Displaying items by tag: Analysis

Germany: Currax and Siemens have announced their collaboration on a mill operations digitisation pilot project involving the Simotics Connect 400 motor data collector and transmitter. They hope that analysis of data processed via the Simotics 400 will better enable the remote operating of mills ‘to increase efficiency and component life’ and speeding the shift towards automation and production that is resilient to crises such as the coronavirus outbreak.

Netherlands: Malvern Panalytical has launched a next version of Epsilon 1 X-ray fluorescence (XRF) spectrometer. The upgrade has reduced the product’s size to 0.15m². Its precision has been improved by integrating a high-power X-ray tube and a new detector.

“With the new generation of our compact Epsilon 1 benchtop XRF spectrometers, you can take a small yet powerful lab directly to your sample for fast product screening and process control”, said Lieven Kempenaers, Malvern Panalytical Product Manager for benchtop XRF systems.

The Epsilon 1 product is available in a number of versions tailored for difference applications. The Epsilon 1 Lube Oil delivers ASTM 6481-compliant elemental analysis of unused lubricating oils; the Epsilon 1 Sulfur in Fuels quantifies sulphur content in fuels according to ASTM D4294-10 and ISO 20847; the Epsilon 1 Academia enables characterisation of unidentified samples, using Omnian software for standardless analysis; and the integrated camera in the Epsilon 1 for Small Spot Analysis simplifies the investigation of very small objects, inclusions or inhomogeneities.

Nigerian financial analysts Cordros Securities concluded this week that the merger of some of Lafarge’s Sub-Saharan African businesses had reduced earnings at Lafarge Africa. The report is interesting because it explicitly points out a situation where the consolidation of some of Lafarge’s various companies have failed in the wake of the formation of LafargeHolcim.

Cordros Securities’ criticism is that Nigeria’s Lafarge WAPCO performed better in 2013 alone before it became part of Lafarge Africa, with a higher standalone earnings before interest, taxation, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA) margin. Lafarge Africa formed in 2014, a year before the LafargeHolcim merger was completed, through the consolidation of Lafarge South Africa, United Cement Company of Nigeria, Ashakacem and Atlas Cement into Lafarge WAPCO. Since the formation of Lafarge Africa, Cordros maintains that its earnings per share have consistently fallen, its share price has dropped, its debt has risen, its margins have decreased and its sales volumes of cement have also withered.

Cordros mainly focuses on the Nigerian parts of Lafarge Africa’s business, given its interest in that market and the fact that about three quarters of the company is based in the country. It blames the current situation on growing operating costs since the merger, skyrocketing financing costs for debts and efficiency issues. In Nigeria, Lafarge Africa has had to cope with disruptions to gas supplies. Nigeria’s Dangote Cement had similar problems domestically in 2017 with falling cement sales volumes in a market reeling from an economic recession but Cordros reckoned that Dangote is picking up market share in the South West due to an ‘aggressive retail penetration’ strategy. Finally, Lafarge Africa faced a US$9m impairment in 2017 due to its abandoned pre-heater upgrade project at AshakaCem. The project has been suspended since 2009 due to security concerns in the North-East region. The plant faced an attack by the Boko Haram militant group in 2014 and the group has seemed reluctant to invest further in the site subsequently.

Cordros’ final word on the matter is that with the Nigerian cement market performing slower than it has previously, the local market has become a battleground between the established players of Dangote Cement, BUA Group and Lafarge Africa. What little the report does have on South Africa covers problems with old and inefficient hardware, labour disputes, low prices due to weak demand, high competition and a negative product mix.

Lafarge Africa itself presents a more mixed picture, with market growth picking up in Nigeria following end of the recession but continued market problems in South Africa. Overall, its reported sales grew by 4.8% to US$448m in the first half of 2018 but its EBITDA fell by 25% to US$76.4m. Overall cement sales volumes were reported as up by 5.4% to 2.6Mt in the first half but volumes were still falling in South Africa in the second quarter.

