Displaying items by tag: Chile

Peru: Unión Andina de Cementos’ (UNACEM) income fell by 14% year-on-year to US$467m in 2020 from US$546m in 2019. Cement despatches dropped by 16% to 4.46Mt from 5.32Mt. Its profit decreased to US$8.33m from US$96m. The cement producer attributed the reduction in sales and profits due to the country’s coronavirus-related lockdown from March to May 2020. In December 2020 it agreed to buy Chile-based Cementos La Unión Chile for US$23m. The deal includes the 0.3Mt/yr San Antonio grinding plant and a concrete plant.

Chile: Peru-based Unión Andina de Cementos (Unacem) has signed a contract with Inversiones Mel 20 Limitada and Spain-based Cementos La Unión for the acquisition of the latter’s Chilean subsidiary Cementos La Unión Chile. Diario Financiero News has reported that the company operates the 300,000t/yr San Antonio grinding plant and a concrete plant. The value of the deal is US$23m. The agreement is subject to approval by local regulators.

Chile: Cementos Bío-Bío has taken a loan worth US$37.6m from BCI-Itaú bank and Scotiabank. It took the measure ‘to ensure the company’s liquidity’ in response to the coronavirus outbreak. Cementos Bío-Bío said, “The Covid-19 pandemic brings risks due to its impact on the world and local economy. The company estimates that it will strongly affect construction, impacting cement dispatches.” It added, “The company maintains a comfortable cash position,” with liquidity of US$53.3m.

Chile: The board of directors of Grupo Hurtado Vicuña (GHV) subsidiary Cemento Polpaico, which operates the 2.3Mt/yr integrated Cerro Blanco plant in Santiago and two grinding plants, has voted in favour of a merger with fellow GHV subsidiary Cementos Bicentario (BSA), which operates three grinding plants in the country. The Diario Financiario newspaper has reported that GHV first mooted with merger with the affected parties in February 2018.

The Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) took on direct implications for the international cement industry this week when an Italian vendor infected with the virus visited Lafarge Africa in Ogun state, Nigeria. The cement producer said that it had ‘immediately’ started contact tracing and started isolation, quarantine and disinfection protocols. This included initiating medical protocols at its Ewekoro integrated plant, although local press reported the unit’s production lines were still open. Around 100 people were thought to have had contact with the man.

Global Cement has been covering the epidemic since early February 2020 when the virus’ effect on the construction industry in China started to become evident. First, an industry event CementTech was postponed, financial analysts started forecasting negative financial consequences for producers and plants started going into coronavirus-related maintenance or suspension cycles. Then at least one plant started to dispose of clinical waste and now China National Building Material Group (CNBM) is considering how to restart operations at scale. Also, this week Hong Kong construction companies reportedly laid off 50,00 builders due to a lack of cement due to the on-going production suspension in China.

The major cement companies have identified that their first business risk from coronavirus comes from simply not having the staff to make building materials. LafargeHolcim’s chief executive officer Jan Jenisch summed up the group’s action in its annual financial results for 2020 this week when he said, “We are taking all necessary measures to protect the health of our employees and their families.” Other major cement producers that Global Cement has contacted have placed travel restrictions for staff and reduced access to production facilities.

The next risk for cement companies comes from a drop in economic activity. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) forecasts a global 0.5% year-on-year fall in real gross domestic product (GDP) growth to 2.4%, with China and India suffering the worst declines in GDP growth at around 1%. The global figure is the worst since the -0.1% rate reported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2009. The OECD blamed the disease control measures in China, as well as the direct disruption to global supply chains, weaker final demand for imported goods and services and regional declines in international tourism and business travel. This forecast is contingent on the epidemic peaking in China in the first quarter of 2020 and new cases of the virus in other countries being sporadic and contained. So far the latter does not seem to have happened and the OECD’s ‘domino’ scenario predicts a GDP reduction of 1.5%. All of this is likely to drag on construction activity and demand for cement and concrete for some time to come.

Moving to cement markets and production, demand is likely to be slowed as countries implement various levels of isolation and quarantine leading to reduced residential demand for buildings directly and as workforces are restricted. Business and infrastructure projects may follow as economies slow and governments refocus spending respectively.

The UK government, for example, is basing its coronavirus action plan on an outbreak lasting four to six months. This could potentially happen in many countries throughout 2020. This has the potential to create a rolling effect of disruption as different nations are hit. Assuming China has passed the peak of its local epidemic then its producers are likely to report reduced income in the first quarter of 2020. The effect may even be reduced somewhat due to the existing winter peak shifting measures, whereby production is shut down to reduce pollution. Elsewhere, cement companies in the northern hemisphere may see their busy summer months affected if the virus spreads. The effect on balance sheets may be visible with indebted companies and/or those with more exposure to affected areas disproportionately affected. The wildcard here is whether coronavirus transmits as easily in warmer weather as it does in the cooler winter months. In this case there may be a difference, generally speaking, between the global north and south. Exceptions to watch could be cooler southern places such as New Zealand, Argentina and Chile. Shortages, as mentioned above in Taiwan, potentially should be short term, owing to global overcapacity of cement production, as end users find supplies from elsewhere.

