Displaying items by tag: Brazil

Brazil: COO of Intercement Ricardo Lima has been appointed as company president. He replaces Jose Edison Franco. Lima and Franco have made a strategic company plan, which includes a US$250m investment in a new cement plant in Mozambique.

Russian refractory manufacturer Magnezit Group has struck a deal this week with Vamtec to sell product in Brazil. What such a cooperation agreement will actually entail, as ever, remains vague but it is an interesting time for a cement equipment supplier to enter the market. The majority of refractories sales are to the iron and steel industries but cement and lime holds the biggest minority market. Industrial research analysts Roskill placed the cement and lime share at 13% in a recent market report.

Competitor refractory producer RHI placed Magnezit in the same Euro0.5 – 1bn revenue bracket with producers such as a Magnesita, Inerys, Krosaki and Shinagawa. Magnesita is the most relevant company out of that list because it is headquartered in Belo Horizonte in Brazil. It is a global company but some of its major mines and production sites are based in Brazil. In 2013 its revenue grew by 8% to US$937m despite static refractory sales volumes led by falling steel production. In 2013 its refractory revenues came mainly from South America. So far in 2014 it appears to have increased its refractory sales volumes, despite a declining marking in Brazil and South America as a whole, by moving into new markets.

A similar situation has been reported by RHI in the region so far in 2014 with falling steel production hitting refractory revenue. RHI originally planned to build a refractory plant in Rio de Janeiro in 2011 but this was amended in late 2012. In this environment it seems that Magnezit may be testing the market rather than planning a full-scale incursion into Brazil.

For the first half of 2014 the Sindicato Nacional Da Indústria Do Cimento (SNIC) has reported that cement sales were 34.5Mt in Brazil, a rise of 2.8% compared to the same period in 2013. Despite this modest growth, Brazilian cement producers will see this as disappointing following years of higher growth prior to 2013.

However, events may not be that gloomy in Brazil after all. The prospect of CRH's impending purchase of three cement plants and two grinding plants from Lafarge and Holcim in Brazil with a cement production capacity of 3.6Mt/yr may stir up the market. For starters CRH may audit the suppliers the new plants are using and decide whether they want to continue using them. The acquisition will add a new player to compete with the existing producers in the high producing states of Minas Gerais and Rio De Janeiro. Competition authority Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (CADE) set up the terms for what Lafarge and Holcim would have to sell in December 2014, so now that a buyer has been found the move may go smoothly. Needless to say this presents an opening for any, say, Russian-based refractory producers looking for new clients!

CRH has made good on its intentions. This week it stumped up Euro6.5bn to buy assets from Lafarge and Holcim in four continents. The move follows preparation since at least May 2014 when the Irish building materials group announced a divestment programme. In October 2014 it announced that it would sell its brickwork division.

CRH is finding the cash through a mix of existing cash, debt and equity placing. Interestingly, back in 2012 an Irish stockbroking analyst who was interviewed reckoned that the company could spend up to Euro3.5bn on acquisitions whilst remaining within its banking agreements. Throw in the recent sales and planned divestments and the planned acquisition from LafargeHolcim doesn't seem like too much of a stretch for CRH.

If completed, the purchase will see CRH take on 24 cement plants with a production capacity of 36Mt/yr. As a back of the envelope calculation suggests the sale price of Euro6.5bn isn't far off the occasionally used price of US$200/t for western cement production. The deal also includes aggregates, ready mixed concrete and asphalt assets.

The purchase marks a change in CRH's buying strategy both in terms of scale and distribution. Much of CRH's previous acquisitions have been minority shareholdings that make it difficult to accurately report the company's position in the cement industry. For example, in our Top 100 Report CRH was reported to have a production capacity of 6.49Mt/yr for majority shareholdings with another 19.9Mt/yr for minority shareholdings. The new cement capacity being purchased blows this away because it more than doubles CRH's total capacity and it appears to be all majority owned. CRH thinks that this will propel it to become the world's third biggest building materials manufacturer after LafargeHolcim and Saint-Gobain, leapfrogging Cemex and HeidelbergCement in the process. Strangely there is no mention of the huge Chinese players in the top five manufacturers in CRH's acquisition presentation.

