The Malaysian Competition Commission took the rather ominous step this week of saying it was taking extra care to watch the cement industry. Ouch! It said that had taken note of recent price rises by both cement and concrete producers and that it was working with the Ministry of Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs as it met with the sector. It also said it was well aware of the recent merger between YTL and Lafarge, “...which had led to the market being more concentrated at the upstream and downstream level.”

The background here is that at least one unnamed cement producer announced a price hike of 40% in mid-June 2019. End-users panicked and the local press took up the story. The Cement and Concrete Association of Malaysia then defended price rises in general, when it was asked for comment, due to all sorts of mounting input costs. Although, to be fair, to the association the Malaysian Competition Commission acknowledged the price pressures the industry was under due to input costs in a report it issued in 2017.

Back in the present, the government became involved and Saifuddin Nasution Ismai, the head of the Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs Ministry, calmed the situation down by saying that producers had agreed not to raise their prices after all and that any future planned price adjustments would be ‘discussed’ with the authorities first. Finance Minister Lim Guan Eng then followed this up with calls for an investigation into prices in Sarawak state in Eastern Malaysia. In response, Suhadi Sulaiman, the chief executive officer (CEO) of CMS Cement, batted this straight back by blaming industry mergers in Peninsular Malaysia and saying the company had no plans ‘anytime soon’ to raise its prices.

As the Malaysian Competition Commission kindly pointed out, this entire furore took place about a month on from the competition of LafargeHolcim’s divestment of its local subsidiary to YTL. The commission agreed to the acquisition of Lafarge Malaysia by YTL knowing that it was giving YTL ownership of over half of the country’s production capacity. With this in mind it is unsurprising that the commission might have wanted to look tough in the face of even a whiff of market impropriety, whether it was real or not.

The problem, as the Malaysian Competition Commission alluded to in its statement, is that the local industry suffers from production overcapacity. On top of this local demand has been contracting since 2015. The country has 11 integrated cement plants with a production capacity of 27.1Mt/yr, according to Global Cement Directory 2019 data. Production hit a high of 24.7Mt in 2015 and then fell year-on-year to 18.8Mt in 2017. Data from the Cement and Concrete Association of Malaysia painted a worse picture taking into account both integrated and grinding capacity reporting an estimated production capacity utilisation rate of just 59% in 2016. Lafarge Malaysia reported a loss before tax of US$97.7m at the end of 2018 as well as declining revenue. Shortly thereafter it announced it was leaving the country, as well as neighbouring Singapore.

In theory the buyout by YTL should have been one step closer to solving Malaysia’s overcapacity woes as either it gained synergies through merging the companies or shut down some of its plants. Certainly, the system appears to be working at some level, as the proposed 40% price rise hasn’t happened. Yet, if the government is reacting to voters rather than the market it could prolong the capacity-demand gap indefinitely. Under these conditions LafargeHolcim’s decision to exit South-East Asia may prove prescient.

There was a glimmer of good news visible through the Delhi smog this week with the launch of a market-based emissions trading scheme (ETS) for particulate matter (PM). A pilot has started at Surat in Gujarat. The scheme will apply to 350 industries in the locality and it will be scrutinised for wider rollout in the country.

China robustly started to tackle its industrial PM emitters a few years ago although the work remains on-going. In its wake India has increasingly made the wrong sort of headlines with horrifically high dust emissions. Delhi, for example, reportedly had PM2.5 emissions of over 440µg/m³ in January 2019. To give this some context, the World Health Organisation’s (WHO) annual upper guideline figure for safe human exposure is 10µg/m³. Research by the Financial Times newspaper suggested that more than 40% of the Indian population is subject to annual PM2.5 emissions of over 50µg/m³.

Air Quality Life Index (AQLI) research reckons that if India were able to meet its national PM2.5 standard of 40µg/m³ then its population would live 1.8 years longer or 4.3 years longer if it met the WHO guideline level. The current situation is an unnecessary tragedy. In strictly structural terms the country’s productivity is being thrown away by damaging the health of its workforce. For comparison amongst other major cement producing countries, AQLI data placed China’s PM2.5 emissions at 39µg/m³, Indonesia at 22µg/m³, Vietnam at 20µg/m³ the US at 9µg/m³. These figures cover all industries in different conditions and climates. If the US can do it, why not the others?

Back on trading schemes, the famous ETS at the moment is the European one for CO₂ emissions. Similar schemes are slowly appearing around the world as governments look at what the European Union (EU) did right and wrong. For example, South Africa started up a carbon tax in early June 2019. Yet as the supporting documents by the Gujarat Pollution Control Board (GPCB) point out there have been a variety of ETS systems’ over the years. The US’s Acid Rain Program is generally seen to have achieved significant reductions in SO2 and NOx emissions although the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) has continued this work. Chile even ran its own PM ETS in the 1990s although the outcomes have been disputed.

One problem with a CO₂ ETS, and anthropomorphic or man-made climate change in general, is that it is intangible. Even if sea levels deluge major coastal cities, rising mean temperatures reduce agricultural yields and human populations contract sharply, people will still be arguing over the research and the causes. The beauty of a PM ETS is that if it works you can literally see and feel the results. A famous example here is the UK’s Clean Air Act in the 1950s that banished the fog/smog that London used to be famous for.

