Pradeep Paunrana’s latest attempt to wrest back control of ARM Cement was dismissed this week in Kenya. Administrators PricewaterhouseCoopers rejected a US$12.5m guarantee to stop the sale to a rival, according to Business Daily newspaper. Paunrana, the former managing director and majority shareholder of ARM Cement, had teamed up with Rai Group to thwart a rival bid for his company from National Cement.

The guarantee was a 20% portion of a full bid of US$63m by Paunrana and Rai Group but the administrators rejected it on the grounds that it had a nine-month time limit. They were reportedly concerned that legal proceedings over ownership of the cement producer could last beyond this. A deal to sell ARM Cement to National Cement for US$50m was agreed in May 2019. However, Paunrana fought back and the courts are expected to deliberate over the issue for some time.

ARM Cement entered administration in August 2018 following a growing loss in 2017 and poor markets in Kenya and Tanzania. At the time the cement producer blamed its poor performance on elections in Kenya causing reduced cement demand, a coal import ban in Tanzania causing production issues at its Tanga cement plant and increased competition in both countries.

The implications of National Cement actually succeeding in its bid for ARM Cement would mean a realignment of the local industry. LafargeHolcim’s subsidiary Bamburi Cement leads the sector by production capacity and market share. It operates one integrated and one grinding plant. Mombassa Cement and then a variety of smaller companies, trail it.

The Devki Group-backed National Cement has steadily been expanding in recent years. In April 2018 it was announced that the International Finance Corporation (IFC) was going to invest US$96m in National Cement and that Devki Group chairman Narendra Raval was going to commit a similar sum towards a new integrated line in Kenya and two new grinding plants in Kenya and Tanzania. More recently it acquired the long-running Cemtech plant project in West Pokot, along with its mineral deposits and licences. If it were able to successfully buy ARM Cement it would become Kenya’s second largest cement producer by market share.

ARM Cement is not the only Kenyan cement producer facing these kinds of problems. The Kenyan government is the majority shareholder East Africa Portland Cement Company (EAPCC) and it has been working on a rescue package for it since early 2019. The local market had similarly negatively affected the EAPCC’s financial performance and it has been attempting to cut its debts. In its case, it has been trying to sell land to pay off its debts but it has faced disputes with local residents. It has also tried reducing its workforce, with varying degrees of success. Its integrated plant at Athi River near Nairobi was reported to be operating at a 50% capacity utilisation rate in late 2018.

Table 1: Cement production in Kenya, 2015 – 2019. Source: Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS).

Overall cement production in Kenya peaked at 6.7Mt in 2016 and has fallen since. It fell by 2.8% year-on-year to 2.9Mt in the first half of 2019 from 3Mt in the same period in 2018. Consumption fell by a similar amount to production in the first quarter of 2019. Analysts like Knight Frank have blamed this on a slowdown in the real estate market, although it holds up hope for government house building scheme to rescue the situation.

In this kind of market it is understandable that the cement market is rationalising. The World Bank has forecast gross domestic product (GDP) growth of 5.8% in 2019 and better in the years ahead. Whoever is left in the cement business once the corporate dust settles stands to benefit.

Forgive the poor image quality but our magazine editor Peter Edwards spotted this provocative graphic (above) at the Federación Interamericana del Cemento (FICEM) technical congress that is taking place in the Dominican Republic this week. It came from a presentation given by Yassine Touahri from On Field Investment Research. The reason this slide raises eyebrows is because it seems to inversely link CO₂ emission regulations with cement grinding capacity growth.

One would expect integrated or clinker production capacity addition to decline in the face of various carbon taxes because the majority of emissions in cement production are process emissions. Yet this graphic suggests that it goes further by affecting the supply of clinker in these regions. If correct then it supports the argument that introducing carbon taxes forces related capacity investment to go elsewhere. In other words, if governments try to control industrial CO₂ emissions, then the market will follow the path of least resistance. The world has a clinker production capacity surplus and the countries with no CO₂ regulations are scooping it up.

The counter argument is that capacity growth and CO₂ legislation is unrelated. The regions with flat or falling grinding capacity additions are the places were this trend is occurring anyway for other reasons. These areas have built their houses and infrastructure and so one would expect no or low capacity growth. In this environment it is easier to introduce CO₂ laws because, rightly or wrongly, it is perceived to be less important to the overall economy. Meanwhile, outside of these zones national economies are growing: they want to build things and new grinding plants to take advantage of a global glut of clinker are helping them to do this.

Other issues with this graphic are the widely different reasons for low cement grinding capacity growth in the areas with CO₂ legislation. Europe, for example, has endured the European Union (EU) Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) for over a decade and it has seen growth in the slag-cement grinding model in some countries in recent years. General trends have also seen a considerable drop in production capacity in Southern Mediterranean countries as their export markets decline. China is actively trying to manage a reduction in production capacity following a period of unparalleled growth. CO₂ legislation is one potential means to do this.

The next step here would be to model the effect of a carbon tax on a developing market, which is genuinely growing its cement consumption, compared to a more mature one. This might help to answer whether economic development can be untangled from carbon emissions. CO₂ regulations are undoubtedly distorting cement markets though. Touahri is right when he says that, “CO₂ management will be the key challenge for the cement industry in the 21st century.” Once it is given a value then it changes the nature of the business.

There will be a full review of the FICEM technical congress 2019 in a future issue of Global Cement Magazine

The news from Mali this week is that a new cement grinding plant is in the works. Ciments et Matériaux du Mali plans to build a 0.5Mt/yr plant near Bamako. Work on the US$34m project is set to start in October 2019 although there has been no word on the equipment supplier. The project is a long-standing one from France’s Vicat.

