Displaying items by tag: Lafarge

On 15 January 2015, the Swiss National Bank (SNB) abandoned the Euro1.20 cap on the Swiss Franc. The effects of the decision were immediate, with the value of a Franc dropping from Euro1.20 to just Euro0.99. The decision caused turmoil for currency brokers and big business in Switzerland's normally bullet-proof finance sector, with some brokers out of business by the end of the same day.

It is not hard to see why these brokers were caught out by the sudden change in the SNB's position. On 18 December 2014 Thomas Jordan, Chairman of the SNB's Governing Board, stated in no uncertain terms that, "The SNB remains committed to purchasing unlimited quantities of foreign currency to enforce the minimum exchange rate with the utmost determination." In research conducted by Bloomberg News on 9 - 14 January 2015, not one of 22 economists questioned expected the SNB to abandon the cap in 2015. That's quite an about-turn by the SNB in less than a month.

The decision to 'scrap-the-cap' shows the potential of outside influences to suddenly unseat even the most secure of businesses. Such companies include Holcim, the share-price of which went on a rollercoaster on the SIX Swiss Exchange in the immediate aftermath of the announcement. At one point on 15 January 2015 Holcim had lost 20% of its value before closing 11% down on the day. It has since recovered somewhat, although a whopping Euro3bn of its capital has been swallowed up due to the plummeting Franc.

Following the sudden changes to its circumstances, Holcim immediately reinforced its commitment to its merger with Lafarge. "Regarding a possible impact on the combination with Lafarge, what we can say is that we remain committed to the merger," said spokesman Eike-Christian Meuter. There was an almost simultaneous reciprocal statement from the French producer, also stating its commitment. No change there then.

The calmness of Holcim's statements was broadly in line with commentary from bankers, which stated that large deals were unlikely to be affected by the change. This is because Swiss firms can insure themselves against the effects of such moves. Another 'get-out of jail free card' could have been a material adverse change (MAC) clause. If in place a MAC would allow the merging parties to terminate a transaction if an external event significantly changes the outlines of the deal. It is not possible to know whether Lafarge and Holcim have such a clause due to confidentiality issues.

Despite the fundamentals of the LafargeHolcim merger appearing to be unaffected, the scrapping of the Franc cap is an excellent example of how external policy makers can have a direct and unexpected impact on the underlying conditions of the global cement industry. Another major external influence at present is the low oil price, mainly affected by the oil producing cartel OPEC. HeidelbergCement said this week that it expects the oil price fall to have a positive impact on its profit in 2015. It makes 80% of its revenue in oil-importing countries, which should see reduced transport and production costs. This will result in improved economic conditions, higher levels of construction and hence cement production. For HeidelbergCement 2015 could be a case of costs down, sales up.

That surely sounds like good news, for some stagnant 'old' developed economies at least. However, in the world of 'new normals' it is the IMF that has sounded the biggest warning this week. It dropped its 2015 global economic growth forecast from 3.8% to 3.5%. As fuel prices slump, so too has inflation. In the EU this has resulted in deflationary pressures that could yet stump the recovery. Consumers (and construction firms alike) may go from a position of not being able to afford things, to not wanting to buy them. In the longer term, this may be yet more bad news for the cement sector in established markets.

US: Continental Building Products (CBP) has appointed James 'Jay' Bachmann to the position of president and CEO, effective immediately. Bachmann has served as interim CEO since November 2014 and CFO since January 2014. He will continue to serve as CFO in an interim role, pending the appointment of a permanent CFO.

CBP has also announced the appointment of Dennis Romps to the position of chief accounting officer (CAO). Romps will also continue to serve as senior vice president and corporate controller, positions he has held since January 2014.

Bachmann formerly served as CFO at Lafarge USA and co-chief financial officer of Lafarge North America from November 2012 through December 2013. He also held multiple executive responsibilities at Lafarge since 2002, including senior vice president of finance (Investor Relations) of Lafarge SA from January 2008 through October 2012 and senior vice president and controller of Lafarge North America from November 2005 to June 2006. Prior to Lafarge, he worked at Arthur Anderson from September 1990 to April 2002.

Romps previously served as CBP's CFO from August 2013 to December 2013. He formerly served as co-chief financial officer of Lafarge North America from December 2006 until August 2013, while also holding a variety of vice president positions in finance, IT and supply chain of the gypsum division of Lafarge North America from 2005 until August 2013.