Part of the backdrop to all of this is the intention of Lafarge Africa to cut its debt. In May 2018 its chairman Mobolaji Balogun said that the company wanted to cut its debts by 2020 before continuing with its expansion programme. Part of this process will include a new rights issue later in 2018 to allow shareholders to buy stock at a discount.

It must have made sense, on paper at least, to merge the Lafarge subsidiaries in the two largest economies in Sub-Saharan Africa. Once the merger had settled in, with synergies generating extra revenue, the group could have considered adding extra territories such as Kenya. However, it’s not turned out like that. Two recessions in Nigeria and South Africa respectively, old equipment, debt and serious competition from locally owned producers have piled on the pressure instead. From a stockholder perspective, Cordros is not impressed by the performance of Lafarge Africa. The wider question is: what else did Lafarge and Holcim get wrong when they joined to form LafargeHolcim?

What’s long, thin and has already exported more than 20Mt of cement in 2018? The answer is Vietnam, which reported this week that it exported 20.1Mt of cement between 1 January 2018 and 31 August 2018. That’s 106 - 112% of its annual ‘target’ in just eight months and around the same amount as it claims to have exported during the whole of 2017. Total cement production in Vietnam was 63.9Mt between January and August 2018, meaning that the country has exported 31.3% of the cement it made over this period. Vietnam itself consumed ‘just’ 43.8Mt. The government target for Vietnamese cement consumption during 2018 is around 65 - 66Mt. That’s basically the amount it has already made.

From a market-led mind-set these targets seem fairly large, huge even, especially the export target. Indeed the concept of such national targets is in itself an alien concept. In most of the world, imports and exports are results of market supply and demand trends, not drivers prescribed by the government.

The reasons behind this apparent desire to export these very large volumes of cement are, therefore, probably best understood from within Vietnam, and we won’t speculate too much on them here. However, Vietnam is clearly determined to continue to produce ever more cement than it can use. In what other country could a major government-owned producer export more than 70% of the cement it makes? In the first half of 2018 Vicem did just that, shipping 11.7Mt of cement overseas from the 14.2Mt that it made.

In 2017 Vietnam’s export target was 15Mt. It ended up smashing this to the tune of 5Mt, 33% more than the target. At the current rate the sector looks like it could overshoot even more spectacularly this year, perhaps hitting as much as 30Mt of cement exports in 2018. This is more than a big European country like Germany can produce! It certainly sounds like a lot but… is it really an exceptional number?

Looking at data from World’s Top Exports (WTEx), which we advise delving into, it seems that this would be a very high number indeed. It reports that a total of 166.6Mt of cement were exported internationally in 2017. It reports that the top exporter was not, as you may by this point have been primed to suggest, Vietnam. It wasn’t even China, as the former number one was bumped into second place (12.91Mt) by Thailand (13.03Mt). Turkey was third (12.79Mt), with Japan fourth (11.93Mt) and Vietnam was listed as fifth (9.53Mt).

All of these biggest exporters except Turkey are in the Far East, an area swamped with cheap cement. China’s average export selling price according to WTEx was US$45/t, against a global average of US$55/t. Thailand undercut it by US$3/t at US$42/t, perhaps explaining its rise to the top spot. Turkey’s average export price was also US$42/t, although it is located in a region that has a lot of saturated markets and others that are growing rapidly. Its average export distance was second only to China’s. Vietnam’s average cement export price was US$51/t, higher than the others. This does not tie in with the apparent rise in exports so far in 2018. This price may have since fallen. Surprisingly, Japan had the lowest export price of the top five exporters by volume at just US$30/t in 2017.

So, to re-answer the question posed two paragraphs above, 30Mt is a very high number indeed. But you’ll have spotted the large discrepancy between WTEx’s 9.53Mt figure for Vietnam, which relies on reciprocal import partner data, and the government’s official line of 21Mt for 2017. One is tempted to ask where the other 50% of the exports reported by the Vietnamese actually ended up, especially given that WTEx reports a US$1.5bn difference in the value of exports and imports across the year. Imports were valued at US$8.8bn but exports were valued at US$10.3bn.