A new plant is probably very welcome following the last six months in the local market. Prices spiked by a third in May 2019, leading local producer Diamond Cement Mali to arrange a press conference to defend itself. Director Ibrahima Dibo explained that the company had fixed its prices in conjunction with the government at its units at Astro and Dio Gare since 2012. Instead, he blamed importers and traders for the situation, as well as low import rates from Senegal and Ivory Coast. The company proposed that it tackle the situation by importing more cement from one of its plants in Takoradi in Ghana and then transporting it into Mali via Dakar in Senegal. Although it noted that it would need permission from the government to do this.

The country has also been targeted by Nigeria’s Dangote Cement for several years. Back in 2016 the Nigerian cement producer was considering building a 1.5Mt/yr grinding plant. It also wanted to build a second production line at its Pout plant near Dakar in Senegal to export clinker specifically to Mali. It has since scaled back its expansion plans as the Nigerian economy entered a recession but in its 2018 annual report it noted that it had exported 0.43Mt of cement from Senegal and that most of this had gone to Mali, with plans to further increase exports in 2019.

At present Mali has three main grinding plants. Two are run by Diamond Cement and the third by Ciments de l'Afrique (CIMAF). An integrated plant at Guinbané, Diéma in the Kayes region was announced in late 2016 when the government signed a memorandum of understanding with Gaia Equity, a private equity company. This project was going to be built by China’s Sinoma.

Figure 1: Distribution of cement prices in Africa and Location of Plants 2015. Source: World Bank / ECDPM.

The status of that last project is unknown since there has been little news on it since. However, Figure 1 above shows why a private equity firm might sense opportunity. It’s out of date as various countries have become self-sufficient and we’ve covered this plenty of times before but the graphic from the World Bank really brings home the message that moving cement overland is uneconomical. This is mirrored by the mounting price of cement in Mali earlier this year. Africa has been described as the last great cement frontier and Mali is on the frontline.

The publication of CNBM’s financial results presents a good opportunity to take stock of the Chinese cement industry in the first half of 2019. Looking at the big picture first, cement sales rose by 5% year-on-year to 1.03Bnt in the first half of 2019 from 0.98Bnt in the same period in 2018. Graph 1 below shows the sales over the last five years since 2014. Generally, sales are decreasing each year but there has been some variation in the half-year periods.

Graph 1: Cement sales in China, 2014 – 2019. Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China.

As the China Cement Association (CCA) pointed out in its summary for the first half of 2019, the cement industry ‘swelled in volume and price’ as industry efficiency grew but that the growth rate dropped ‘significantly’ compared in 2018. By region, as Graph 2 shows, variation can be seen between the south-east of the country where growth was slow or even fell compared to stronger performance elsewhere. Cement production increased by above 20% in Jilin, Shanxi, Shandong, Tibet and Heilongjiang and by over 10% in Hebei, Gansu, Tianjin, and Liaoning. However, it fell in Hainan, Beijing, Qinghai, Guizhou, Guangxi, Hunan, Guangdong and Ningxia. Most of these changes were attributed to either rising or falling demand for cement, except for Jilin where reduced imports from neighbouring provinces pushed up its demand. In most of these latter regions it attribute the decline to falling demand for cement.

Graph 2: Cement production growth by province in first half of 2019. Source: China Cement Association.

Other points of note from the CCA include the surge in imports to China. Imports of cement and clinker rose by 149% year-on-year to 8.97Mt in the five months from January to May 2019. Vietnam supplied 68% of this followed by 11% from Thailand. On the production side, 10 new production lines with a total capacity of 15.5Mt/yr were commissioned in the period. These were fairly scattered across nine provinces, in Shanxi, Anhui, Hubei, Fujian, Guangxi, Hunan, Guizhou, Gansu and Yunnan respectively.

Sales and profits were supported by growing demand and prices on the corporate side. CNBM’s operating income for its cement businesses grew by 16% to US$8.14bn from US$7.04bn. Its adjusted profit increased by 40% to US$2.76bn from US$1.98bn. Anhui Conch’s sales rose by 17.9% to US$2.15bn from US$2.11bn. It blamed poorer profits in the south of the country on adverse weather leading to weakened demand.

The weaker sales in the south could be seen in China Resources Cement’s (CRC) results with its turnover down by 6% to US$2.22bn from US$2.36bn. Likewise, its earnings before interest, taxation, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA) dropped by 8.5% to US$820m from US$896m. The majority of its cement plants are based in Guangxi, Guangdong and Fujian. Jidong Cement was also reported as having received US$30m in subsidies from the government during the first half of 2019 in relation to its ‘daily activities.’

As is usual for these kinds of roundups the dynamic in China is between government industrial policies, like peak shifting and pollution mitigation, and local demand and price trends. One of the latest spins on peak shifting, for example, is a rating system that is being considered to decide which companies should be subject to production limits and for how long. General cement sales are slowly falling each year but the rise of imports into the word’s biggest cement producing nation (!) mark an interesting trend. Also, it may not be connected, but lots of those provinces with falling demand so far in 2019 are those on the south coast facing the heavy clinker exporting nations of South-East Asia. Given the decisiveness with which the Chinese government dispensed with imports of waste materials under its National Sword initiative since 2017, those countries importing cement to China should beware. It could change very quickly. The Chinese cement market is never dull.