Displaying items by tag: Montenegro

Montenegro: The government of Montenegro and the Ministry of Mining, Oil and Gas plan to construct a new cement plant in Pljevlja at the Jagnjilo site, known for its significant marl deposits. This initiative aims to replace an old landfill, contributing to environmental preservation and harnessing local raw materials for cement production, continuing a legacy that began with a plant operating from 1975 to 1988, according to a statement by the Ministry.

The mountainous eastern shore of the Adriatic Sea and its hinterlands in Europe’s Balkan Peninsula have one of the world’s highest densities of countries: six, across a broad equilateral triangle of 212,000km². All six states – Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia – are historically characterised by political non-alignment, carrying over from the Cold War period, and all the more notable for the presence of the EU to the north (Croatia, Hungary and Romania) and east (Bulgaria and Greece).

A nine-plant, 9Mt/yr local cement sector serves the 16.8m-strong population of the unconsolidated ‘bloc.’ Albania has 2.8Mt/yr (31%), Serbia 2.7Mt/yr (30%), Bosnia & Herzegovina 1.6Mt/yr (18%), North Macedonia 1.4Mt/yr (15%) and Kosovo 500,000t/yr (6%), while Montenegro has no cement capacity – for now. Altogether, this gives this quarter of South East Europe a capacity per capita of 539kg/yr. The industry consists entirely of companies based outside of the region. Albania’s two plants are Lebanese and Greek-owned (by Seament Holding and Titan Cement Group respectively). Titan Cement Group also controls single-plant Kosovo and North Macedonia, and competes in the Serbian cement industry alongside larger and smaller plants belonging to Switzerland-based Holcim and Ireland-based CRH, respectively. Lastly, Bosnia & Herzegovina’s capacity is shared evenly between Germany-based Heidelberg Materials and Hungary-based Talentis International Construction, with one plant each.

Lafarge Srbija, Holcim's subsidiary in Serbia, announced plans for its second plant in the country, at Ratari in Belgrade, last week. No capacity has yet emerged, but the plant will cost €110m, making something in the region of the country’s existing 0.6 – 1.2Mt/yr plants seem likely. This would give Serbia over a third of total capacity in the Central Balkans and twice the number of plants of any other country there, expanding its per-capita capacity by 22 – 44%, from a regionally low 408kg/yr to 500 – 590kg/yr.

In announcing the upcoming Ratari cement plant, Lafarge Srbija laid emphasis on its sustainability. The plant will use 1Mt/yr of ash from the adjacent Nikola Tesla B thermal power plant as a raw material in its cement production. In this way, it will help to clear the Nikola Tesla B plant’s 1600 hectare ash dumps, from which only 180,000t of ash was harvested in 2023. Circularity has been front and centre of Holcim’s discussions of its growth in Serbia for some time. When Lafarge Srbija acquired aggregates producer Teko Mining Serbia in 2022, the group indicated that the business would play a part in its development of construction and demolition materials (CDM)-based cement and concrete.

Holcim’s Strategy 2025 growth plan entails bolt-on acquisitions in ‘mature markets,’ backed by strategic divestments elsewhere. Other companies have been more explicit about a realignment towards metropolitan markets, above all in North America, at a time when they are also diversifying away from cement and into other materials. Just why a leading producer should look to build cement capacity in Serbia warrants investigation.

Serbia is the only Central Balkan member of Cembureau, the European cement association. In a European market report for 2022, the association attributed to it the continent’s fastest declining cement consumption (jointly with Slovakia), down by 11% year-on-year. Like the rest of Europe, Serbia is also gradually shrinking, its population dwindling by 0.7% year-on-year to 6.62m in 2023, which limits hopes for a longer-term recovery. Serbia remains the largest country in the Central Balkans, with 39% of the total regional population.

Several factors have compounded Serbia’s difficulties as a cement-producing country. Firstly, like the Nikola Tesla B thermal power plant, its kilns run on coal. 50% of this coal originated in Russia and Ukraine in 2021, causing the entire operation to become ‘imperilled’ after the former’s brutal invasion of the latter in February 2022, according to the Serbian Cement Industry Association. In planning terms, this was a case of putting half one’s eggs in two baskets – and dropping them both.

