Displaying items by tag: Lafarge

One fascinating statistic stands out in a study on how the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) pays its bills: cement represented 4% of its revenue in 2015 or around US$100m. The Centre for the Analysis of Terrorism (CAT) came up with this figure as part of its analysis on how the group finances itself. Its data was based on available information such as local sources, internal ISIS documents and reports from governments and institutions.

What’s more, the previous year in 2014, CAT estimated that ISIS brought in US$300m from cement sales. The difference in revenue between 2015 and 2014 came about from the group losing control of territory. In late 2014 it controlled four cement plants: the Lafarge Al-Jalabiya plant in Ayn al-Arabin, the Al-Raqqah Guris Cement plant and Fallujah, Kubaisa and Al-Qa’im plants in Iraq. Altogether it had a cement production capacity of 7.5Mt/yr, a higher capacity than 62% of the cement producing nations that are recognised formally by the United Nations. Briefly it had production parity with countries like Angola, Uzbekistan and Kuwait.

However the loss of the Al-Jalabiya and Kubaisa plants has stifled this revenue stream. At its peak ISIS couldn’t have been selling cement for more than something like US$40/t (capacity / revenue) if the plants were operating at full capacity. Yet it’s much more likely that the plants were chronically under-utilised and prices significantly higher in the heat, dust and confusion of a militant group attempting to form a state in a warzone.

Global Cement Weekly has covered previously the furore that erupted when French media accused Lafarge of cutting deals with ISIS to keep its Jalabiya cement plant during the early stages of the Syrian Civil War. At the time of the revelations in June 2016 LafargeHolcim said that its first priority was the safety and security of its employees at the plant before it eventually closed it, although it did not deny accusations directly.

Since then the plant’s former security manager Jacob Waerness has popped up in an interview with Bloomberg in connection with a book he wrote about the affair. According to Waerness, Lafarge stayed in the country for too long before the plant was finally seized by ISIS in September 2014.

The problem for Lafarge, as other multinational companies left the warzone, was that the US$680m plant had only been operational since late 2010 before hostilities broke out in 2011. Essentially, it tried to wait out the conflict and then got left behind. Pertinent to the start of this column, Waerness says that as the more extreme groups took control of the surrounding area he was offered and declined a meeting with the IS finance chief in Raqqa in the summer of 2013. However else one might describe IS, it was and clearly is well aware of the revenue to be gained from functioning cement plants.

LafargeHolcim has since started an internal review into the reported allegations under the auspices of its Finance & Audit Committee. In September 2016 the Iranian-backed Fars News Agency was reporting that US special forces were using the Jalabiya plant as a base. If and when peace comes to the region it will be intriguing to find out what condition the plant is in. Until then, LafargeHolcim will have to wait and take the loss on its investment.

Back in 2001 a UK government advisor gained infamy for trying to use the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 to bury bad news. This week’s column is trying hard NOT to be about the UK vote to leave the European Union (for more on that try our editorial director’s column in the latest issue of Global Cement Magazine). They’ll be plenty of time for that later on when the repercussions for the cement and construction industries sink in. However, it has inadvertently buried some bad news coverage for LafargeHolcim.

The French newspaper Le Monde reported on 21 June 2016 that Lafarge’s Syrian subsidiary paid money to Islamic State (IS) militants in order to keep its Jalabiya cement plant in operation in 2013 and 2014. The paper said that the plant was kept in operation until September 2014 as the result of ‘agreements with local armed groups, including the Islamic State.’ It added, that Lafarge ‘indirectly financed the jihadist organisation.’

LafargeHolcim issued a statement on the story on same day. However, it didn’t deny the accusations. It stated that the company, as Lafarge, was under control of the plant in Jalabiya between 2010 and September 2014 and that the safety of its employees had always been its first priority. Part of the statement read, “Once the conflict reached the area of the plant, the first priority for Lafarge was the safety and security of the employees, while planning for the eventual closure of the plant. In September 2014, Lafarge stopped operating the Jalabiya plant. After that, all employees were evacuated, put on paid leave and were no longer allowed to access the plant. In December 2015, given the evolution of the situation in Syria, the decision was taken to terminate all employee contracts and, where possible, transfer employees to other parts of the group.”

The company may yet face prosecution for the dealings if it is found to have financed any terrorist organisation. Emmanuel Daoud, a specialist in international law quoted by various media sources, speculated that the outcome of any potential investigation might depend on whether the company was protecting its staff or protecting its profits. Additional complications also arise from the subsequent merger of France’s Lafarge and Switzerland Holcim to form LafargeHolcim.