The end of 2014 proved a good time to tidy up outstanding business for various organisations with links to the cement industry. Lafarge and Holcim received clearance from the European Commission for their proposed merger and they announced their executive committee, Holcim and Cemex concluded their transactions in Europe, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) announced regulations for coal ash, HeidelbergCement found a buyer for its Hanson Building Products business and even PPC managed to appoint a new CEO.

The HeidelbergCement sale is of interest because the company has said it is using the proceeds to pay off debt rather than to make purchases. CEO Bernd Scheifele said in the press release that the intention was to improve the company's 'credit-worthiness.' This isn't directly related to the cement industry because Hanson Building Products produces concrete gravity pipe, concrete and steel pressure pipe and clay bricks in the US, UK and eastern Canada. Yet the potential cash bonanza is relevant. Remember, this is happening at the same time that Lafarge and Holcim have been offloading lots of their own assets to meet competition regulations in various territories.

When the initial public offering was made for Hanson Building Products in September 2014, analysts assumed that HeidelbergCement was positioning itself for a spending spree. The purchase price for Hanson Building Products agreed with a private equity firm was US$1.4bn. This could be used to buy five 1 Mt/yr cement plants at an average price of US$250/t for cement production capacity!

Unfortunately for HeidelbergCement its net debt rose from Euro7bn in 2012 to Euro7.5bn in 2013. This was the first time it had risen since 2007 when it hit a peak of Euro14.6bn. That year was when it agreed to purchase Hanson. It also marked the start of the 2007 – 2008 financial crisis. Similarly, ratios such as net debt to operating income before depreciation (OIBD) also rose in 2013. Although it looks from interim financial reports that HeidelbergCement's debt may have decreased again in 2014, it is probably not doing so at any great speed. Hence the Hanson Building Products sale.

For comparison with debt held by the other European-based cement producers, Lafarge's net debt stood at Euro10.3bn at the end of 2013, Holcim's net debt was Euro7.9bn, Italcementi's net debt was Euro1.9bn and Mexico-based Cemex's net debt was Euro14.8bn. Compared to most of these their operating incomes these company's have net debt to earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortisation (EBITDA) ratios (net debt/EBITDA) of between two and three-and-a half suggesting that they can pay back their debts within a few years if absolutely necessary. The outlier here is Cemex with a ratio of over six following previous acquisition bursts.

The implication here is that Lafarge and Holcim have chosen to sell their wares at a time when their European competitors are weakened. Meanwhile their Chinese competitors have only just started to directly expand outside of mainland China. Smart move.

France/Switzerland: Holcim and Lafarge have announced the executive committee for the proposed merged company, LafargeHolcim, due to be formed in the first half of 2015. As previously announced, Lafarge's current CEO Bruno Lafont will become LafargeHolcim's first CEO and the chairman of the new board will be Wolfgang Reitzle, currently chairman of Holcim.

Lafont will lead a project team of 10 managers from both Holcim and Lafarge to handle the transition. Once the merger is finalised, the members of this project team will be officially appointed members of the Executive Committee.

The future executive committee is composed of:

• Finance: Thomas Aebischer, currently in charge of Finance at Holcim;
• Integration, Organisation and Human Resources: Jean-Jacques Gauthier, currently in charge of Finance at Lafarge;
• Europe: Roland Köhler, currently in charge of Europe at Holcim;
• Asia Pacific: Ian Thackwray, currently in charge of East Asia Pacific and Trading at Holcim;
• Middle-East Africa: Eric Olsen, currently in charge of Operations at Lafarge;
• North America: Alain Bourguignon, previously in charge of North America and UK at Holcim;
• Latin America: Saâd Sebbar, currently in charge of Morocco at Lafarge;
• Performance and Cost: Urs Bleisch, currently in charge of Corporate Functions at Holcim;
• Growth and Innovation: Gérard Kuperfarb, currently in charge of Innovation at Lafarge;

In India both companies are well on track in preparing the merger of Holcim and Lafarge, with the future structure for the subcontinent to be announced in due course upon clearance by the Competition Commission of India.

The current executive committees of Holcim and Lafarge remain in charge and accountable for the activity and operations of their respective groups until completion of the merger. Both groups continue to operate entirely separately as competitors until the merger is completed.