Secondly, Serbia’s choice of export markets is mainly confined to either the EU or global markets via the River Danube, Black Sea and Mediterranean. Either way, it is in competition with a cement exporting giant: Türkiye. Serbia sold €19.7m-worth of cement in the EU in 2023, up by 63% over the three-year period since 2020 – 31% behind Türkiye’s €28.8m (more than double its 2020 figure).¹ One other Central Balkan country had a greater reliance on the EU market: Bosnia & Herzegovina. It exported €48.4m-worth of cement there, quadruple its 2020 figure and behind only China (€133m) and the UK (€54.7) in cement exports to the bloc by value.

Bosnia & Herzegovina’s cement industry underwent a different permutation at the start of 2024: an acquisition, replacing one EU-based player with another. Lukavac Cement, which operates the 800,000t/yr Lukavac cement plant in Tuzla, changed hands from Austria-based building materials producer Asamer Baustoffe to Hungary-based property developer Talentis International Construction. Talentis International Construction belongs to one of Hungary’s major family-owned conglomerates, Mészáros Csoport.

Besides Central Europe, Balkan countries have found a ready source of investments in the past decade in China. In construction alone, Chinese investments total €13.2bn in Serbia, €2.4bn in Bosnia & Herzegovina, €915m in Montenegro and €650m in North Macedonia.² This can be a booster shot to all-important domestic cement markets, but has some risks. Montenegro previously faced bankruptcy after Export-Import Bank of China began to call in an €847m loan for construction of the still upcoming A1 motorway in the country’s Northern Region. This did not put off the Montenegrin government from signing a new memorandum of understanding (MoU) with China-based Shandong Foreign Economic and Technical Cooperation and Shandong Luqiao Group for construction of a new €54m coast road in the Coastal Region in mid-2023.

In Montenegro, UK-based private equity firm Chayton Capital is currently funding a feasibility study for a partly state-owned cement plant and building materials complex at the Pljevlja energy hub in the Northern Region. Along with an upgrade to the existing Pljevlja coal-fired power plant, the project will cost €700m.

In 2026, EU member states will begin to partly tax third-country imports of cement and other products against their specific CO₂ emissions, progressing to the implementation of a 100% Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) by 2034. Montenegro led the Central Balkans’ preparations for the EU’s CBAM roll-out with the introduction of its own emissions trading system in early 2021. Bosnia & Herzegovina will follow its example by 2026, but other countries in the region have struggled to conceive of the arrangement except as part of future EU accession agreements.

Based on the average specific CO₂ emissions of cement produced in the EU, the World Bank has forecast that exporters to the bloc will be disadvantaged if their own specific emissions exceed 5.52kg CO₂eq/€.³ By contrast, any figure below this ought to offer an increased competitive edge. Albanian cement has average emissions of 4.71kg CO₂eq/€, 15% below ‘biting point’ and 13% below Türkiye’s 5.39CO₂eq/€. Albania’s government consolidated its anticipated gains by quintupling the coal tax for 2024 to €0.15/kg. The figure is based on the International Monetary Fund’s recommended minimum CO₂ emissions tax of €55.80/t, 21% shy of the current EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) credit price of €70.49/t.⁴

The Central Balkans is a region of apparently slow markets and industry growth regardless – to 11 cement plants, following the completion of current and upcoming projects. A recurrent theme of capital expenditure investments and the way investors talk about them may help to explain this: sustainability. Looking at the mix of technologies in the current nine plants, these include wet kilns and fuels lines built for conventional fossil fuels. This is not to presume that any given plant might not be happy with its existing equipment as is. Nonetheless, the overall picture is of a set of veteran plants with scope to benefit from the kind of investments which all four global cement producers active in the region are already carrying out elsewhere in Europe. Such plans may already be in motion. In late 2023, Titan Cement Group’s North Macedonian subsidiary Cementarnica Usje secured shareholder approval to take two new loans of up to €27m combined.

As the latest news from Serbia showed, taking care of existing plants does not preclude also building new ones. The cement industry of the Central Balkans is finding its position in the new reduced-CO₂ global cement trade – one in which old and new work together.