It should be remembered though that cement plants and their staff are often very real targets in regional conflicts. They can also be held under switching jurisdictions. We reported that a Lafarge Syria plant near Aleppo was attacked and set on fire in 2014. Before the site was abandoned to protect the staff the site was first under the auspices of the Syrian army and then the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party. Paying ‘taxes’ to the loosing side in a civil war might well be interpreted as funding terrorists in the aftermath.

A similar story resolved itself this week with the news that seven quarry workers kidnapped in Nigeria were released. Unfortunately there was one death and injuries sustained in the ambush that trapped them. Sy van Dyk, the chief executive of Macmahon, the company involved, refused to comment to local press on whether his company had paid a ransom to release the workers.

This all links to the wider issue of how multinational companies should deal with armed groups and de-facto governments in unstable areas. For example, the UK and US governments discourage paying ransoms to kidnappers because they say it encourages it as a business. Yet, other European nations notably paid to release their nationals during the earlier stages of the Syrian conflict and elsewhere. This in turn offers insight towards why Lafarge, a French multinational company, might have been more likely to negotiate with armed groups in Syria than say a British or American one. If an official investigation into Lafarge’s dealings follows then more details may emerge but there are no easy answers to these kinds of issues.

San Miguel Corporation has upped the pace of its capacity expansion this week to a US$1bn investment towards five new 2Mt/yr cement plants in the Philippines. The announcement builds on its previous plans to build two plants for US$800m. At that time construction had already begun at subsidiary Northern Cement's plant in Pangasinan and Quezon. Plants in Bulacan, Cebu and Davao have now joined the list for completion in 2017.

The scale of this expansion is vast considering that the Philippines has 17 active cement plants with a total integrated production capacity of 24.6Mt/yr. San Miguel president and COO Ramon Ang's comments to media that if there were an oversupply of cement the market would correct itself in a couple of years may sound flippant to anyone who isn't the head of a multi-billion dollar corporation. However, if achieved it will propel the San Miguel subsidiaries from the country's fourth largest cement producer to its largest.

However each of the other major producers also have their own expansion plan in various stages of completion. Holcim Philippines announced US$40m plans in May 2015 to expand its production capacity to 10Mt/yr by the end of 2016, mainly through reviving existing projects. Cemex announced plans in May 2015 to spend US$300m towards building a new 1.5Mt/yr integrated line at its Solid Plant. Lafarge Republic had plans in April 2015 to raise its cement output through the opening of grinding plants at its Rizal and Bulacan cement plants. The former was opened in April 2015 but this is the one plant that hasn't been acquired by CRH following the sale of Lafarge Republic in the run-up to the LafargeHolcim merger. The latter was last reported due for opening in December 2015.

The big change in the Philippine cement industry in 2015 has been the merger of Lafarge and Holcim to form LafargeHolcim. Given that Lafarge Republic and Holcim Philippines held over 55% of the country's production capacity before the merger, it was inevitable that they would be forced to sell off assets. In the end CRH picked up most of Lafarge Republic's cement assets bar the Teresa Plant in Rizal, which stayed with Holcim. The merger has skewed the market towards one clear leader, LafargeHolcim (9.5Mt/yr), followed by Cemex (4.73Mt/yr) and CRH (4.19Mt/yr) with similarly sized cement production bases. These producers are then chased by San Miguel (2.15Mt/yr) and the other smaller firms. If San Miguel succeeds in its expansion strategy then the market will change once again.

Cement sales rose by 11.1% to 11.9Mt in the first half of 2015 according to the Cement Manufacturers Association of the Philippines (CeMAP). They attributed this growth to strong construction activity helped by increases in government infrastructure spending. Alongside this, gross domestic product (GDP) is predicted to rise by 6% in 2015 and 6.3% in 2016 by the Asian Development Bank. Another promising sign for development came from a study by Antoinette Rosete of the University of Santo Tomas which forecast that cement demand would meet 27Mt/yr. Capacity utilisation rates rose to 85% from 68% in 2014 according to Department of Trade and Industry data.

With this kind of encouragement, no wonder San Miguel is betting on such a large expansion project. If Rosete's forecast and capacity utilisation rates hold then the Philippines might need a capacity base of around 36Mt/yr. San Miguel's growth will fill that gap.

Of course other players might have their own ideas about giving away market share. LafargeHolcim and Cemex are likely to be saddled with debt or existing projects. CRH meanwhile is the wildcard as its expansion strategy is opaque. In recent years it has seemed to focus on acquisitions over building its own projects. The Euro5.2bn the company has spent on buying Lafarge and Holcim assets this year seems likely to slow down investment on any internal development plans. However CRH is bringing in local partner Aboitiz in the Philipines to help with a US$400m loan.