The cement industry is also likely to encounter disruption to its supply chains. Major construction projects in South Asia are already reporting delays as Chinese workers have failed to return following quarantine restrictions after the Chinese New Year celebrations. As other countries suffer uncontrolled outbreaks then similar travel restrictions may follow. Global Cement has yet to see any examples of materials in the cement industry supply chain being affected. On the production side, raw mineral supply tends to be local but fuels, like coal, often travel further. Fuel markets may prove erratic as larger consumers cut back and suppliers like the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) react by restricting production.

On the maintenance side cement plants need a wide array of parts such as refractories, motors, lubricants, gears, wear parts for mills, ball bearings and so forth. Some of these may have more complicated supply chain routes than they used to have 30 years ago. On the supplier side any new or upgrade plant project is vulnerable if necessary parts are delayed by a production halt, logistics delayed and/or staff are prevented from visiting work sites. Chinese suppliers’ reliance on using their own workers, for example, might well be a hindrance here until (or if) international quarantine rules are normalised. Other suppliers’ weak points in their supply chains may become exposed in turn. This would benefit suppliers with sufficiently robust chains.

Chinese reductions in NO₂ emissions in relation to the coronavirus industrial shutdown have been noted in the press. A wider global effect could well be seen too. This could potentially pose problems to CO₂ emissions trading schemes around the world as CO₂ prices fall and carbon credits abound. This might also have deleterious effects on carbon capture and storage (CCS) development if it becomes redundant due to low CO₂ pricing. In the longer-term this might undesirable, as by the time the CO₂ prices pick up again we will be that much nearer to the 2050 sustainability deadlines.

COVID-19 is a new pandemic in all but name with major secondary outbreaks in South Korea, Iran and Italy growing fast and cases being reported in many other countries. The bad news though is that individual countries and international bodies have to decide how to balance the economic damage disease control will cause, versus the effects of letting the disease run unchecked. Yet as more information emerges on how to tackle coronavirus, the good news is that most people will experience flu-like symptoms and nothing more. Chinese action shows that it can be controlled through public health measures while a vaccine is being developed.

Until then, frequent handwashing is a ‘given’ and many people and organisations are running risk calculations on aspects of what they do. It may seem flippant but even basic human interaction such as the handshake needs to be reconsidered for the time being.

Chile: Cementos Bío Bío has appointed Katia Trusich as director and member of the Directors Committee. Her appointment follows the resignation of André Roberto Leitão. Trusich has held of number of private and public sector roles, including working as the Under Secretary of Economics for the Chilean government between 2014 and 2016. Most recently she has been the Corporate Affairs Manager for CGE.

After a couple of weeks looking at the capacity-rich cement markets of Angola and Vietnam, we turn our attention this week to some of those countries on the receiving end of overcapacity.

Costa Rica is an unlikely place to start but it came to our attention this week due to a short but significant news item. In summary, the amount of cement imported into Costa Rica increased by a factor of 10 between 2014 and 2016, from around 10,000t to over 100,000t. This is around 5% of its 2Mt/yr domesitic capacity, so the change is already fairly big news. The fact that an incredible 97% of this came from just one country, China, makes the story far more interesting as it shows the effects that Chinese overcapacity can have on smaller markets.

But when we look at how the value of the cement imports has changed over time, we see an even more dynamic shift. While the amount of cement imported into the country increased by nearly 10-fold, the value of the same imports only increased by around half as much between 2014 and 2016. If these figures can be taken at face value, the implication is stark. Taking the very low base as effectively ‘zero,’ each tonne of cement imported must cost around half as much as it used to.

Digging a little deeper and the picture gets more complicated. While they have fallen, Costa Rican cement prices have not fallen by 50% and why the sudden deluge of imports anyway? In 2015 the country changed its rules on cement imports to facilitate more flexible imports and lower prices for consumers. It did this by changing a regulation relating to how long cement can be stored, previously set at just 45 days, with the aim of allowing cement to come from further afield and, crucially, in bulk rather than bags.

The effects on price were immediate. Previously as high as US$13/bag (50kg) in December 2014, fairly high by global standards, Sinocem, the first Chinese importer, immediately sold its first shipment at US$10/bag. This effect of lower prices has now forced the average sales prices down to around US$10/bag across the country by 2017. This is good for consumers but not necessarily the local plants.