References

1. Trend Economy, ‘European Union – Imports and Exports – Articles of cement,’ 28 January 2024, https://trendeconomy.com/data/h2/EuropeanUnion/6810#

2. American Enterprise Institute, 'China Global Investment Tracker,' 3 February 2024 https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/

3. World Bank Group, ‘Relative CBAM Exposure Index,’ 15 June 2023, https://www.worldbank.org/en/data/interactive/2023/06/15/relative-cbam-exposure-index

4. Ember, 'Carbon Price Tracker,' 26 August 2024, https://ember-climate.org/data/data-tools/carbon-price-viewer/

Montenegro: UK-based private equity firm Chayton Capital has agreed to fund the feasibility study for the establishment of a joint public/private building materials production complex at the site of the Plejevlja energy hub. The complex will include a cement plant and cement bonded particle boards plant. Emerging Market Watch News has reported that the firm will also be involved in the modernisation of a coal-fired power plant at the site. The total budget for the project is Euro700m.

From 2027, the 27 member states of the European Union (EU) will begin to charge third country-based cement exporters for the CO₂ emissions of their products sold inside the bloc. The new Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) is a lynchpin in the strategy to reduce EU industries' CO₂ emissions by 55% between 1990 and 2030. Starving foreign cement industries of a source of income may also help to make them change their ways. A regional solution leveraged through an unfair head start, however, might cause progress to falter where it is most needed in the global fight against climate change.

Carbon leakage has hung over the EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) since its inception in 2005. Cembureau, the European cement association, reported a 300% five-year increase in third-country cement imports up to 2021, with spikes matching those in ETS credit prices. Companies from Turkey to Australia have produced and transported their cement into the EU, at great CO₂ cost, while benefitting from a competitive edge over domestic producers, it would seem. Lawmakers rectified the situation by maintaining free allocations of ETS credits to EU industries, including cement, which received US$92m-worth in 2021.¹ In the wake of the Paris Agreement, an emissions pricing mechanism on cement imports first came before a vote of the member states in February 2017.

In what would become a recurring theme, opposition from all sides of the issue defeated the proposal. Most interesting was the international response: Brazil, China, India and South Africa voiced ‘grave concern’ over the proposed CBAM. A Russian representative at the Department of European Cooperation lamented the possible necessity of ‘response measures,’ while US Climate Envoy John Kerry coolly urged the EU to wait until after the COP26 climate change conference in November 2021. The outbursts were surprising given that the mechanism clearly conformed to World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules: free allocations were always expected to phase out in a mirror image of the CBAM phase-in. The proposal eventually adopted on 22 June 2022 set the end date for both as 2032.

In 2020, the EU imported US$383m-worth of cement and concrete across its external borders, down by 17% year-on-year from US$463m in 2019.² Imports had previously more than doubled decade-on-decade from US$204min 2009. China accounted for US$167m-worth (43%) of global cement and concrete exports to the EU in 2020, followed by Vietnam with US$34m (9%) and the UK with US$30m (7.9%). Other significant sources include Belarus (US$28m - 7.4%), Russia (US$13.8m - 3.6%), Bosnia and Herzegovina (US$13.5m - 3.5%), Serbia (US$13.1 million - 3.4%), Israel (US$13m - 3.4%), Turkey (US$12.6m - 3.3%) and the US (US$10.3m - 2.7%).

China

China’s first emissions trading scheme will be one year old on 16 July 2021. The scheme, covering more than twice the CO₂ emissions accounted for under the EU ETS, may lend an apparent synergy to EU energy policy and that of the bloc’s main trade partner.³ On the contrary, Chinese carbon credits cost 8.5% the price of EU ETS credits on 29 June 2022, with a growth rate of just 10% year-on-year, compared to 53% in EU ETS credit prices. Unlike their European equivalent, they are also restricted to the energy sector. Chinese cement exporters are unready to meet the CBAM on its own terms. The inclusion of indirect emissions further disadvantages plants operating in China’s 57% coal-powered economy. Premier Li Keqiang has warned countries to be on their guard against a ‘new green trade barrier.’

These concerns ought to be considered in light of the scale and diversified nature of the China-EU trade partnership. The eventual inclusion of polymers, hydrogen and ammonia under the CBAM still does not extend its scope beyond 3% of Chinese imports to the EU by value, enabling China to retain the leverage it has previously proved willing to exercise against those who threaten the perceived interests of global trade.

China plans to reach net zero CO₂ emissions by 2060 through an energy transition in which it invested US$266m in 2021, more than the next six ranked countries combined.⁴ In the medium-term future, the CBAM may become a green bridge, connecting with Chinese emissions reduction policies in a single carbon border measure to raise money for developing countries’ sustainable transitions, as suggested by former governor of the People’s Bank of China Zhou Xiaochuan. Until then, China seems well positioned to ensure that a fair share of the costs arising from the CBAM pass to importers and the consumer.