The selection and nomination process for the rest of the leadership team is also well underway. Apart from the future executive committee, the following direct reports of the future CEO have been selected under project mode:

• Strategy and M&A, Christof Haessig, currently in charge of Corporate Finance and Treasury at Holcim;
• Communication, Public Affairs and Sustainable Development, Alexandra Rocca, currently in charge of Communication, Public Affairs and Sustainable Development at Lafarge;
• Legal, Xavier Dedullen, currently in charge of Legal & Compliance at Holcim;
• Health and Safety, Sapna Sood, currently in charge of Health and Safety at Lafarge.

Kenya: Lafarge has appointed two directors to the board of East African Portland Cement Company (EAPCC) following the exit of Titus Naikuni after eight years with the company. EAPCC said that the terms for ex-Capital Markets Authority chairman Kung'u Gatabaki and Sarone Sena, chairman of Eldoret University council, are effective immediately. Bill Lay was reappointed as EAPCC chairman for a three year period, effective from 7 November 2014, by president Uhuru Kenyatta.

This week we heard news of two potential bidders for Lafarge and Holcim divestments. However, for a change it was where they will not be bidding that was of interest: Brazil. India's UltraTech Cement and Colombia's Cementos Argos now seem to have no interest in developing their positions in South America's largest cement market, having both previously stated their interest.

The Brazilian assets to be sold are three integrated cement plants and two grinding plants that share a capacity of 3.6Mt/yr (as well as a one ready-mix plant). Cementos Argos came out and said that it would not be bidding. UltraTech's position is more of a rumour, given by 'a source close to the company' that was not revealed by local media. However, both stories suggest that Brazil is currently not a good place for cement producers to buy up assets.

The reasons for these decisions are related to the state of the Brazilian economy, which has seen sub 2% growth in the last 11 quarters. The economy actually contracted by 0.9% in the second quarter of 2014 and by 0.25% in the third quarter of 2014. A 0.2% rise in the fourth quarter will be negated by a fall of 0.28% in the first quarter of 2015. Over the course of 2015 the IMF forecasts growth of 1.4%.

Although Brazilian cement production has risen from around 40Mt/yr in 2006 to around 70Mt/yr in 2013, it has been growing by lower and lower amounts each year. In 2013, it rose by 1.5% year-on-year, down from a 6.7% rise in 2012, an 8.3% rise in 2011 and a near 16% rise in 2010. Taken along with the IMF's GDP growth forecast, there is a genuine chance that Brazilian cement sales could plateau in 2014 or 2015. There will certainly be better places to try to sell cement over the next couple of years, hence the eagerness with which Cementos Argos declared its position.

One country that Cementos Argos has said it's looking at Lafarge and Holcim assets in is Mexico. Its economy is anticipated to grow by 3.5% in 2015, more than twice as quickly as Brazil and far more than the Americas as a whole (2.2%). Another anticipated strong performer in 2015 will be the US (3.1%), where Cementos Argos acquired assets in 2013. This week also saw the news that the Portland Cement Association's 8.1% cement consumption forecast for 2014 will be met.

Taking this all together, it appears that economic growth, and hence cement demand growth, will return to North America in earnest in 2015. Meanwhile South America's largest market is starting to lag behind. How will the rest of the two continents fare in 2015 and beyond?

A couple of news stories this week from Myanmar present an opportunity to look at the country. Lafarge has opened a cement repacking plant in the Thilawa special economic zone (SEZ). Upcountry meanwhile, Anhui Conch has had a joint venture approved by the government for an upgrade to an existing cement plant in Kyaukse.

Towards the end of 2013 the government announced that 13 companies were to establish joint ventures with the local state-owned cement plants. In addition the Myanmar Investment Commission had approved the construction of nine new cement plants with an aim of a target cement production capacity of 10.53Mt/yr. Following this, Siam Cement Group's on-going investment in a 1.8Mt/yr plant is due for completion in 2016. Semen Indonesia have been pushing for a joint venture since mid-2014 although it was still trying to agree terms in September 2014, according to local media. Italcementi's chief executive Carlo Pesenti also expressed his company's interest in setting up a joint venture in early 2014.

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) investment bank CIMB placed cement demand in Myanmar at 4Mt in 2012 and a local cement production capacity of 3Mt/yr. Cement consumption was placed at 76kg/capita for the country's population of 52.8 million. In contrast, Thai cement engineering supplier LV Technology reported demand of 6Mt in 2012. CIMB recorded Myanmar's capacity utilisation rate at 60%. Cement sales were broken down as 95% by bag and 5% by bulk.