The Philippines is clearly an exciting market for the cement industry at the moment. One consequence of the current situation is that it may signal what CRH's global intentions are following the LafargeHolcim merger. If it decides or is able to start building new capacity then it may reveal the start of a new phase for the Ireland-based multinational.

UK: Investment boutique Perella Weinberg Partners has hired LafargeHolcim co-chairman Wolfgang Reitzle as an advisory partner.

Reitzle, also a former chief executive of the German gas maker Linde and chairman of the supervisory board of German car supplier Continental, will provide counsel in a senior role to the investment firm and its clients, especially in Europe, according to Perella Weinberg. He will continue in his role at LafargeHolcim.

Reitzle has had previous dealings with Perella Weinberg Partners; Holcim appointed Perella Weinberg banker Dietrich Becker to renegotiate the terms of its merger with Lafarge. "Reitzle has an exceptional track record of successfully managing growth across a variety of industries," said Joseph Perella, co-founder and chairman of Perella Weinberg Partners.

UK: Aggregate Industries' new cement division will be led by Joe Hudson as managing director of cement and concrete products. He joins Aggregate Industries from Lafarge, where he has worked in a number of key functional and operational roles since 2001. Hudson was heavily involved in preparations for the LafargeHolcim merger as group senior vice president for organisation and development at Lafarge and has experience of running a cement business, having previously worked as managing director / CEO for Lafarge Wapco Plc in Nigeria.

Kenyan cement producers kicked off this week about Chinese cement imports for the Standard Gauge Railway Project in Kenya. Local producers, including ARM Cement and Lafarge, have asked the Kenya Railways Corporation to explain why the Chinese-backed project is importing cement. Project builders the China Rail & Bridge Corporation (CRBC) has imported 7000t of cement so far in 2015 according to Kenya Ports Authority data.

Project completion is planned for 2017 with a requirement of 1Mt of cement. If CRBC carried on this rate then, roughly, the project might only use 42,000t of imported cement if the import rate holds. This is less than 5% of the estimated requirement. However, cement imports increases into Kenya have stayed steady since 2012. Imports rose by 2000t from 2013 to 2014. CRBC's imports will stick out significantly in 2015.

Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) data places Kenyan cement production at 5.8Mt in 2014, an increase of 16.3% from 5.1Mt in 2013. Production growth has been steadily building since the late 1990s with, more recently, a dip in the rate of growth in 2011 that has been 'corrected' as the growth has returned. Consumption has risen by 21.8% year-on-year to 5.2Mt in 2014 with imports also rising and exports dropping.

Imports for the railway project are duty free as ARM Cement Chief Executive Officer Pradeep Paunrana helpfully explained to Bloomberg. Producers have also recently upgraded their plants to specifically supply 52.5 grade cement to the project. Given this, it is unsurprising that local Kenyan producers, including ARM Cement and Lafarge, are complaining about this situation, especially given the increasingly pugnacious African response to foreign imports led by Dangote and companies in South Africa. Both ARM and Lafarge hold integrated plants and grinding plants in Nairobi and Mombasa. This is the route of the new railway line.

The backdrop to this is that the Chinese cement industry is struggling at home as it adjusts to lower construction rates and reduced cement production growth. Profits made by the Chinese cement industry fell by 67.6% year-on-year to US$521m for the first quarter of 2015, according to National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) statistics. At the same time the Shanghai Composite, China's principal stock market, has seen the value of its shares fall by 30% since June.

Although it is unclear where the cement imports in this particular row are coming from, informal or formal business links between large state controlled corporations such as a China's major cement producers will always be questioned by competitors outside of China for both genuine issues of competitiveness and simple attempts to claw more profit. If the Chinese cement producers are sufficiently spooked or they really start to lose money then what is to stop it asking a sister company building a large infrastructure project abroad to offer it some help? Or it might consider asking the Chinese bank providing 90% of the financing towards the US$3.8bn infrastructure project to force the Kenyan government to offer more concessions to foreign firms. Meanwhile one counter argument goes that Kenya has a growing construction market with a giant infrastructure project that may unlock the region's long-simmering low cement consumption per capita boom. The Kenyan government may face some difficult decisions ahead.

The Greek debt crisis directly hit the local cement industry on Tuesday 30 June 2015 when Titan Cement reported that it was unable to pay a dividend to its shareholders. The leading local cement producer blamed the capital controls introduced by the government.