The mystery destination of all that cement, real or imagined, could be the topic of an entire separate column. What appears to be the case at present, is that rampant Vietnamese cement overcapacity is here to stay. The country, as well as Japan, Turkey, Thailand et. al., could stand to benefit in the short term, as China acts ever more aggressively to end its own oversupply situation. However, there could come a time when it has to take its foot off the gas. There are no signs of that yet though.

There have been quite a few new cement plant project announcements in the past week, with expansions announced in Mexico, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Indonesia, India and Uzbekistan. 11.8Mt/yr of new capacity has been announced in just a week, mostly from a whopping 9.0Mt/yr project in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia, the first in that Province. Notable in this project, as well as two of the others, is the involvement, once again, of large Chinese-based cement plant manufacturers and / or finance and associated influence from Chinese parties.

Of course, this trend is nothing new. The rise of Chinese cement plant manufacturers, particularly into Africa and other developing cement markets, has been covered in previous Global Cement Weekly columns. However, it does appear to be stepping up a notch in 2018 compared to previous years. So far this year we have reported on 21 confirmed Chinese cement plants being built in 15 countries other than China, from the planning stage to ‘up-and-running.’ A total of 37.2Mt/yr, more than the capacity of Germany, is being built across Algeria, Cambodia, Cameroon, Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, Namibia, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Zambia. That’s not including a similarly large number of news stories where the supplier is not explicitly stated. This is seen a lot in Indian projects, as well as in Vietnam, where the cement sector appears to still be expanding, despite the government’s pronouncements. In many of these cases, and elsewhere, these unidentified suppliers are likely to be Chinese.

The driver for this increase in Chinese-led cement sector investment is, of course, the severe overcapacity in China’s domestic cement sector. The government is currently undertaking its most drastic capacity reduction measures so far. The ongoing integration of Sinoma and CNBM is one example of the lengths it will go to to reduce the current inefficiencies in the sector. This week the Chinese government reiterated its strict prohibition on new greenfield cement plants. It also warned that any producer that wants to upgrade its plant with a new line must only install the same capacity as the line that will be replaced, amid concerns that some were flouting this rule. This comes as the profits of major producers have been rising. Presumably the government would like them to climb further still.

So where does this leave the more established (read ‘European’) cement plant manufacturers such as Fives, FLSmidth, KHD and thyssenkrupp Industrial Solutions, some of which are fully or partly-owned by Chinese companies? Well, with fewer full-line projects available in developing regions due to the rise of the Chinese, they have become increasingly specialised in specific areas. Those that want European equipment will increasingly specify a pyro-line from Supplier A, a mill or two from Supplier B, conveyors and storage from supplier C, and so on. Arranging this, as it turns out, is something that Chinese plant manufacturers are quite keen to do. Take, for example, FLSmidth working for Sinoma (China) alongside Atlas Copco (Sweden) and Kawasaki Heavy Industries (Japan) on a cement plant in Indonesia. Indeed, FLSmidth signed a framework with CNBM on future collaborations in July 2018. FLSmidth and CNBM already have an extensive ‘back catalogue’ of joint projects. FLSmidth has valuable expertise that Chinese firms need to complete these kinds of projects.

Of course, another European supplier, Germany’s KHD, is mostly owned by China’s AVIC. In a forthcoming interview in the September 2018 issue of Global Cement Magazine, KHD’s CEO Gerold Keune states that the Engineering, Procurement and Construction (EPC) scene is now ‘completely dominated’ by Chinese suppliers. KHD fits in by providing a wide range of equipment but, crucially, great expertise in pyroprocessing and crushing solutions. It itself relies on smaller firms to provide their knowledge to specific parts of a larger project, be it conveyors, feeding systems or silos. Everyone is getting better and better, but in a smaller and smaller area.

