement, real or imagined, could be the topic of an entire separate column. What appears to be the case at present, is that rampant Vietnamese cement overcapacity is here to stay. The country, as well as Japan, Turkey, Thailand et. al., could stand to benefit in the short term, as China acts ever more aggressively to end its own oversupply situation. However, there could come a time when it has to take its foot off the gas. There are no signs of that yet though.

It’s been a tough week for ARM Cement with the announcement that PricewaterhouseCoopers placed the company into administration on 18 August 2018. Given the performance of the company of late, this is not a surprise. It reported a growing net loss of US$55m in 2017 due to poor demand in Kenya and Tanzania.

First, the company made a series of personnel changes to the board of the company at the start of last week, according to Business Daily and other local press. This was led by the announcement on 13 August 2018 that Pradeep Paunrana would step down as the chief executive officer (CEO). This is significant since Paunrana’s father Harjivandas set up the company, previously known as Athi River Mining (ARM), in 1974. Paunrana was reported as owning 9% share in the company in late 2017 with his family controlling a further 14%. He will remain as a board member. Paunrana’s departure was also joined by Wilfred Murungi who stepped down as chairman following 24 years as a director of the firm and Surendra Bhatia, who will retire as deputy managing director. Although ARM Cement is yet to announce who its new CEO will be it has said that Linus Gitahi will become the new chairman and he has also been appointed as a non-executive independent director. Former Lafarge executive Thierry Metro has also been appointed as a non-executive independent director.

Then, over the weekend PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) announced in the local press that it had placed the beleaguered company into administration. Muniu Thoiti and George Weru have been appointed as the lead administrators tasked with the job of either rescuing the company or preserving the best possible value for its creditors. On 20 August 2018 the local stock exchange, the Nairobi Securities Exchange, suspended trading of ARM Cement for seven days.

ARM Cement blamed its woes in 2017 on elections in Kenya causing reduced cement demand, a coal import ban in Tanzania causing production issues at its Tanga cement plant and increased competition in both countries. Those last two reasons carried resonance this week with the news that the Petroleum Development Corporation and Dangote Industries Tanzania had signed a long-term gas deal. Dangote Cement has also had energy supply problems in the country, being forced to resort to diesel generators at its Mtwara plant. Due to this its 3Mt/yr cement plant only sold 0.2Mt of cement in the first half of 2018, a decrease of 48% year-on-year from the same period in 2017. The forced reliance on diesel also caused earning losses that negatively affected its wider Pan-African area margins.

The general consensus in the local press is that the CDC Group forced the latest changes in management. The UK government-backed investment company owns a 41% stake in ARM Cement. In June 2018 it replaced two of ARM’s board members and appointed a new executive director and a new company secretary following resignations. CDC Group injected US$140m into the firm in mid-2016 in return for a 40% stake in the business. When the Nairobi Securities Exchange suspended trading, ARM Cement shares were a tenth of the value CDC Group paid for its stake. Given that the share value of ARM has steadily fallen since 2016, the question that occurs is: why did CDC Group take so long before taking action?

Two thoughts occur at this point. One: whatever else emerges in the coming weeks and months about how ARM Cement has ended up in administration, it is unfortunate that a burgeoning multinational producer took a hit in more than one country at the same time in an area with such growth potential for construction. As has been proved, market potential and performance are not the same thing. Two: if this is any indication of how the UK government will act in the post-Brexit world generally, then investing in pound sterling assets before the end of March 2019 may be unwise.

The world’s largest cement producer China National Building Material (CNBM) released its half-year results this week and the figures were generally good. Despite falling production, the state-owned company has managed to raise its prices year-on-year to generate significant sales revenue and earnings increases. As usual the level of detail was fairly light, although not much lighter than some non-Chinese producers on the international market. The key point was that cement production fell by 5% year-on-year to 143Mt. This was due to poor demand, mounting environmental regulations and rising input costs.

The half-year report was significant because it is the first financial report from the company since its merger with China National Materials (Sinoma) completed in early May 2018. Just like the reports of LafargeHolcim and HeidelbergCement following mergers or acquisitions, CNBM has seen a boost to its performance. Further gains from scale and synergy are expected. The union has indisputably created the world’s biggest cement producer, putting aside any European or American cries of over-calculation of production capacity on the part of their Chinese rivals. However, size comes with particular problems.

Placed in a wider context CNBM and its owners, the Chinese government, are attempting to manage a wind-down from the biggest construction boom in human history. National Bureau of Statistics data show that sales of cement fell by 10% to 984Mt in the first half of 2018 from 1.1Bnt in the same period in 2017. So, falling cement production volumes are not a surprise. What is curious, though, is how cement prices have appeared to rise in a country with massive production overcapacity. Each of CNBM’s cement producing subsidiaries reported that its average selling price of cement grew year-on-year.

Graph 1: Sales of cement in China, 2014 – 2018. Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China.

