Displaying items by tag: Sanctions

Belarus: The US government sanctioned the management company of Belarusian Cement Company on 6 December 2023. PrimePress News has reported that 10 other Belarus-based companies and eight individuals were also added to the US sanctions list. This is the latest group of additions since the US and its allies began sanctioning Belarusian entities in connection to election rigging, human rights abuses and complicity in the on-going Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Russia/Uzbekistan: The US Department of State has imposed sanctions upon USM Holding including its subsidiaries Akkermann Cement and USM Cement in Russia, and Akhangarancement in Uzbekistan. The action is intended to target company owner Alisher Burhanovich Usmanov and his various business interests. Other USM companies in the iron, steel, copper, gold, telecommunications and real estate sectors are also affected.

The US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control noted that Usmanov was, “one of Russia’s wealthiest billionaires, with vast holdings across multiple sectors of the Russian Federation economy as well as internationally.” It added that he was linked to multiple senior Russian officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin as well as Dmitry Medvedev, current Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of Russia and former President and Prime Minister of Russia. Usmanov has also been sanctioned by Australia, Canada, the European Union (EU), Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland and the UK.

These latest US sanctions are in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Companies on the sanction list are forbidden to conduct business transactions with any US citizens.

Akkermann Cement operates two cement plants and a network of 12 terminals in Russia. It acquired a majority stake in Uzbekistan-based Akhangarancement in early 2022.

After the initial shocking coverage of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which began in February 2022, came announcements of the most extensive sanctions in history by the EU, G7 nations and others against Russia. In the EU, this effectively deconsolidated companies' Russian subsidiaries, leaving decision makers with the choice whether to sell up or hold out for better times.¹ Four Russian-facing EU cement producers - Buzzi Unicem, CRH, Heidelberg Materials and Holcim - finalised their strategic responses in March 2022.

One year on, on 15 March 2023, 666 (21%) of 3110 eligible multinationals have withdrawn from Russia, according to the KSE Institute.² Ireland-based CRH led the cement sector exit. It abandoned its Finland-based subsidiary Rudus' ready-mix concrete joint venture, LujaBetomix, on 2 March 2022. Switzerland-based Holcim took longer, but affected its exit on 14 December 2022, agreeing to sell Holcim Russia to local management. One condition of the sale was a rebrand (to Cementum, in February 2023) to withdraw the Holcim name from Russia. Unlike CRH, Holcim's Russian business included multiple cement plants - though the producer stated that it contributed less than 1% of group sales during 2021.

The KSE Institute uses the equivocal label of 'waiting' for companies which have paused investments, or scaled back operations, in Russia, while retaining their subsidiaries. This applies to 500 companies globally (16% of the pre-war total). Germany-based Heidelberg Materials acted swiftly to freeze further investments in HeidelbergCement Russia on 10 March 2022. At that time, its three cement plants were in winter shutdown. In terms of capacity, the 4.7Mt/yr-capacity Heidelberg Materials Russia constitutes 2.8% of Heidelberg Materials. In 2022, Heidelberg Materials suffered a Euro102m impairment on account of its Russian business. CEO Dominik von Achten, announcing the freeze, had described the subsidiary as a 'pure local business with no imports or exports.' Its website has since come offline, but the corporate structure presumably maintains in its frozen isolation.

1220 global multinationals - 39% of all those previously operating in Russia - are still 'continuing operations.' Among these is Buzzi Unicem. Having decided that 12 months was long enough, the Ukrainian National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption (NAPC) placed Italy-based Buzzi Unicem on its list of Russian war sponsors on 8 March 2023 for the actions of its subsidiary SLK Cement. A scathing denouncement accompanied the listing, in which the NAPC set out its main charges. It accused Buzzi Unicem of:

1. Expanding its business in Russia since the invasion;

2. Supplying its products to Russian state-owned businesses, including energy suppliers Rosatom and Rosneft;

3. Voicing support for the invasion via its social media presence.

The NAPC concluded “Buzzi Unicem's continued business in Russia means direct support and sponsorship of terrorism by Russia.”

Buzzi Unicem responded in no uncertain terms that these allegations are untrue: it has no business in Russia, and the entity bearing its logo on its (SLK Cement's) website is entirely independent in its decision-making and commercial actions.