Also in the September 2018 issue of Global Cement Magazine will be a report from the VDMA’s Large Industrial Plant Manufacturer’s group (AGAB) in Germany, which highlights another advantage for the Europeans: Digitisation. According to a VDMA survey, the industry anticipates a positive influence from digitisation activities on sales and earnings and expects to see margins improve by up to 10% as a result of the efficiencies it offers over the next three years. In this regard they are ahead of the Chinese mega-suppliers.

The conclusion from this wide-ranging column? The integration of Chinese weight and European know-how is stepping up a notch and will only accelerate from here. Can everyone be ‘winners?’ The next few years may reveal some of the answers.

A couple of news stories have emerged from West Africa this week reminding Global Cement of the growth potential the region holds. First Ghacem announced that it had opened a new truck terminal at Sefwi Dwenase in Ghana. Then LafargeHolcim Ivory Coast inaugurated a new mill at its grinding plant in Abidjan. Then Cimburkina, a subsidiary of Germany’s HeidelbergCement, said that it was starting work on enlarging its grinding plant at Kossodo in Burkina Faso.

The other theme that received some coverage this week was another attempt by an African government to regulate its hastily growing cement sectors. Jean-Claude Brou, the Minister of Industry and Mines in Ivory Coast also found time to announce the creation of a commission to monitor the quality control of cement when he inaugurated the new mill in Abidjan. As building collapses due to substandard cement in Nigeria have shown, this kind of government monitoring is essential to protect the public in booming markets. Unfortunately, rightly or wrongly, these kind of bodies often seem to end up embroiled in rows about imports of cement competing with local producers.

Away from the cut and thrust of the market, the new mill at Abidjan is particularly interesting because it was imported and reinstalled piece-by-piece from its original home at a former Holcim plant in Spain. The move cost Euro23m and LafargeHolcim say that it is now the largest horizontal ball mill in French-speaking west Africa. The 1Mt/yr year mill was originally manufactured by Polysius (ThyssenKrupp) in 2006 and uses a 4500kW motor.

Data from the National Institute for Statistics in Ivory Coast reported a 39% rise year-on-year in cement production to 1.64Mt in the first half of 2017. This follows reports of cement shortages in early 2017. The government then took the action of importing 0.15Mt of cement to meet the shortfall until local production capacity caught up.

This is starting to happen now with the LafargeHolcim opening. Other projects that were in the pipeline include Cim Ivoire’s 2.6Mt/yr grinding plant, also in Abidjan, that was due to be completed by the end of 2017. This project is interesting because Cim Ivoire is a subsidiary of Burkina Faso’s Cim Metal Group. It also operates a grinding plant, Cimfaso, near the capital Ouagadougou. Similar to LafargeHolcim it is preparing its supply lines to the African interior. Finally, Nigeria’s Dangote Cement was also building a 3Mt/yr grinding plant near Abidjan. This unit was due to be finished by the end of 2017 but there has been little news about it in recent months.

Ghana’s cement industry has been consolidating itself and is facing an oversupply situation. The government placed production capacity at 8.5Mt/yr in 2016 versus demand of 6Mt. It has since made the headlines with spats between local producers and foreign companies like Dangote Cement. Unlike Ivory Coast, Ghana has two integrated plants that, no doubt, want to preserve their markets from imports. Despite this, Ciments de l'Afrique (CIMAF) and Diamond Cement both opened plants in late 2016. More recently two grinding plant projects have been announced near Tema.

Although the timing is fortuitous , we admit that these stories are fairly loosely connected at best. However, they do illustrate an inward development trend in the region. Bigger and more efficient grinding plants to process locally made or imported clinker, more terminal infrastructure to distribute the cement and then more grinding plants further inside the region geographically as the logistics situation permits. The Cimburkina plant, for example, is situated in landlocked Burkina Faso. Clinker for its mills will initially be supplied by HeidelbergCement’s integrated Scantogo plant at Tabligbo. The drive to develop these countries moves ever forwards and they demand cement.

