Analysis

Lafarge UK's release of its 2011 Sustainability Report for its cement business this week presented some bold headline figures. Key statistics for the period covering 2009 - 2011 included a 17% reduction in CO2 emissions through the use of solid recovered fuels (SRF), a 17% reduction in the use of electricity and a 26% cut in emissions to air.

For a European producer this is some positive news in a time of gloom. Looking a little deeper into the report reveals the usual ambiguities that can arise with interpreting statistics. Lafarge UK's fossil fuel consumption actually rose by 9% from 285,000t in 2009 to 311,000t in 2011. CO2 emissions to air rose by 15% from 2.31Mt to 2.65Mt. In terms of emissions per tonne of Portland Cement Equivalent (tPCE), the figures are more encouraging with fossil fuel use decreasing from 87kg/tPCE to 82kg/tPCE (6%) and CO2 emissions remaining stable at 704kg/tPCE. These figures are good considering that Lafarge's production increased from 2009 to 2011 due to construction for the London 2012 Olympics.

As mentioned in Edwin A R Trout's article 'The British cement industry in 2011 and 2012' the move to refuse-derived fuels (RDF) has consistently made the news with projects at several Lafarge plants. RDF use at Lafarge UK plants rose by 48%, from 92,758t in 2009 to 137,143t in 2011. Each of the alternate fuels – tyres, waste-derived liquid fuel, processed sewage pellets (PSP), meat and bone meal, SRF – roughly increased its unit share per tonne of cement produced by 2%.

Lafarge UK is clearly reacting to uncertain input costs and preparing for any further future green taxes. It failed to meet its 2011 target rate for RDF substitution of 31% (it reached 29%) but it has raised the target to 35% for 2012. It is also continuing to secure permits for PSP use at its Dunbar plant and SRF use at its Hope plant, although by the time this is approved Hope may be someone else's facility. However, the key question is, how can Lafarge push alternate fuels? It will be interesting to see how much Lafarge UK's fuel mix can be reduced in cost over the next five years.

News from Mexico and the US over the past week confirms the contrasting fortunes of the cement industry in the 'Old World' and the 'New World,' of Europe and North America. First, Cemex reported a significantly reduced loss of US$203m in its third quarter, compared with a loss of US$730m in 2011. However, the firm's European units again faired worse than other regions. 

The European problem is not limited to Cemex, but while much of the continent has seen a poor 2012 so far, North America appears to be in the midst of a construction renaissance. HeidelbergCement estimates US cement sales growth of 8-11% in 2012. In Mexico, a strong and growing industry, it has also been announced that the Mexican billionaire Carlos Slim had partly financed a new US$300m plant in Mexico, due to go into production early in 2013.

In light of this apparent upward trend in North America, it is surprising that France's Lafarge has agreed to sell two more of its US cement plants, this time to Eagle Materials. If the Eagle deal is approved, it will represent (along with the May 2011 sale of Lafarge's Roberta and Harleyville plants to Cementos Argos) a continued and substantial reduction in Lafarge's presence in the US. In under 18 months, Lafarge will have offloaded four plants, taking its total from 12 to eight.

Lafarge's decision to sell to Eagle seems like an attempt to meet its own debt-reduction schedule. Yet to do this it may be losing important territory in North America. This can't have been an easy decision.

"We believe that Nigeria has arrived as a cement manufacturing country," said Joseph Makoju, Chairman of the Cement Manufacturing Association of Nigeria (CMAN), to mark yet another 'moment' when Nigeria's ability to produce cement has overtaken its demand.

One of Makoju's reasons for Nigeria's 'arrival' was the fact that the Nigerian government hasn't issued any import licenses since the start of 2012.

As Global Cement Weekly #46 noted in April 2012 this is strange given that domestic consumption is up to 18Mt/yr: a figure 4Mt below modest estimates of national capacity which start at 22Mt/yr. According to Global Cement monthly price reviews the cost per bag has risen by 20% since 2010 despite presidential orders to keep it down. However much cement Nigeria seems to produce the price still keeps on rising.

The prices aren't the only figures that are rising year-on-year. Dangote, Nigeria's leading-producer, reported an increase in operating profit of 14% to US$745m in 2011 from US$654m in 2010. Lafarge WAPCO, the country's second largest producer, reported an increased operating profit of 41.7% to US$74.1m from US$52.3m.

Prices continue to rise but this could be due to cartel-like behaviour. President Goodluck Jonathan seemed to suggest as much in 2011 when he ordered prices down. Then again Nigeria's poor transport infrastructure and distribution chains could be to blame for rising prices instead. CMAN has announced plans to promote the use of concrete road construction with the government and Dangote announced plans in August 2012 to widen its distribution by opening more 'mega-depots' and signing on new distributors.

It's unclear exactly how much cement the Nigerian market actually wants. Its per capita consumption is 110kg, compared to 280kg in South Africa and over 600kg in Egypt. This is way down the consumption/GDP curve compared to Europe and North America. Its population has reportedly risen by 30m from 2006 to 2012. This implies massive total demand and demand potential.

So - past massive transport infrastructure projects, improved distribution and possible price inflation - how does Nigeria keep momentum? Ironically, given Nigeria's protectionist stance against imports, one of the measures CMAN is exploring is how to export cement to other countries. Recent news reports about local producers in Namibia and South Africa fighting foreign imports suggest that other African countries are starting to 'arrive' too. Even building the roads may not be enough to keep Nigeria's cement express-train on track.