This goes to the root of what it means to be a subsidiary of a corporation. Buzzi Unicem seeks to define the relationship as beginning and ending in operational involvement. Yet Buzzi Unicem and other corporations have invested large sums in businesses like SLK Cement. According to the NAPC, Buzzi Unicem paid Euro62m in taxes alone in Russia between 2016 and 2021. Whether they have elected to 'continue operations,' 'wait' or write in favourable buy-back options into sales contracts, as has happened in other industries, companies can be expected to seek to return to their investment.

As such, it is not entirely surprising that Buzzi Unicem should have followed up its rebuttal with a defence of SLK Cement. It stated "SLK Cement is a Russian domiciled entity operating exclusively in that country and therefore subject to domestic legislation. Payment of taxes and having employees being mobilised to the army are not discretionary decisions, rather legal obligations within the Russian jurisdiction."

In the decision to sell or hold, multinationals face the usual considerations: can they afford to yield their market share to other - less conscientious - competitors? Or, in this instance, those from Türkiye, India and China, whose potential investments are unrestrained by sanctions? Even as Holcim thrashed out its exit deal in October 2022, China-based West China Cement announced plans for a new US$260m, 1.2Mt/yr cement plant in Tatarstan, Volga Federal District. Meanwhile, Cemros (formerly Eurocement) is carrying out a Euro3m mill upgrade at its Lipetsk integrated cement plant in Central Federal District, which will increase the plant's capacity by 20% upon commissioning in early 2023. Between them, Central Federal District and Volga Federal District host four former Holcim cement plants.

12 months into the Russian invasion of Ukraine, an onslaught of withdrawals has shrunk, but not collapsed, the Russian economy.³ The Russian government insists that cement demand remains high (up by 2.1% year-on-year to 58.3Mt during the first 11 months of 2022, according to the Russian cement association Soyuzcement).⁴ The country has substituted new sources of imports for those lost since the beginning of the invasion, the government claims. It is even preparing for a cement shortage from 2024 onward by 'further developing domestic production capacities.'

Far from shrinking, Russian cement production rose by approximately 2.5% year-on-year to 60.7Mt in 2022.^{4, 5} The two aforementioned districts - Central Federal District and Volga Federal District - contributed a healthy 15.3Mt (25%) and 13.4Mt (22%) respectively. If the statistics are to be believed, the EU's recalled producers are missing out on a bonanza.

At the same time, all four EU-based producers face the parallel burden of increased costs in their key markets, as sanctions keep energy prices at an all-time high, and nowhere more so than in Europe. These sanctions purport to target Russian businesses and individuals, but their bite is far less discriminating. Companies may well wonder why they are being penalised by governments whose policies failed to prevent a Russian invasion of Ukraine in the first place.

We have no idea what will happen in Ukraine and Russia in the rest of 2023, but we can be sure it will be uncertain territory for the two countries’ cement producers. Those with (former) assets in the Russian market will have to continue their delicate balancing act.

1. European Commission, 'Frequently Asked Questions,' 16 March 2022, https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2022/march/tradoc_160079.pdf

2. KSE Institute, 'Stop Doing Business with Russia,' 15 March 2023, https://leave-russia.org/leaving-companies?flt%5B147%5D%5Beq%5D%5B%5D=9062

3. European Council, 'Infographic - Impact of sanctions on the Russian economy ,' 9 March 2023, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/impact-sanctions-russian-economy/

4. Soyuzcement, 'Cement Review,' December 2022, https://soyuzcem.ru/documents/%D0%A6%D0%B5%D0%BC%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%82%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B5_%D0%BE%D0%B1%D0%BE%D0%B7%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B5_%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BA%D0%B0%D0%B1%D1%80%D1%8C%202022.pdf

5. BusinessStat, 'In 2022, 60.7 million tons of cement were produced in Russia,' 21 February 2023, https://marketing.rbc.ru/articles/14025/

Ukraine/Italy: The Ukrainian National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption (NAPC) has placed Italy-based Buzzi Unicem on its list of Russian war sponsors. Ukrinform has reported that the NAPC accuses Buzzi Unicem of expanding its business in Russia since the country's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, of supplying its products to Russian state-owned businesses including energy suppliers Rosatom and Rosneft, and of voicing support for the on-going invasion via its social media presence.