Well it doesn’t normally happen like this. In late September 2017 Ash Grove Cement announced that it was set to be bought by Ireland’s CRH. The words it used were a ‘definitive merger agreement.’ Then suddenly this week on 5 October 2017 Ash Grove said that it had received a higher offer from an unnamed third party and that it was extending its so-called ‘window shop period.’ So much for definitive! The following day Reuters revealed that the new bid was from Summit Materials.

The on-going board machinations at LafargeHolcim and the PPC-AfriSam merger saga in South Africa show that the cement industry has its moments of boardroom high drama. Indeed, both of these long-rumbling stories have had murmurs this week with the early departure of LafargeHolcim’s finance director Ron Wirahadiraksa after less than two years and Dangote Cement’s decision to exit the ring from the PPC bidding. However, it’s rare that cement companies are publicly announced as sold and then get gazumped instead.

The Ash Grove debacle also carries a personal dimension. Ash Grove chairman Charlie Sunderland initially described CRH as his company’s biggest customer and one with a close relationship to the firm. Yet a US$300m higher bid suggests how much those ‘kind’ words were actually worth. To add insult to injury the chief executive officer (CEO) of Summit Materials, Tom Hill, used to work for CRH. This no doubt gave him an idea of how the management of CRH thinks. CRH’s public response so far has been that it has noted the extended shareholder approval period at Ash Grove.

At first glimpse Summit Materials and CRH have a similar cement production base in the US. Both companies operate two integrated plants in the country. Summit Materials runs plants at Hannibal, Missouri and Davenport, Iowa. CRH runs plants at Sumterville, Florida and Trident, Montana. Summit then has 10 cement terminals along the Mississippi River from Minnesota to Louisiana compared to CRH US’ five cement terminals in Detroit, Michigan, Cleveland, Ohio, Dundee, Michigan, Buffalo, New York and Duluth, Minnesota.

Yet, CRH also has two plants in Canada. Then the sheer scale of CRH’s other operations in North America simply dwarfs Summit’s. CRH Americas reported sales of US$16.7bn in 2016, more than 10 times higher than the US$1.6bn that Summit Materials declared. Both companies cover aggregates, asphalt, readymix concrete and cement but CRH is by far the larger of the two. So much so in fact that Summit Materials might potentially be taking on a serious amount of debt to finance the Ash Grove sale. As such any blip to the US cement market over the next few years could have serious repercussions to an overleveraged Summit Materials.

On face value the possible engagement with Summit Materials might appear to show that there is a lack of trust between CRH and Ash Grove. However, this cannot be inferred. As its shares are traded over the counter, Ash Grove’s shareholders have allowed a two-week shop window to enable other companies to counter-offer. This is to ensure that they get the best possible value. Talking to Summit is part of this process and may, or may not, mean that the last remaining US-owned cement producer stays based in the US after all.

One of the surprises from the recent round of half-year results has been HeidelbergCement’s struggle to grow its sales so far in 2017. Part of this has been down to a variable market in Indonesia where the German cement producer runs the second largest player, Indocement.

Cement consumption for the country as a whole dropped by 1.3% year-on-year to 29Mt in the first half of the year, according to Indonesian Cement Association figures. This appears to be due to a particularly poor month in June 2017 where local consumption fell by 27% to 3.7Mt. Prior to that, consumption was actually showing 4% growth up until the end of May.

Fairly reasonably HeidelbergCement blamed the decline in part on this year’s timing of Ramadan. Unfortunately this could not explain everything, as its total sales volumes including exports fell by 2.4%. Remove the exports and its sales volumes fell by 4.4%, more than the national average. It said this was due to its concentration in weaker markets in Jakarta, Banten, and West Java where competition pressures had forced prices down ‘significantly.’

They weren’t alone in feeling the pain in June 2017 with both Semen Indonesia and LafargeHolcim reporting reduced sales. However, LafargeHolcim also raised the issue of production overcapacity creating increased sales volumes and pushing down prices. This was reflected in lower earnings for its Asia Pacific division. HeidelbergCement too saw its earnings crumble.