Turkey

Turkey provided 3.3% of the EU’s cement and concrete imports in 2020, but the volume corresponded to 13% of Turkey’s total exports of the same. Thus, the country has a high exposure to any adverse effects of the CBAM – quantified at an estimated US$789m/yr by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.⁵ Turkey’s ratification of the Paris Agreement in late 2021 is among the positive outcomes of the CBAM. The country now plans to align with the CBAM. In this, the Turkish cement industry will rely on a share of a US$3.2bn loan from the World Bank, France and Germany.

The UN has yet to receive an updated climate action plan from the Turkish government in line with its pledges. Should Turkey fail to transition within the short timeframe provided by the CBAM, its cement sector might increase its existing focus on the West African market, where it holds 55% and 46% market shares for cement and clinker imports to Ghana and Ivory Coast respectively. The beleaguered industry has one greater refuge still: the US market, which consumed 18% of Turkish cement exports in 2020.

North America

Discussions of the CBAM’s impacts in Canada and the US are tied to those countries’ on-going deliberations over possible adjustment mechanisms of their own. At present, individual provinces and states are responsible for implementing carbon pricing. An international emissions trading scheme, called the Western Climate Initiative, already exists between the US state of California and the Canadian province of Quebec. The Canadian government is conducting a consultation on federal Border Carbon Adjustment (BCA) credits in the context of economy-wide pricing.⁶ Carbon border adjustment was previously an item on the US Trade Policy Agenda in 2021, but disappeared in 2022. President Biden pledged to impose 'carbon adjustment fees or quotas on carbon-intensive goods from countries that are failing to meet their climate and environmental obligations' during his candidateship in the 2020 US presidential election. On 7 June 2022, two weeks before the EU adopted CBAM, Senator Sheldon Whitehouse introduced a carbon border adjustment bill to the US Senate, which it referred to its Committee on Finance.⁷

North American legislators will need to follow the European Parliament in building a broad centrist majority in order to pass their CBAMs. If they succeed, the world will gain a low-carbon axis of cement markets, bringing their trade partners behind them.

Other European countries

The UK cement industry expects to pay an extra US$30.1m/yr on account of the CBAM.⁹

A November 2021 report by the Ukraine Resource & Analysis Centre (Society and Environment) concluded that Ukraine's 'largest and most technological' cement producers will experience no critical influence from the CBAM when exporting to the EU.⁸ At that time, the Ukrainian strategy consisted of an alignment with any future CBAM. On 31 May 2022, The European Business Association calculated Ukrainian cement producers' total CBAM tax bill as US$3.36m/yr.¹⁰

Montenegro introduced its own emissions trading system, modelled on the EU ETS, in February 2021, a move which Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Macedonia have both announced their intent to follow.¹¹

Norway has called for international acceptance of the CBAM, but questioned the practicality of including indirect carbon pricing.

An example of the possible adverse effects of the CBAM comes from the EU's ban on Russian cement imports in April 2022. The loss of the EU market was one likely contributor to a rollback of climate regulation there.¹²

Developing countries

Non-governmental organisation (NGO) Oxfam has criticised the CBAM's failure to include an exemption for the least developed countries. The EU's solution is an indirect one: it will put CBAM revenues towards its budget, from which international climate finance funding will be raised to an equivalent level. As Paris Agreement signatories, EU member states already expect to contribute towards a total US$100bn/yr in climate finance funds for poorer countries in 2023.

Oxfam has recommended that the EU do more to take account of its disproportionate contribution to cumulative global CO₂ emissions. This would include directly paying CBAM revenues into international climate finance and accelerating the phase-out of free ETS allocations.

Conclusion

On 22 June 2022, the most sustainable cement market in the world successfully harnessed market forces to its emissions reduction ambitions. The European cement industry will be able to celebrate the end of carbon leakage. Cement companies outside of the EU, however, now face increased costs and lower prices for their product. The legislation addresses some of the harm that it causes to less developed countries; those – like China, Turkey and Vietnam – in the middle must meet it head-on.

So far, we have cited governments and lobby groups, but the real question of readiness for the CBAM lies with producers. Global cement companies, including those based in the EU, have implemented their sustainable cement technologies across all continents, and are beginning to reap the rewards of a new world where paying for pollution is unavoidable.