Regional variation could explain some of this in a country as large as China and similar trends can be observed in India with its own diverse internal markets. The local focus on environmental regulations offers another explanation. In June 2018 the government’s State Council issued regulations to reduce the production capacity of construction materials, set up emission limits for pollution, implement peak shifting of production and to establish a ‘strict’ accountability mechanism for all of this. CNBM has followed these directives with its ‘Price – Cost – Profit’ (PCP) strategy and all of its subsidiaries have conformed to this. What is not covered in the report is whether there is a negative financial effect of peak shifting and other environmental regulations and how bad this is.

It’s easy to dismiss the performance of a state-controlled company but the enlarged CNBM is facing a unique set of challenges. It appears to be off to a great start but both its scale and its challenges are unprecedented. In its outlook for the second half of 2018 it said that the, “contradiction of overcapacity in the industry has not been changed fundamentally.” This suggests that, although cement prices and profits have held up so far, there is no guarantee that this situation will continue.

There have been quite a few new cement plant project announcements in the past week, with expansions announced in Mexico, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Indonesia, India and Uzbekistan. 11.8Mt/yr of new capacity has been announced in just a week, mostly from a whopping 9.0Mt/yr project in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia, the first in that Province. Notable in this project, as well as two of the others, is the involvement, once again, of large Chinese-based cement plant manufacturers and / or finance and associated influence from Chinese parties.

Of course, this trend is nothing new. The rise of Chinese cement plant manufacturers, particularly into Africa and other developing cement markets, has been covered in previous Global Cement Weekly columns. However, it does appear to be stepping up a notch in 2018 compared to previous years. So far this year we have reported on 21 confirmed Chinese cement plants being built in 15 countries other than China, from the planning stage to ‘up-and-running.’ A total of 37.2Mt/yr, more than the capacity of Germany, is being built across Algeria, Cambodia, Cameroon, Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, Namibia, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Zambia. That’s not including a similarly large number of news stories where the supplier is not explicitly stated. This is seen a lot in Indian projects, as well as in Vietnam, where the cement sector appears to still be expanding, despite the government’s pronouncements. In many of these cases, and elsewhere, these unidentified suppliers are likely to be Chinese.

The driver for this increase in Chinese-led cement sector investment is, of course, the severe overcapacity in China’s domestic cement sector. The government is currently undertaking its most drastic capacity reduction measures so far. The ongoing integration of Sinoma and CNBM is one example of the lengths it will go to to reduce the current inefficiencies in the sector. This week the Chinese government reiterated its strict prohibition on new greenfield cement plants. It also warned that any producer that wants to upgrade its plant with a new line must only install the same capacity as the line that will be replaced, amid concerns that some were flouting this rule. This comes as the profits of major producers have been rising. Presumably the government would like them to climb further still.

So where does this leave the more established (read ‘European’) cement plant manufacturers such as Fives, FLSmidth, KHD and thyssenkrupp Industrial Solutions, some of which are fully or partly-owned by Chinese companies? Well, with fewer full-line projects available in developing regions due to the rise of the Chinese, they have become increasingly specialised in specific areas. Those that want European equipment will increasingly specify a pyro-line from Supplier A, a mill or two from Supplier B, conveyors and storage from supplier C, and so on. Arranging this, as it turns out, is something that Chinese plant manufacturers are quite keen to do. Take, for example, FLSmidth working for Sinoma (China) alongside Atlas Copco (Sweden) and Kawasaki Heavy Industries (Japan) on a cement plant in Indonesia. Indeed, FLSmidth signed a framework with CNBM on future collaborations in July 2018. FLSmidth and CNBM already have an extensive ‘back catalogue’ of joint projects. FLSmidth has valuable expertise that Chinese firms need to complete these kinds of projects.

Of course, another European supplier, Germany’s KHD, is mostly owned by China’s AVIC. In a forthcoming interview in the September 2018 issue of Global Cement Magazine, KHD’s CEO Gerold Keune states that the Engineering, Procurement and Construction (EPC) scene is now ‘completely dominated’ by Chinese suppliers. KHD fits in by providing a wide range of equipment but, crucially, great expertise in pyroprocessing and crushing solutions. It itself relies on smaller firms to provide their knowledge to specific parts of a larger project, be it conveyors, feeding systems or silos. Everyone is getting better and better, but in a smaller and smaller area.

Also in the September 2018 issue of Global Cement Magazine will be a report from the VDMA’s Large Industrial Plant Manufacturer’s group (AGAB) in Germany, which highlights another advantage for the Europeans: Digitisation. According to a VDMA survey, the industry anticipates a positive influence from digitisation activities on sales and earnings and expects to see margins improve by up to 10% as a result of the efficiencies it offers over the next three years. In this regard they are ahead of the Chinese mega-suppliers.

The conclusion from this wide-ranging column? The integration of Chinese weight and European know-how is stepping up a notch and will only accelerate from here. Can everyone be ‘winners?’ The next few years may reveal some of the answers.