Graph 1: Cement production capacity and consumption. Source: Semen Indonesia investor presentation, March 2017.

Graph 1 shows quite nicely the fix the Indonesian cement market is in at present. Consumption surpassed production capacity in the early 2010 before incoming capacity jumped ahead again around 2013. You can also view Global Cement’s version of this graph here. Even at an optimistic annual growth rate of 8%, consumption won’t get close to capacity until 2020. Yet before the market collapsed in June, consumption was growing at 4%, which is the weakest of Semen Indonesia’s growth scenarios.

Admittedly the graph is in an investor document so we can forgive ebullience but they are going to need a magic bullet to dodge this one. Lucky then that the graph also has infrastructure highlighted. The cement producer says that the Indonesian government earmarked US$26bn for infrastructure spending in 2017 and that this spending campaign can be seen in the changing ratio of bulk to bagged cement it has been selling. Independent of Semen Indonesia, the Fitch credit rating agency was also predicting rising consumption off the back of infrastructure plans in a report it put out in June.

However, as more cement plants are being built, cement plant utilisation rates seem destined to stay subdued for the foreseeable future unless the government seriously ups its infrastructure investment or unless the economy goes into overdrive. Unsurprisingly exports have shot up so far in 2016, by 74% to 1.14Mt. Cement producers in neighbouring countries beware!

Last week we looked at the prospect of two new Angolan cement plants, a situation that will reportedly lead the country to being ‘self sufficient in cement.’ When we hear this phrase, very often from relatively small markets in Africa or Asia, the obvious next step invariably follows: The country in question will become a regional powerhouse for cement exports.

But try telling that to the desperate Vietnamese cement producers, swamped by chronic overcapacity and very low prices, both at home and abroad. In an effort to shift more of Vietnam’s cement mountain, this week the Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) proposed big changes to its handling of cement exports. At the moment cement is subject to a 5% export tax and does not receive VAT refunds. This means that Vietnamese cement has become less competitive than Chinese, Thai, Indonesian and Japanese cement on the regional market, compounding the oversupply situation at home.

The MPI now proposes to scrap the tax and allow for VAT refunds to avoid a colossal 36-47Mt oversupply of cement by 2020. It is quite staggering that this response hasn’t been considered before. This is especially the case, given that the VICEM’s General Director Tran Viet Thang asked for the government to look at the rules back in February 2017. Indeed the Vietnam Cement Association predicted an oversupply of nearly 50Mt/yr by 2020 in January 2017.

Vietnam exported 14.7Mt of cement and clinker in 2016 according to its domestic statistics service. The country was the seventh largest exporter of cement and clinker in 2016 in value terms, with a total value of US$431.7m. China, as one might suspect, topped the list, but only at US$683.6m, around 58% more than Vietnam. Given that China’s cement capacity is around 20 times that of Vietnam, this highlights the extent to which Vietnam is trying to rely on imports.

A market-led response to this would be to close some of the cement plants down and stop commissioning any new ones. China has made some inroads into this approach and Vietnam is following suit… to some extent. That said, however, Trinh Dinh Dung, the Deputy Prime Minster, inaugurated the second production line at the Thanh Thang Cement plant on 4 July 2017 and Long Son Cement will open its second production line at Long Son in late August 2017. That new line will add nearly another 3Mt/yr of capacity to the national total just by itself. On top of this, Thai-owned Siam City Cement Vietnam opened a new ‘terminal’ in Vietnam in late June. Thailand ranked above Vietnam in the cement and clinker export list for 2016 at US$612.2m, suggesting that, contrary to the obvious implication, the port could even be used to ship out Thai exports into Vietnam!