Back in 2015, the two local integrated plants operated by Cemex and Holcim warned that cement quality would suffer if cement bags were not used within 45 days. This apparently self-serving ‘warning’ went unheeded by the Ministry of Economy, Industry and Trade (MEIC), which pointed out that other countries in South America, as well as the European Union and United States, had no analogous short use-by dates for cement bags.

The rule remains in place, although discontent rumbles on. Indeed LafargeHolcim noted in its third quarter results for 2016 that ‘Costa Rica was adversely affected by increased foreign imports.’  This may well be a little bit of posturing and it doesn’t square with the fact that Costa Rica exported three times more cement that it imported in 2016. Of total exports of 0.34Mt, over 95% went to neighbouring Nicaragua, which has a single 0.6Mt/yr wet process plant owned by Cemex. It seems that the two Costa Rican plants have found a way to keep a little bit of the Chinese producers’ margin for themselves.

Of course, Chinese cement overcapacity doesn’t only affect the Central American market. It has been rippling all around the Pacific Rim. In July 2017, this column looked at the decision by Cementos Bío Bío to stop making clinker at its Talcahuano plant in Chile. It now favours grinding imported clinker from Asia. Before that, Holcim New Zealand closed its Westport cement plant in 2016, finally admitting that domestic clinker was not viable.

In the grand scheme of things, this all makes sense. The market has forced those operating on thin margins to adjust. Ultimately, the end consumer is likely to benefit from lower prices, at least for as long as reliable low-cost imports can be secured. What happens, however, if China actually gets round to curtailing its rampant cement capacity, or simply decides to charge more for its cement? Flexible imports, the main aim of the Costa Rican rule change, may then prove vital, as long as there is more than one international supplier of cement.

Sad news this week from the Talcahuano cement plant in Chile that is to stop producing clinker. Local media reports that the Cementos Bío Bío unit has decided to import clinker from Asia instead, which will reduce its production costs. At the same time it has laid off a third of its workforce. The plant has been producing cement since 1961.

The decision carries echoes of Holcim New Zealand’s closure of its Westport cement plant in 2016, another unit in a country on the Pacific Rim. However, in that country LafargeHolcim has purposely moved towards becoming a distribution company by opening import terminals and depots. Plus the local subsidiary benefits from the cement-trading arm of a multinational company. By contrast, local producer Cementos Bío Bío still retains two integrated plants and a grinding plant in Chile. Following the closure its production share from integrated plants will drop to 2.4Mt/yr (39%) from 3.2Mt/yr (45%). The country will retain a total production capacity of 6.2Mt/yr from its clinker producing plants.

The timing of Cementos Bío Bío’s decision is also interesting given that the Chilean competition authority (TDLC) approved Hurtado Vicuña Group to buy a controlling stake in Cemento Polpaico from LafargeHolcim in early July 2017. The deal was originally announced in October 2016 to sell LafargeHolcim’s 54.3% stake in Cemento Polpaico for US$225m. The sale includes one integrated plant with a cement production capacity of 2.3Mt/yr and two grinding plants. Hurtado Vicuña has not been required by the regulator to sell any of its cement units but it has been asked to sell parts of its concrete business and to abide to a ban on repurchasing the assets within 10 years. Hurtado Vicuña owns Cementos BSA, a subsidiary that runs the El Bosque cement grinding plant in Santiago and it has just started-up production at a new 0.95Mt/yr grinding plant at Quilicura, also near the capital.

In its 2016 annual report LafargeHolcim reported that cement sales volumes of cement fell in Chile due to a fall in the residential construction market in the second half of the year. However it did manage to raise its operating earnings before interest, taxation, depreciation and amortisation (EBTIDA) off the back of higher prices and lower production costs compared to the previous year. Cementos Bío Bío concurred with this assessment of the market in its 2016 report, lamenting the country’s poor economic growth since 2015 and declines in the mining and construction sectors. Despite this its cement despatches rose very slightly to 1.56Mt in 2016. The big drop in its sales occurred in 2014 when its sales fell by 10% year-on-year to 1.51Mt. More recently, Bío Bío noted a 37% decrease in its operating profit for its cement, concrete and lime division for the first quarter of 2017 due to falling sales volumes and margins in cement and lime. However, it did benefit from falling costs for energy and petcoke inputs. The group also announced plans to sell a minority stake in itself in February 2017.

These stories show another country that is realigning its cement industry to a clinker-rich world market. Chile appears to retain a ‘big three’ group of local clinker producers that has shifted with the rise of Cementos BSA and the departure of LafargeHolcim. However, the market share in the cement grinding business has changed significantly as Cementos BSA has gained both an integrated plant and a more national profile, away from the capital, with its grinding plants. Once the local market picks up it will be interesting to see whether this trend towards clinker import and local grinding continues.

Chile: Cementos Bío Bío has appointed Iñaki Otegui as its new CEO, effective 1 August 2013. Otegui replaces Jorge Matus, who has resigned after 39 years with the company.