It is worth looking at the effects on the domestic cement industry as the Eurozone bureaucracy and the Greek government play 'chicken' with each other while Greece starts the default process, having failed to pay the latest International Monetary Fund (IMF) payment on 30 June 2015. Greece will now join a group, possibly even more select than the European Union, of countries that have failed to pay back the IMF, including current defaulters like Sudan and Zimbabwe.

A better comparison might be made with Argentina which defaulted upon its foreign debts in 2001. Its construction industry fell by 12% year-on-year in 2001 and by a further 30% in 2002. Cement consumption and cement production utilisation rates hit 23% in 2002. One key difference with Greece is that the country has had major financial difficulties for far longer than Argentina. Argentina ran into financial depression in 1998 and defaulted in 2001. Greece ran into financial trouble following the 2008 financial crisis and then received its first bailout in 2010.

As the capital controls show, even initial responses to the financial situations are impacting upon the standard transactions a limited company conducts. The Financial Times ran an article in May 2015 examining the potential effects on businesses of a debt default and Greek exit from the Eurozone (Grexit). In short, business and commerce will continue where possible reacting to whatever comes their way. For example, an olive oil producer reported switching to exports to make profits. Crucially though, another company interviewed, a construction contractor, worried about potential cuts to government or EU-led infrastructure projects.

As Titan reported in its first quarter results for 2015, its Greek market has been dependent on road building. In February 2014 Titan Cement reported its first improved operating results in seven years followed by profit in 2014 as a whole. The other major cement producers, Lafarge subsidiary Heracles General Cement and Italcementi subsidiary Halyps Cement, reported an improved construction market in 2014 with rising cement volumes. However, it was noted by Lafarge that it was developing exports to 'optimise kiln utilisation.' Titan also noted the benefits of exports in its first quarter report for 2015, focusing on a strengthening US Dollar versus the Euro. Given on-going events, one suspects there is going to be a lot more 'development' of this kind.

To set some sense of scale of the crisis Jim O'Neill, former head of economics at Goldman Sachs, famously calculated that, at the height of its growth, China created an economy the size of Greece's every three months. What happens next is down to the crystal balls of economists, although the path of least resistance now seems to be pointing at further default, departure from the Eurozone and Euro and further significant financial pain for Greece.

It looks likely that the local construction market will stay subdued and exports will offer a lifeline. How much the EU is prepared to let Greece default on its bills and then try and undercut its own over-capacity cement industries remains to be seen. However, since the main cement producers in Greece are all multinational outfits, it will afford them some flexibility in their strategy in coping with the fallout. Meanwhile a cement production capacity of around 14Mt/yr for a population of 11m suggests over capacity by European standards. If exports can't help then the situation looks grim.

UPDATE: Here is Global Cement's previous take on Greece from June 2012

India: Lafarge India has appointed Ujjwal Batria as CEO of the company effective from 22 June 2015. Batria will take over the responsibility from Martin Kriegner, who has been named as area manager for Central Europe of LafargeHolcim.

The development comes shortly before the expected completion of the LafargeHolcim merger. The Indian Competition Commission of India (CCI) has already approved the Indian leg of the proposed merger, with certain provisions, including divestment of two cement plants; Lafarge's plants at Jojobera, Jharkhand and Sonadih, Chhattisgarh. The two plants have a combined capacity of 5.15Mt/yr. Holcim's business in India is run through ACC and Ambuja Cements. It is not clear what Batria's role will be in the merged LafargeHolcim entity. Since ACC and Ambuja Cements are public listed firms, Lafarge's Indian unit may continue to operate separately, at least to begin with.

Prior to his appointment as CEO of Lafarge India, Batria was managing director of the company and was managing its cement business. He has been with Lafarge for 16 years. He had joined the company in 1999 and has served on different position across functions since then.

Encouraging news from Egypt with the announcement that Lafarge Ecocem has taken on two refuse-derived fuels (RDF) contracts in Suez and Qalyubeya. The RDF plants will have production capacities of 42,000t/yr and 280,000t/yr respectively, after upgrades are built.

The move follows a deal Lafarge struck with Orascom in March 2015 to develop a waste management framework of municipal and agricultural waste. The plan is to achieve an average fuel substitution rate of 25% by the end of 2015. Around the same time Ecocem also signed a cooperation agreement with the German Development Cooperation (GIZ) and the Qalyubeya Governorate to upgrade a recycling plant in Qalyubeya to produce RDF. Part of the deal was intended to reinvest some of the revenue from RDF sales back into the region's waste collection infrastructure.