Eagle Materials has picked up two cement plants in the US from Lafarge with a combined capacity of 1.6Mt/yr for US$446m. The deal also included six distribution terminals, two aggregates quarries, eight ready-mix concrete plants and a fly ash business.

Following our column in August 2012 following an acquisition in India we decided to ask a similar question: how much are American cement plants worth?

Eagle's acquisition now increases its presence in the Midwest and South Central regions of the US, giving it a rough line of plants across the country nearly connecting Lake Michigan to the Gulf of Mexico. As shown in our industry report on the US between 2005 and 2011 cement consumption fell in both the states the plants are located in. Missouri's consumption fell by 45% from 2.82Mt to 1.56Mt, just above the US national average. By contrast Oklahoma's consumption only fell by 11%, from 1.6Mt to 1.43Mt, the fourth smallest decline in the country.

However, Eagle has demonstrated financial health in contrast to the US sector as a whole, reporting a 21% rise in total revenue in the quarter to 30 June 2012 and a 60% rise in operating earnings year-on-year in the quarter to 31 March 2012. The combined operations at the two plants generated about US$178m in revenue during the year ending in June 2012. By contrast Eagle Materials' revenue totalled US$529m during the same period. The plants' additional capacity will increase Eagle's total by about 60%.

Lafarge are still thinking big though, with the proviso that Eagle will supply certain Lafarge operations with cement for four to five years, as well as an agreement with a Lafarge affiliate to supply low-cost alternative fuels to the acquired operations. According to its 2011 annual report North America comprised 11% of Lafarge's cement sales. Lafarge's sales in the US remained flat in 2011. In that year the company's capacity was 12.8Mt with a 12% market share. This picture has started to change in 2012 with a reduced loss in earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA) in the first quarter followed by volume and sales increases of above 10% in the second quarter.

Back in June 2011 Cementos Argos picked up two plants from Lafarge in Roberta, Alabama and Harlyville, South Carolina for US$760m with a combined capacity of 2.7Mt/yr. As with the Eagle deal the sale included a number of peripheral assets including a clinker mill, cement mixer lorries and a marine port.

Cementos Argos recently put the world average at US$250m/t when publicising the expansion of its Rioclaro plant. The European Cement Association reports the figure at being above US$200m/t on its website. In August 2012, at the time of the potential CRH acquisition in India, the cost of Indian cement production capacity was placed at US$110/t-US$120/t.

Perhaps the question we should ask is how much is a US cement plant worth when it used to belong to Lafarge. Both the Cementos Argos sale and the Eagle deal worked out at US$280/t including all the ancillaries. The actual question we should ask is why has Lafarge chosen these specific plants to sell to a competitor in the US market?

Today's report that cement producers from Taiwan are preparing for new Chinese NOx regulations is yet another reaction to several 'seismic' shifts of government-led change rocking the industry in China. These have included the closure of old, inefficient capacity and significant implementation of waste-heat recovery (WHR) systems. Last week's launch of the Guangdong Emissions Trading Scheme (GETS) is one more.

As reported by Reuters Point Carbon, GETS involves four cement plants from the start and it is the largest of seven such provincial schemes. It is as big and bold as the manufacturing hub that it covers. It includes over 800 manufacturing sites and will regulate the emissions from 42% of all power consumed in Guangdong and 63% of all its industrial emissions. It will be the fifth biggest ETS in the world after those in the EU, Australia, California and South Korea.

While GETS is large, the rate that it will be implemented will be more restrained. There will be three years of testing (2012-2015), an 'improvement period' (2016- 2020) and a proper market from 2020. The scheme's progress will be watched closely - its success or failure could determine the shape of emissions trading schemes (ETS) across China and the rest of Asia.

While the aims of ETS are laudable, they have met with 'mixed' reviews in other parts of the world. In Australia in 2011, there were dire warnings of the potential for job-losses and carbon-leakage, with China itself identified as a probable destination for both.

In Europe there is now a strong claim that the EU-ETS has been ineffective, with carbon prices slumping to under Euro10/credit (~US$13/credit), less than a quarter of projected levels for 2012. In the midst of the downturn Ireland's CRH 'earned' millions of Euros in unused credits. Security has also been a problem for the EU-ETS.

Even GETS, less than a month old, has drawn criticism. Unnamed commentators have suggested that the higher-than-expected prices, US$9.50/credit, (only slightly lower than in Europe), already look like the result of collusion in the market.

With all of these concerns, the immediate demand from the cement producers, China Resources Cement, Sinoma, Taipai and Yangchun Hailuo, looks a little strange. However, local media reports that there are advantages to be gained by buying early. All of the four producers have to buy credits for cement plant projects they are currently working on. They are gambling on the fact that carbon prices can only rise - something that is not expected by analysts.

In addition the producers can gain valuable experience of the scheme before it has to be used 'in anger,' which may give them an operational advantage over others. They also know that, unlike in other parts of the world, the government will not backtrack on its decision. Recent NOx regulations, closure of older capacity and implementation of WHR have all been imposed (or are being imposed) from above. They know that it is better to jump into the deep end than to be pushed.