Between 2016 and 2021, Buzzi Unicem reportedly paid Euro62m-worth of taxes to Russia. In a statement, the NAPC said "For comparison, this is the cost of 206 Tochka U missiles." It concluded “Buzzi Unicem's continued business in Russia means direct support and sponsorship of terrorism by Russia.”

On 10 March 2023, Buzzi Unicem clarified that it has no business in Russia, calling the NAPC's listing 'defamatory.' The group explained that it has 'no involvement' in its Russian subsidiary SLK Cement's decision-making process related to local initiatives and commercial actions.

Buzzi Unicem said "Buzzi Unicem already clarified in its press release dated 12 May 2022 the decision to cease with immediate effect any operational involvement in the activities carried out by the subsidiary SLK Cement in Russia and to suspend all strategic initiatives and investments in the country." It defended the subsidiary, saying "SLK Cement is a Russian domiciled entity operating exclusively in that country and therefore subject to domestic legislation. Payment of taxes and having employees being mobilised to the army are not discretionary decisions, rather legal obligations within the Russian jurisdiction."

The group also voiced its support for Ukraine, saying "Despite significant financial losses incurred as a consequence of the Russian invasion, Buzzi Unicem did not stop operations in Ukraine, keeps supplying products to Ukrainian customers, paying taxes in Ukraine and providing job and humanitarian aid to its nearly 1000 employees and families in the country."

The English language release may be found here.

Afghanistan: Ghori Cement says that its Baghlan cement plants currently produce 600t/day of cement, corresponding to annual production of 0.22Mt/yr. The producer states that production is restricted by shortages of electricity and vehicles. With regular supply of these, it would increase its production by 33% to 800t/day (0.29Mt/yr), according to the company.

Production at the Baghlan cement plants was previously suspended for four months in mid-2022 due to high coal prices. This was resolved when the government began supplying the plants with coal at a pre-agreed price. The plants then reopened with a daily production of 520t/day (0.19Mt/yr), up by 49% from 350t/yr (0.13Mt/yr).

The provincial government said that an upgrade with equipment from China and Iran since increased production by 15% to its present 600t/day (0.22Mt/yr).

Uzbekistan: The government has ordered a partial transition of industries, including cement, to coal fuel from natural gas. The Turan Information Agency has reported that the ordinance, entitled Accelerating the Introduction of Renewable Energy Sources and Energy-Saving Technologies, will create an additional coal demand of 1.63Mt/yr and reduce national gas consumption by 926Mm²/yr. From 1 April 2023, the government will halve tariffs on coal imports, while the construction of new gas pipes to industrial facilities will be banned from 1 May 2023.

Russia: Holcim’s divested Russian business has rebranded as Cementum. Local management concluded a deal to buy the company from Switzerland-based Holcim in December 2022. The new ownership agreed to change the name upon completion of the transaction. Holcim Russia had been operating as a deconsolidated subsidiary of Holcim since March 2022, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Lafarge Cement Zimbabwe (LCZ) received an unwelcome present before Christmas when the US Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) placed the company buying it on its economic sanctions list. OFAC made its announcement on 12 December 2022. However, the cement producer said that its parent company, Associated International Cement, had concluded its sale of a 76% stake in LCZ to Fossil Mines on 6 December 2022. Local press reports that the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange halted trading in the cement company on 23 December 2022. Then, LCZ said on 29 December 2022 that the OFAC sanctions had “impacted some processes” within it. It added that it was considering various courses of action to protect the business and the interests of all stakeholders.

OFAC took action against Fossil Agro, Fossil Contracting and the group’s chief executive officer, Obey Chimuka, due to alleged links to a previously sanctioned individual, Kudakwashe Tagwirei, and his company, Sakunda Holdings. OFAC said that Tagwirei had “materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, logistical, or technical support for, or goods or services in support of, the Government of Zimbabwe.” It accused him of using his relationships with government officials to gain state contracts, to receive access to currencies, including the US Dollar, and of supplying luxury items such as cars to ministers. It added that Chimuka was a “longtime business partner” of Tagwirei. Fossil Agro was also linked to a mismanaged agricultural subsidy scheme.