These production levels compare to SITA UK's new RDF plants in the UK, which has a more mature RDF market. There, the newly opened Malpass Farm plant is planned to produce 200,000t/yr and the Tilbury plant will have an output capacity of 500,000t/yr when it opens. However, the Malpass Farm plant mainly feeds one cement plant, the 1.3Mt/yr Cemex Rugby plant with a mean substitution rate of 61% in 2013. By contrast, Lafarge Cement Egypt runs the massive 10.6Mt/yr El Sokhna plant.

Co-processing at El Sokhna by Lafarge is of particular interest given the links with Egypt's unofficial household waste collectors, the Zabbaleen. Lafarge Egypt recruited and trained 140 Zabbaleen to gather waste material for RDF production. The strategy enabled Lafarge to gather continuous supplies of RDF and strengthen local stakeholder relations, as Lafarge's 2013 sustainability report puts it. Lafarge Egypt's substitution rate was 2.2% in 2012 with significant improvements made since then. The current target of 25% for the end of 2015 shows how much progress Lafarge has made.

Hisham Sherif of the Egyptian Company for Solid Waste Recycling (Ecaru) placed Egypt's municipal solid waste level at 20Mt/yr at a presentation given at the Global CemFuels Conference earlier in 2015. From this 4Mt/yr of RDF could be produced. Together with biomass derived fuel (BDF) Sherif reckoned that the country's cement plants could reach substitution rates of 30 – 40%. Problems though with increasing RDF rates in Egypt include legal complexities, institutional issues, poor services and monitoring and centralised planning with little regard for the country's unofficial waste pickers, such as the Zabaleen.

Lafarge Ecocem appears to be tackling each of these problems in turn as the deals with Orascom and the Qalyubeya Governorate show. However, spare a thought for Egypt's unofficial waste sector workers who are likely to lose their livelihoods as waste management becomes more formalised and personnel rates per tonne of waste collected tumble.

For more information on the Zabaleen, check out the documentary made about them in 2009, called 'Garbage Dreams'.

There was a lot of news out of Lafarge and Holcim this week regarding preparations towards their merger. Just this morning we heard that the partners have entered into a binding agreement with Ireland's CRH regarding the sale of the assets that must be divested. Meanwhile, Lafarge and Holcim have also completed the appointments for the future LafargeHolcim executive committee. Its nine members will be responsible for such tasks as finance, integration, performance and costs, growth and innovation, as well as regional activities in Europe, Asia Pacific, the Middle East and Africa, North America and Latin America.

However, it was other types of personnel that featured in Lafarge and Holcim's earlier press releases. On 19 May 2015 Lafarge came out and announced the first (pre-merger) job losses that will result from the merger. It will cut 380 positions in central and regional corporate roles, with 166 going in its native France. For its part Holcim will make 120 pre-merger job losses, all in Switzerland. Ignoring the clear discrepancy in scale between the different sides, Lafarge and Holcim will have lost at least 500 jobs out of their combined ~130,000. This is just a scratch on the surface, but it does raise an interesting question: How many more jobs will go at LafargeHolcim?

First up are the staff that will go to work for CRH. This probably represents the largest number of staff that will come of LafargeHolcim's books relative to Lafarge and Holcim's current staff levels. According to their 2014 Annual Reports, Lafarge and Holcim employ a combined 81,000 staff in cement roles. Given that they have a combined 425Mt/yr of cement capacity (give or take) this equates to around 190 staff for each 1Mt/yr of capacity.

As the new LafargeHolcim will have control over around 340Mt/yr of cement capacity, we can crudely scale the 190 staff up to 64,600 cement sector staff. This indicates that around 16,400 staff that are currently employed by Lafarge and Holcim will be 'off' to CRH (and others). This leaves 48,100 staff in non-cement roles at LafargeHolcim.

Will more jobs be lost post-merger? Lafarge and Holcim have stated that the new entity will have 115,000 staff. However, with around 42% of future employees employed in non-cement roles - compared to 41% and 34% for Lafarge and Holcim respectively in 2014 - it certainly seems that there could be scope for at least some reduction in overall numbers from LafargeHolcim's non-cement functions. Future job losses could therefore be a possibility, but the exact scale of future consolidations and 'synergies' (if any) will only become apparent post-merger. Maybe LafargeHolcim could end up with around 105,000 to 110,000 staff.

A key time may well be early 2016, when LafargeHolcim will launch a new 'corporate structure.' This term was also used by Lafarge and Holcim in their most recent releases, so further job losses could be on the cards.

One member of LafargeHolcim staff with nothing to worry about now will be Bruno Lafont, current CEO of Lafarge. He received a Euro2.5m bonus this week for his 'key role' in conducting the merger. How LafargeHolcim staff who could be nervous about their jobs will take this remains to be seen.

The Lafarge-Holcim Report from Global Cement is available to order now