CRH has avoided buying plants in southern Europe but it is relying on the slowly improving growing UK market, where CRH will pick up four plants, to balance the risk. Elsewhere in Europe, the three Holcim plants in France have been suffering from continued low construction rates in that country and the two Lafarge cement plants in Romania are unlikely to have recovered from a production fall in 2013. Outside of Europe growth has been poor in Quebec in 2013 and 2014, where CRH is buying two plants from Holcim. Both Lafarge and Holcim have also seen a slowdown in Brazil. However, the Philippines does seem like a better bet for CRH, with solid cement volumes growth seen by Lafarge in 2013 and the first three quarters of 2014.

With CRH now looking like a company that wants to produce cement rather than one that owns parts of companies that produce cement, all eyes are on the construction markets. 14 of the 24 cement plants CRH are buying are in Europe. Buying at the bottom of a sustained production slump makes sense because the asking price will be low. However, has the bottom been reached yet?

The Brazilian cement industry took a knock last week when the competition watchdog Cade (Administrative Council for Economic Defence) confirmed its intention to issue the sector with fines worth a combined US$1.4bn.

Under the terms of the ruling, Votorantim will have to pay US$672m, Cimpor will pay US$133m, InterCement Brasil will pay US$108m, Itabira will pay US$184m, Holcim will pay US$227m and Itambé will have to pay US$39.4m. The companies involved will be forced on average to sell 24% of their assets. Votorantim, for example, will be compelled to divest 35% of its cement assets or 11Mt/yr of production capacity. In addition a fine of nearly US$2m is to be imposed on the cement associations ABCP and SNIC.

To give these figures some context, Votorantim reported a net profit of US$105m in 2013 across all its business lines including cement, metals, mining and pulp. The fine Cade wants to impose is over six times greater than this! A fine of this size will be a serious setback for Votorantim if it goes through. Votorantim's net revenue for its cement business in 2013 was about US$5.5bn. This places the fine at just over 10% of company annual turnover, a common upper limit for fines imposed by anti-competition authorities around the world. 10% of turnover, for example, is the maximum percentage fine that European Union competition regulators can impose.

Although hard to compare with the other Brazilian cement producers due to differences in financial reporting, the proposed fines seem equally tough on the other companies. Before the acquisition of Cimpor inflated its financial figures, InterCement reported a net revenue of US$1.2bn in 2011. This places its fine at 9% of annual turnover. Holcim's net sales in its Latin American region as a whole, including operations in Brazil, totalled US$3.73bn in 2013.

Both Holcim and Cimpor have issued corporate rebuttals to Cade insisting that they followed and still follow all the necessary competition laws. Both companies intend to fight the decision. Votorantim went further in its response saying that it considering the fine 'unjust and unprecedented' and it warned that the ruling would cripple any investments in the Brazilian cement sector. The ruling also forbids the company from opening new factories within the next five years, places limits on the company taking out new loans and prevents it from consolidating its market share.

Internationally, the Cade fine surpasses the US$1.1bn Competition Commission of India penalty imposed against 11 producers in India in 2013. Other recent anti-trust fines against the cement industry include a Euro80m fine in Poland that was upheld on appeal in 2013 and the US$19.3m Lafarge was charged in South Africa in 2012.

The prosecutors pointed out that work on public roads had been inflated by nearly US$8m. Overall they reckon that the cartel cost the Brazilian economy US$6.3bn. Examples likes this are unlikely to gain sympathy for the accused cement producers from a Brazilian public already angry about the amount of public money spent on building excessive sports stadiums and the like for the Football World Cup later in June 2014 and the Olympic Games in 2016. In the meantime though – over to the lawyers.

Cement cartels (or at least cases of cartel-like behaviour) have reared their ugly heads this week... again. In two different markets, Australia and Brazil, competition authorities are at various stages of taking major action against large proportions of their respective cement industries. In another, Europe, it is the cement producers that are taking on the authorities.