When a company says it has concluded a divestment or acquisition the expectation is that everything has finished. However, LCZ has admitted that the OFAC action has caused it some problems. We’ll have to wait for more information to be released to appreciate the full extent of these ‘problems.’ However, it is worth noting that government capital controls caused delays for the handover of a new vertical cement mill ordered from China-based CBMI to LCZ in mid-2022. At the time it was reported that the cement producer still owed the supplier around US$5m but was unable to make the payment due to economic measures the government had taken to avoid depreciation of the local currency. Other potential issues could also lie in any continuing services or materials that Associated International Cement and its parent company Holcim might have agreed to supply to Fossil Mines in the future as part of the divestment deal.

Looking at LCZ’s business more generally, in its third quarter trading update it said that revenue was down by 43% year-on-year due to suppressed cement and mortar sales volumes. Yet, this was due, in part, to a roof collapse at the company’s plant in late 2021 and the commissioning and ramp-up of that new mill in the fourth quarter of 2022. So the company expects ‘significant’ recovery in its sales volumes in 2023. In a sobering aside illustrating the realities of doing business in Zimbabwe, it also mentioned that the local interest rate jumped to above 200% in July 2022! Despite all of this though, it noted that both residential and government-based infrastructure markets were driving market demand.

South Africa’s PPC reported a fall in its cement sales volumes from its subsidiary PPC Zimbabwe in the six months to September 2022 with knock-on declines to revenue and earnings. It blamed this on a planned kiln shutdown, noted the negative role of hyperinflation and forecast that volumes would improve subsequently due to ‘robust’ cement demand. It pointed out that its earnings were hit during the maintenance period because it had to import clinker from South Africa and Zambia and that this was more expensive than locally manufactured clinker. The other thing that both LCZ and PPC raised were power cuts, although LCZ reported that unscheduled outages had decreased in the third quarter of 2022.

The growing demand for cement in Zimbabwe as reported by both LCZ and PPC helps to explain how Holcim was able to finalise a deal to sell its local subsidiary in 2022. Operational and financial hurdles such as coping with hyperinflation and power cuts show the problems these companies have also faced running a business in the country. Merger and acquisition deals in the cement sector often face travails as they are proposed, negotiated, made public and then put to the scrutiny of regulators. It seems unusual though for a divestment deal to run into problems after it has seemingly been closed.

Zimbabwe: A deal by Fossil Mines to buy a 76% stake in Lafarge Zimbabwe has been stalled by the introduction of economic sanctions by the US Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC). In mid-December 2022 OFAC added Fossil Agro, Fossil Contracting and the group’s chief executive officer, Obey Chimuka, to its Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list due to alleged links to a previously sanctioned individual, Kudakwashe Tagwirei, and his company, Sakunda Holdings.

OFAC said that Tagwirei had “materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, logistical, or technical support for, or goods or services in support of, the Government of Zimbabwe.” It accused him of using his relationships with government officials to gain state contracts, to receive access to currencies including the US Dollar and of supplying luxury items such as cars to ministers. It added that Chimuka was a “longtime business partner” of Tagwirei. Fossil Agro was also linked to a mismanaged agricultural subsidy scheme.

In a statement Lafarge Zimbabwe said that it was “considering various courses of action with a view to protecting the business and the interests of all stakeholders.” The deal to sell a majority stake in the subsidiary of Switzerland-based Holcim was originally finalised in early December 2022.

Russia: Holcim has agreed to sell its Russian business to its local management. When the transaction is completed, the business will continue to operate under different branding. Holcim says that it remains committed to supporting Holcim Russia’s employees and ensuring an orderly transfer for its customers. DGAP Corporate News has reported that Holcim deconsolidated the subsidiary in March 2022, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Holcim said “Holcim’s Board of Directors expresses its heartfelt concern about the tragic human suffering in the region, and is fully committed to supporting affected people, families and communities. The Board of Directors thanks all Holcim colleagues who are mobilising around the world alongside local NGOs to provide shelter, essential goods and medical supplies, as well as volunteering their time.”