This kind of supply-demand gap excites foreign investors. Neighbouring Thailand has a consumption of 515kg/capita, Myanmar imports cement from Thailand, Indonesia and India and the country's GDP growth rate is currently estimated to be around 8%.

Yet what's notable about Myanmar's industry are the high number of small, low production capacity cement plants. Many of them are wet process plants. Only one plant is reported as being capable of producing over 0.5Mt/yr with the Siam Cement plant project due to significantly bust this record when it is commissioned in 2016. Limited limestone deposits in the country may also make plants larger than 1.5Mt/yr unviable. Fuel is also an issue, with LV Technology advocating a wholesale industry conversion from state-subsidised gas to coal due to power shortages and impending competition issues.

In 2015 Myanmar is set to enact free trade tariffs from its ASEAN membership. Without protection or preparation, its cement plants could face serious consequences from cheaper imports from Thailand, Indonesia and Vietnam. The move by the government to encourage joint ventures with foreign partners looks like one way to mitigate this. In a market report in 2013 CIMB described the situation for investors as 'high-growth, high-barrier.' This seems to be an apt description given the experiences of Semen Indonesia.

Lafarge's third quarter financial results have coincided with the alarming news that terrorists attacked one of its cement plants in Nigeria. Thankfully nobody was hurt at the Ashaka plant. The suspected Boko Haram insurgents reportedly came looking for French nationals but the plant had been mostly evacuated following an earlier more violent incident at a nearby town. Instead they stole explosives and trucks and fled.

The resonance here with Lafarge's global financial situation is that rebel action elsewhere in the world was noted as having an adverse effect on the cement producer's coffers for the third quarter of 2013. In Iraq cement volumes have reportedly fallen by 15% in the year-to-date and almost halved in the third quarter, hit by an inability to transport cement across the country since June 2014, when Islamic State fighters captured parts of northern Iraq.

Looking at the nine months so far in 2014, Lafarge's sales have fallen by varying amounts with the exception of one territory: Middle East and Africa. Here, bucking the trend, sales rose by 3% to Euro2.8bn. The area had been the group's single largest sales region so far in 2014. Of course countries such as a South Africa are much more stable, but most other countries in the territory have had recent terrorism campaigns where a European-backed cement plant might present itself as a target.

This is not good news for a corporate balance sheet relying on these same countries to keep the profits up. However, as Lafarge states in its outlook, 'emerging markets continue to be the main driver of demand and Lafarge will benefit from its well-balanced geographic spread of high quality assets.' Spreading its bets geographically should pay off.

Also in its outlook, Lafarge announced that it intends to pause its stand-alone divestments pending completion of the planned merger with Holcim. The move suggests that the company is prioritising the impending merger over debt reduction. With Lafarge's and Holcim's recent formal notification to the European Commission of their proposed merger to obtain regulatory approval, the last of its necessary notifications worldwide, the merger is getting closer. So far, the original expectation of closure in the first half of 2015 does not look unreasonable.

When former British prime minister Harold Macmillian was asked what causes governments trouble, his apocryphal reply was, "Events, dear boy, events." The same applies to building materials producers. There may be more 'events' before the merger completes.

Nigeria: Lafarge Africa has notified the Nigerian Stock Exchange of the appointment of Adepeju Adebajo and Anders Kristiansson to the board of Lafarge Africa. Both staff members were formally appointed on 27 October 2014.

Adebajo is currently the MD of WAPCO operations. Prior to this, she served as the Chief Executive Officer and Managing Director at Mouka Limited. She was already the CEO of UTC Nigeria Plc, where she successfully turned the business around.

She previously headed strategic planning, brand management and product development at the United Bank for Africa and has had management consulting experience at Boston Consulting Group in the UK and financial analysis experience at Citibank in the UK.

Peju holds a Bachelor of Engineering (Chemical Engineering) from the Imperial College of Science & Technology, London; a Master of Engineering (Chemical Engineering) from the University of London; and a Master of Business Administration, Harvard University, Boston.

Anders Kristiansson is a Swedish citizen who started his career with Procter & Gamble (P&G) in Scandinavia and thereafter worked for P&G in South Africa. He has been a Global Divisional Controller for Eaton Automotive working in Europe and North America, whereafter he returned to Africa to oversee Celtel's finance departments across its African operations as Director of Financial Operations.