This week, the Australian Federal Court has found five producers guilty of agreeing anti-competitive contracts with regard to fly-ash supply contracts from power stations in the state of Victoria. Only Cement Australia Holdings was not accused. Penalties are to be determined at a later date – watch this space.

As drastic as the Australian situation may be, it is Brazil's anti-trust authority Cade that looks set to make the biggest 'splash' in a cement industry in 2014. On 13 March 2014 it was reported that a US$1.32bn fine, split over six cement producers, has been put on hold after the producers disputed a ruling that would see them lose an average 24% of their cement assets each. So big is this fine that it actually eclipses the US$1.1bn fine seen in India in 2012. In light of the amount of influence that they look set to lose, it now looks extremely likely that the producers will appeal. This sets the scene for indeterminably long waits for legal proceedings and more evidence to be collected. Whatever happens in Brazil, there will be major implications for its increasingly-concentrated cement market.

Elsewhere, in a strange inversion of the normal situation, in Europe it is the cement producers that are taking action. This week the European Court has rejected an appeal from eight major cement producers including Holcim, HeidelbergCement and Cemex subsidiaries with respect to the European Commission's handling of an anti-cartel investigation that began in 2008. That case saw anti-trust investigations start in 2010. Proceedings continue.

As stated previously in this column, cartel-like behaviour is not necessarily indicative of a formal cartel. There are innumerable factors that make every case different and, in each, proving actual collusion is very hard indeed. In the cement industry however, it appears that 'convictions' in cartel cases are easier to spot than in other sectors.

"The first thing for any new competition regulator is to go out and find the cement cartel. My experience of this subject is, it is always there, somewhere," wrote Richard Whish, a Professor of Law at King's College London in 2001. "The only countries in which I had been unable to find the cement cartel is where there is a national state-owned monopoly for cement."

The authorities will keep looking and producers, guilty or not, will continue to wait for their call.

Brazil: Dirce Navarro de Camargo, who became Brazil's richest woman when she inherited the Camargo Corrêa industrial conglomerate, has died at the age of 100.

Camargo died on Saturday 20 April 2013. Her age was disclosed by an executive close to the family who asked not to be named because the matter is private. She controlled a fortune valued at US$13.8bn and was the 62nd richest person in the world, according to Bloomberg.

Founded in 1939 by her late husband, Sebastiao Camargo, the conglomerate has played a key role in developing Brazil's infrastructure. It participated in the construction of Brazil's new capital, Brasilia, in the 1950s. Today, its interests range from publicly-traded cement maker Cimpor Cimentos de Portugal to a flip-flop manufacturer.

Camargo's three daughters, Regina de Camargo Pires Oliveira Dias, Renata de Camargo Nascimento and Rosana Camargo de Arruda Botelho, are poised to inherit the family fortune. The company spokesman declined to comment on how that fortune will be split up.

Camargo Corrêa came out fighting this week when it announced plans to invest US$1.5bn into the Brazilian market. The move represents the serious readjustment to the Brazilian cement industry that's been shadowed ever since the government approved the Cimpor takeover in 2012.

To show how high the stakes are, in October 2012 Votarantim, the Brazilian cement market leader, released early plans to invest US$160m for a 0.75Mt/yr plant in the Treinta y Tres region of Uruguay to meet demand for the 2016 Rio de Janeiro Olympic Games. At these prices the Camargo Corrêa spend could represent projects creating up to 7Mt of cement production capacity in Brazil. This is close to the current capacity gap between Camargo Corrêa (15Mt/yr) and market-leader Votarantim (23Mt/yr)! It's no killer blow for Camargo Corrêa but it does put the two producers in the same 'weight' category.

Although SNIC, the Brazilian cement industry association, recently downgraded estimates for growth in the market to 5.5% in 2013, this still represents very strong demand growth. A previous estimate by Research & Markets put the figure at 9%/yr until 2016. Either way that puts Brazilian capacity at between 87Mt/yr and 100Mt/yr in 2016 with Camargo Corrêa poised to snare a hefty chunk all for itself.