Sources

1. Sandbag, E3G and Energy Foundation, A Storm in a Teacup, Impacts and Geopolitical Risks of the European Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, August 2021, https://9tj4025ol53byww26jdkao0x-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/E3G-Sandbag-CBAM-Paper-Eng.pdf

2. Trend Economy, ‘Imports: European Union: 6810,’ 14 November 2021, https://trendeconomy.com/data/h2/EuropeanUnion/6810

3. Energy Monitor, ‘Carbon trading the Chinese way,’ 5 January 2022, https://www.energymonitor.ai/policy/carbon-markets/carbon-trading-the-chinese-way

4. China Power, ‘How Is China’s Energy Footprint Changing?’ https://chinapower.csis.org/energy-footprint/

5. Politico, ‘EU’s looming carbon tax nudged Turkey toward Paris climate accord, envoy says,’ 6 November 2021, https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-carbon-border-adjustment-mechanism-turkey-paris-accord-climate-change/

6. Canadian Climate Institute/L'Instut Climatique du Canada, 'Border Carbon Adjustments,' 27 January 2022, https://climateinstitute.ca/publications/border-carbon-adjustments/

7. Congress, 'S.4355 - Clean Competition Act,' 7 June 2022, https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/4355?s=1&r=6

8.Ukraine Resource & Analysis Centre (Society and Environment), ' The Impact of Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) on the EU - Ukraine trade,' November 2021, https://www.rac.org.ua/uploads/content/624/files/impactcarbonmechanismcbamukrainesummaryen.pdf

9. Burke et al, 'What does an EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism mean for the UK?' April 2021, https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/What-does-an-EU-Carbon-Border-Adjustment-Mechanism-mean-for-the-UK_FULL-REPORT.pdf

10. European Business Association, 'Ukrainian exporters to pay more than € 1 billion in carbon tax to the EU under the CBAM,' 31 May 2022, https://eba.com.ua/en/ponad-1-mlrd-yevro-podatku-na-vuglets-shhoroku-splachuvatymut-ukrayinski-eksportery-v-yes-v-ramkah-svam/

11. Balkan Green Energy News, 'Which Western Balkan countries intend to introduce carbon tax?' 18 May 2022, https://balkangreenenergynews.com/which-western-balkan-countries-intend-to-introduce-carbon-tax/

12. Climate Home News, 'Russian climate action and research is collateral damage in Putin’s war on Ukraine,' 26 May 2022, https://www.climatechangenews.com/2022/05/26/russian-climate-action-and-research-is-collateral-damage-in-putins-war-on-ukraine/

Montenegro: State-owned energy supplier Elektroprivreda Crne Gore (EPCG) has proposed the gradual shutdown of its Pljevlja coal-fired plant and its replacement with a new cement plant. The company said that such a plant would eliminate Montenegro’s 750,000 – 800,000t/yr of cement imports.

The first stage of the Pljevlja power plant’s shutdown will only commence once a replacement power facility is online. Currently, the plant supplies 40% of the country’s energy. Its closure is part of Montenegro’s plan to accede to the EU as soon as 2025.

Montenegro: The Chamber of Economy of Montenegro has discussed plans to build a new cement plant at Pljevlja. The project has been proposed to reduce imports of cement, grow the local economy and take advantage of local resources, according to the Vijesti newspaper. The location is favoured due to local reserves of marl, coal, gypsum and fly ash from a local coal-fired power station. However, Dragica Sekulić, the minister of economy, said that the project would require a ‘serious’ investor.

In 2017 the country imported cement with a value of Euro41m. In the first nine months of 2018 it has imported Euro39m worth of cement.

Bosnia & Herzegovina: Coal producer Banovici plans to build a 1.1Mt/yr cement plant for Euro250m. It has already obtained the necessary documents and secured an environmental permit. Work on the plant is planned to begin in 2019, according to Ekapija. The company said that a strategic partner would provide the funds and ‘may’ build the plant or choose the contractor for its construction. Cement from the plant will be used locally and exported to Serbia, Montenegro and Croatia.

Croatia/Montenegro: Cemex Crotia says it is supplying cement for a local construction boom in Montenegro. It is supplying building materials for several infrastructure projects, including three mixed-use resorts and a motorway. It has already supplied over 0.28Mt of cement for the Smokovac-Mateševo section of the Bar-Boljare motorway. It has also supplied over 0.2Mt/yr of cement for resort projects at Portonovi, Porto Montenegro, and Luštica Bay on the Adriatic coast.