He moved to Nigeria in 2008 as Group CFO for PZ Cussons Nigeria, managing Finance and IT for PZ's five Nigerian companies. Prior to joining Lafarge, he was the CFO for NBC/Coca-Cola HBC's operations in Nigeria.

He holds a Master of Science Degree in Business Administration and Economics from the Gothenburg University, Sweden.

The 'revelation' this week that South Korean cement producers have been paid US$127m to use/dispose of Japanese coal that is thought to be radioactive certainly sounds scary. If it is true that cement made with contaminated coal has led to the construction of radioactive buildings and roads, this may have prised open a 'can of worms' for coal producers, exporters and cement players alike. According to local media, four South Korean firms - Ssangyong Cement, Tongyang Cement, Lafarge Halla Cement and Hanil Cement - received the money to use the coal between March 2011, when the Fukashima nuclear power plant started to leak radiation, until 2013. A total of 3.7Mt of cement is 'under suspicion.'

Caesium-137 is formed by fission reactions that start with uranium-235 in nuclear reactors. The Fukushima reactor that started leaking in 2011 used this type of fuel. Once it leaked, caesium-137 was deposited into the sea and onto the land, presumably also making its way into nearby coal deposits.

As it is a metal with a melting point of just 28.5°C and a boiling point of 671°C, the caesium-137 would vaporise if it were to enter a cement production line operating at 1450°C as a metal. However, caesium will not enter the cement-making process as a metal due to its rapid and explosive reaction with water. An interesting slow-motion of this reaction can be seen here.

Instead, caesium will enter the cement-making process either as its oxide or a simple salt (e.g.: caesium chloride) in the coal. The salt will be ionized in the heat of the flame, sending caesium ions into the kiln and thus direct contact with the clinker as it is being formed. Here it will become part of the matrix of the clinker and hence the final cement product. All the time the caesium-137 is radioactive.

And it stays radioactive once it is in the finished product, for example in a building or road surface. Its half-life, the time that it takes for half of the caesium-137 to decay to meta-stable barium-137 (emitting radiation as it decays), is unfortunately very well matched to the life-span of concrete buildings at 30.7 years. This means that after about 100 years of building life the building would still be around 10% as radioactive as it was when it was built.

This would certainly be a problem if the coal was highly contaminated. However, a few questions come to mind. Firstly, if the coal contains 20-73 becquerels per kilogramme (Bq/kg) of caesium-137, as has been claimed by Lee In-young, an opposition spokesman for the New Politics Alliance for Democracy party and member of the National Assembly's Environment Labour Committee, why is this a problem when the Japanese legal limit for eating caesium-137 in contaminated vegetables is all the way up at 500Bq/kg? When the most dangerous mechanisms of caesium-137 poisoning relate to accumulation in soft tissue, how can driving along a caesium-137-containing highway constitute a health risk?

Also, the coal may well start the cement making process with 25-73Bq/kg of caesium-137 but the clinker will have a lower level. This is because for every 1t of clinker the plant will typically consume just 100-200kg of coal. The caseium-137 and hence the radiation will therefore be spread out over a larger mass. A level of 50Bq/kg in the coal would translate to a clinker level of 5-10Bq/kg. This is around 100 times lower than the Japanese vegetable limit. After this, the clinker is extended with additives to make cement. This is then added to aggregates and / or sand when concrete or mortars are made, further diluting the caesium-137, perhaps to as low as 1-5Bq/kg. It is arguable that South Korea has received a higher caesium-137 dose from Japan via air and sea than via coal imports.

In light of all this, it appears that those calling for investigations on scientific grounds, like Lee, may be misguided. However, there may be political gain. The histories of Japan and South Korea are long, violent and distrustful. Indeed, according to a BBC World Service poll conducted earlier in 2014, South Korea and China jointly have the most negative perceptions of Japan of all world nations. In this environment stories about radioactive coal become much easier to believe in.

In reality the Japanese vegetable limit is well above the likely levels that might be found in any cement products resulting from the use of this coal. It is consistent with EU limits set more than 20 years earlier (600Bq/kg). A search on the US Environmental Protection Agency's website fails to bring up any formal limit. Instead it states that everyone is exposed to caesium-137 from atmospheric fallout to a low level and that the most dangerous cases are where waste metal processors unwittingly come across sources.

So on the surface then, the South Korean reaction seems like a storm in a teacup. One question remains though. If the caesium-137 levels in the coal are so much lower than the Japanese vegetable limit, why are Korean firms being paid to take it out of Japan?