Yet before onlookers count Votorantim out, the company filed for an Initial Public Offering on 9 April 2013. No amounts were revealed but Dow Jones reported a figure of US$2.95bn in mid-January 2013 for expansion both inside and outside of Brazil. Also, the sale of shares must be approved by the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission. The industry heavyweight isn't going down without a fight! International companies have also shown interest with Lafarge's announcement in January 2013 that it would invest US$500m in the country, just one of many such moves on the way. Whatever happens, the Brazilian cement market is shaping up for one hell of a scrap.

For more information see our article on the Brazilian cement industry in the February 2013 issue of Global Cement Magazine. In early 2014 Global Cement will hold the first Global Cement CemBrazil Conference and Exhibition. Dates are to be confirmed.

The news that Brazil's competition regulator, Cade, has approved Camargo Corrêa's attempt to control Portugal's Cimpor after over two years of poker-faced mergers, acquisitions and deals, has significantly changed the cement landscape of the country. Camargo will now be allowed a controlling stake in the Portuguese producer assuming that Votorantim, Cimpor's other major shareholder, sells its Brazilian Cimpor assets to a third player. 

The deal looks likely to happen fairly quickly, with Votorantim stating that it never intended to remain as Camargo's partner in Cimpor. Lafarge appears to have first refusal as the original seller of the stake to Votorantim, but Cade may want to avoid this due to Lafarge's strong Brazilian position.

With its Cimpor interests now set to go to another producer, the regulator is clearly looking to spread the cement wealth in the country. Cade also said that Camargo must sell some assets in Brazil's heavily developed São Paulo state - presumably not to Votorantim! An asset swap will see Cimpor assets abroad transferred to Votorantim.

The Brazilian cement market has become increasingly concentrated since 1990. At that time there were 19 different producers; by 2000 there were 12. That number has since increased slightly, but Votorantim, Cimpor, Camargo Corrêa, Holcim and Lafarge still have 85% of the integrated capacity between them. Cade's attempts to moderate their influence is understandable, given that some regions are currently now supplied by Votorantim-owned production to the tune of 70%. Accusations of cartels have been rife in Brazil for many years.

Consumers, both large and small, will be hopeful that the deal will go through smoothly and that a drop in market concentration will reduce prices in the country. Even the Brazilian government is affected. It is seeking to spend hundreds of billions of dollars on road, port and home construction and for expansion of its mines, farms and factories. If prices of building materials can be reduced, it will be able to accelerate its general development and ramp up extraction and production of its valuable natural resources.

Camargo Corrêa's ongoing bid for Cimpor must be creating nightmares for Brazil's anti-cartel authorities.

If the takeover goes through, Camargo Corrêa's Brazilian market share will rise from 24% to 37% according to data from the Global Cement Directory 2012. Together with industrial conglomerate Grupo Votorantim, who already own 21% of Cimpor, this share would amount to 72% of the country's total cement capacity.

As covered in this week's Global Cement Weekly #44 Jose Barros Franco, chief executive of Intercement a subsidiary of Camargo Corrêa, has explicitly denied that Camargo had a pre-agreement with Votorantim to split up Cimpor assets. However, he did not rule out a deal in the future to jointly manage the company. This implies that companies representing nearly three-quarters of the Brazilian cement market might be working together to at least some degree!

In October 2011 Camargo Corrêa denied that it was in talks to buyout Cimpor. According to one source at that time, Camargo Corrêa planned to take over Cimpor's operations in Brazil while Votorantim was considering taking assets outside of Brazil. Currently analysts expect the same thing to happen now if the takeover goes through, especially given any possible anti-competitive attention in Brazil.

With operations in four continents Portugal's Cimpor holds 77% of its global capacity outside of Brazil. If the takeover does actually happen, then the key question is this: how much of Cimpor's international operation does Votorantim want in return for helping its competitor Camargo Corrêa to grow back at home in Brazil?