The Gujarat PM ETS is a pilot, the results of which will be considered by researchers from a number of US-based universities and the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab. Explicitly, the study plans to use a randomised control trial to compares its results against the command and control style approach used in the rest of the country. On the cement-side various Indian news stories have emerged as state pollution boards have increasingly started fining producers for emission limit breaches. Clearly the government is taking dust emissions seriously. Reduction is long overdue.

Tourah Cement in Egypt took the tough decision last week to temporarily stop production. It blamed this on an acute financial crisis rendering it unable to pay its running costs. The subsidiary of Germany’s HeidelbergCement was reported in the Global Cement Directory 2019 as already being partly closed. This latest news is regrettable but not surprising.

Graph 1: Cement consumption and production in Egypt. Sources: Industrial Development Agency, Global Cement Directory 2019, Cement division of the Building Materials Chamber of the Federation of Egyptian Industries.

As Graph 1 shows that the backdrop here is of a local cement sector rife with overcapacity. Capacity utilisation rates have hovered around 70% in recent years. The sector breaks down into about a quarter of production capacity under state control and the remainder owned by private companies. Overall, about half of the production capacity is run by multinational companies like Greece’s Titan, France’s Vicat and Germany’s HeidelbergCement.

The country hosts some of the largest cement plants in the world as well as several very big plants by European or North American standards anyway. The whopping 13Mt/yr government/army-run El-Arish Cement plant at Beni Suef opened fully in 2018. It seemed likely that there were going to be losers in the industry following that kind of disruption from a state-owned player. Indeed, Medhat Istvanos, head of the cement division of the Building Materials Chamber of the Federation of Egyptian Industries, explicitly blamed the El-Arish Cement plant for making the situation worse in September 2018. He said that the decision to build the plant was ‘not based on precise information’ and that it had harmed local production.

In the wider picture, the cement sector started to move away from subsidised natural gas and heavy fuel oil to coal instead in the mid-2010s. Tourah Cement mentioned this in its statement about halting production. The government has supported the cement industry through large-scale infrastructure projects and a state-sponsored compensation system under the Contractors Compensation Act that offset the loss prompted by the Egyptian pound’s floatation in 2017.

However, overcapacity has consistently been a problem and this was clear when the El-Arish Cement plant was approved. Exports of cement crept up to 1Mt/yr in 2017 from 0.1Mt/yr in 2015. Yet, as the Low-Carbon Roadmap for the Egyptian Cement Industry pointed out, Egyptian FOB exports of cement cost US$20/t higher than regional competitors such as Turkey. At this kind of disadvantage Egypt lacks the traditional escape route for an overproducing cement sector.

In these kinds of conditions, consolidation appears to be crucial while organic or government-backed demand plays catch-up with the production base. Certainly Egypt has the population and the development potential as its economy grows in the medium to long term. The government stabilising the economy after recent troubles is crucial for the construction industry. In the meantime all is not lost as the focus is on efficiency gains and cost cutting. The growth of alternative fuels as the sector’s fuel mix continues to adjust to the new normal following the abolition of subsidies on natural gas is one example of this.

Talk of US tariffs on imports from Mexico was not troubling the National Chamber of Cement (CANACEM) this week. Director general Yanina Navarro pointed out to local media that Mexico only exports 1.42Mt or 3.4% of its total production of 44Mt/yr to its northern neighbour. This is a little higher than the 1.04Mt reported by the United States Geological Survey (USGS) in 2018, although that figure is believed to have underestimated imports to El Paso district in Texas. Mexico was the fifth largest exporter of hydraulic cement and clinker to the US behind Canada, Turkey, China and Greece.

Commentators pointed out that Grupo Cementos de Chihuahua (GCC) might be affected more that other Mexican producers as two of its plants are close to the border at Samalayuca and Juárez in Chihuahua. However, GCC operates five plants in the US. Cemex also has a plant near the US border at Ensenada in Baja California. Yet it’s the fourth largest producer in the US by integrated production capacity. If either company had its export markets seriously disrupted by any border duties they could likely focus on production in the US to compensate.

Once again this is similar to the situation with the proposed border wall where, although President Donald Trump wanted Mexico to pay, it would have been Mexican companies benefiting the most from any construction boom. This was also the case with the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), the successor to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The international structure of many of the larger Mexican cement producers insulates them from these kinds of political and trade disputes.

Mexican producers shouldn’t be too complacent though. Tariffs are likely to play havoc with integrated supply chains as in the car industry. Building materials will probably be affected less so but that 1.42Mt export figure is more than the production capacity of many individual Mexican cement plants. Taking away this export market will drag on the industry’s utilisation rate and alternate destinations may be hard to find. Note the trouble Mexico has had distributing its products in Peru. The Supreme Court there upheld a fine this week on UNACEM for trying to block the distribution of Cemex’s brand of cement in 2014. Also, although Trump’s tariffs on Chinese products may not have much of an impact on building materials, USGS data shows that Chinese imports of cement to the US fell by 27% year-on-year to 0.76Mt in the six months to the end of February 2019. Similar reductions could await Mexico’s exporters.

The general consensus from the free market press is that tariffs will ultimately hurt both economies. In agreement the Portland Cement Association (PCA) published a market report in April 2018 on the effects of tariffs on US cement consumption in the wake of tariffs on steel and aluminium imports from the European Union (EU), Canada and Mexico. The summary was that all forms of tariff – from minor to a global trade war – would likely result in reduced US cement consumption to varying degrees due to slower economic growth. A full-scale set of tariffs on Mexican imports is likely to induce similar consequences.