This is not the first time we have heard about Vietnam’s massive cement surplus but it is the first time that the government appears to have registered it as needing attention. A market-led economy would simply shut the plants down but Vietnam plays by different rules. Will changing the rules on tax help it sell out its surplus? Call us in 2020…

The small cement industry of Mozambique, in south west Africa must be an interesting place to make cement. On one side the country's producers, like their more vocal South African counterparts, have been fighting off cheap imports from Iran, Pakistan, China et al. On the other side of the coin though, Mozambique has growing domestic demand and is within striking distance of growing markets further into Africa, like Malawi and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

With the announcement this week that there will be not one but two new integrated cement plants in the country, bringing over 2Mt/yr of new capacity, everything should be set fair for the coming years then, shouldn't it? Domestic production will rise, the price of local cement will fall as a result, competition from imports will drop off and money will be made from new exports.

Except that might not happen. Before the announcement of these two plants, (one of which does not state a capacity), there was around 5.5Mt/yr of grinding and integrated capacity either currently active in Mozambique or due to come onstream in 2015. With the new projects this rises to over 7.5Mt/yr.

The desirable chain of events described above starts to break down due to the fact that domestic demand in Mozambique, while rising, is not currently anywhere near as high as domestic supply. The United States Geological Survey estimated that the country produced just 1.2Mt/yr in 2012. Data for 2013 and 2014, though unavailable, is highly unlikely to show a three-fold increase. Indeed Insitec, a minority shareholder in Cimentos de Moçambique, predicted in 2014 that demand for that year would rise to just 1.5Mt, before hitting the dizzying heights of 1.8Mt in 2018 – And that's still three years away!

So what are the options? Option 1: Some or all of the planned and mooted cement plants will fail to come to fruition. Option 2: Some or all of the plants will be built but will operate at reduced capacity and/or on a campaign basis. Option 3: The Mozambican cement industry becomes a regional powerhouse and starts to export to its neighbours.

Option 1 is certainly possible. Limak Group, one of the parties linked to the new projects, is a Turkish cement producer that is inexperienced outside of Turkey. There has also been a lack of information on the progress of projects by Austral Cimentos ('coming on stream in 2015'), Star Cement and Consolidated Building Materials, although a lack of progress reports does not necessarily imply 'no progress.'

Option 2 is more likely, as some producers already operate on a campaign basis. InterCement's plant at Nacala, formerly an integrated plant, currently operates only as a grinding station. Option 3 is also possible, with Malawi particularly lacking in cement production facilities.
In reality a combination of all three 'Options' is the most likely outcome. However, this will lead to Mozambique becoming yet another player in an increasingly busy African cement market. The desire for self-sufficiency in cement production, a common goal for the region's governments, can easily lead to over-estimates of local demand growth, with resultant over-capacity. Of course the expectation that all African countries can get rid of this extra cement capacity via exports will ultimately backfire.

In southern Africa we already have South Africa exporting. Angola declared 'cement self-sufficiency' in October 2014 and banned imports at the start of 2015. Zambia, Botswana, Zimbabwe and DRC all have large-scale Dangote and/or PCC projects near completion or in production that will greatly reduce their need for imports. Meanwhile, further north, Nigeria is already a gigantic producer and significant cement exporter. Cameroon has recently banned imports and Ghana is thinking of doing the same. Over in the east of Africa, Ethiopia's (and the rest of that region's) rapidly-developing situation was covered in this column just two weeks ago.

Finally, in the north of Africa, Algeria has declared its intention to be self-sufficient in cement by 2016. This news must have 'gone down like a lead balloon' in Italy, Spain and Greece, which have been reliant on north African markets after the bottoms fell out of their own economies. In the north east, Egypt has different problems at present, also described previously. It needs fuel not cement!

So where does this all lead for regional cement dynamics in Africa? Well perhaps the situation in India points the way. There, as in Africa, local and regional producers with the desire to expand grew from their local bases and eventually overlapped. Against a backdrop of lower-than-expected demand, the country now has overcapacity. This has resulted in smaller producers being acquired and leaving the market.

Could this eventually happen in Africa? Only time will tell. However one thing is certain: It's just not possible for every country to export to every other country!