UK: Hanson Cement has appointed Robert Keough as technical development manager at its cement plant in Ketton, Lincolnshire. His role will involve promoting the sustainability credentials of concrete specifications and emphasising the use of ground granulated blast furnace slag (GGBS) as a sustainable cement replacement product.

Keough has two years’ experience working for Hanson UK’s parent company, HeidelbergCement Group, as an engineer in training, giving him a firm foundation in the organisation’s values. During this time he worked in the continuous improvement team where he focused on reducing costs and increasing operational performance across the aggregates business.

Keough, aged 26 years, holds a bachelors degree in chemistry with management from the University of Bath and a master’s degree in minerals engineering from the University of Exeter. He holds experience with the financial services company Hargreaves Lansdown.

Sandbag, a climate policy think tank, published its report on the European cement sector entitled ‘Cement - The Final Carbon Fatcat’ last week on 16 March 2016. Amongst its findings the report accused the European Union (EU) Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) of pushing up emissions created by the cement industry. Unsurprisingly, Cembureau, the European Cement Association, took exception to some of the content of the report and issued a rebuttal. Notably, it said that ‘allegations that the ETS has incentivised overproduction are based on thin air.’

Here we present a section of the executive summary of Sandbag’s report that describes the current situation with the EU ETS and how Sandbag argue this has distorted the European cement industry.

The depressed carbon price under the EU ETS has done little to effect a reduction in emissions from the European cement sector. A surplus of more than 2bn EU allowances (EUAs) has built up in the European carbon market since 2008 with no expectations for the situation to change significantly over the medium term. Industry sources cite that the costs of upgrades to best available technology are tantamount to greenfield investments. The current low carbon price alone is not enough to render such investments economic, especially in the context of a depressed cement market. This applies even more so in the case of capturing and storing/using direct emissions (CCUS) which at this stage seems to be an expensive technology merely in the development stages across Europe.

Figure 1: Expected development of allowance surpluses for major industrial sectors until the end of Phase 3. Source: EUTL (Sandbag calculations).

The rules governing free allocation of allowances have failed to incentivise abatement in the cement sector. In particular, the sector’s inclusion on the list of sectors exposed to the risk of carbon leakage, as well as insensitivity to production changes, will cause its over-allocation to balloon. As we reveal in Figure 1, if activity levels continue at 2014 levels, by 2020 this surplus will be larger than 2.5 years’ worth of emissions. This is more than would be the case for almost any of the other major industrial sectors, practically all of whom expect to lose all or most of their earlier surpluses by the end of this decade.

The chronic oversupply of EUAs to the cement sector is partly due to the fact that cement firms are able to optimise their production of different products across different facilities to maximise their free allocation. Free allocation to cement installations is based on benchmarks relating only to the manufacture of clinker, an intermediate product. Many firms have been able to retain maximum free allocation, corresponding to peak production, by keeping a range of their facilities operating at just above 50% of their historic activity levels – the level required to retain 100% free allocation.

Figure 2: EU net clinker trade. Source: UN COMTRADE (Sandbag calculations).

This free allocation loophole has resulted in both windfall profits and a de facto production subsidy for highly carbon-intensive clinker. This clinker is then either blended in higher than necessary shares into cement or, as we show in Figure 2, actually exported, as EU cement subsidised by free allowances has a competitive advantage compared to manufacturers outside the ETS. This creates a net import of emissions to the EU – the complete reverse of the carbon leakage threat that many industry groups have emphasised. As we show in Figure 3, this stimulation of clinker exports to countries outside the EU has been the single most damaging factor to the decarbonisation of this sector, pushing 2013 emissions nearly 15Mt higher than they could have been.

Figure 3: Different factors’ contribution to cutting the cement sector’s emissions EU-wide during 2005 - 2013. Source: Cement Sustainability Initiative ‘Getting the Numbers Right’ database (Sandbag calculations).

As well as causing a surge in emissions, the insufficiently responsive free allocation rules leave cement companies strongly over-allocated. Table 2 shows the surpluses we estimate that the five cement majors have accumulated (or monetised) since the beginning of Phase 2.

Table 2: Largest cement companies’ surpluses and emissions (millions of EUAs, euros and tonnes). Source: EUTL (Sandbag calculations).

These five companies from the cement sector have collectively received nearly Euro1bn worth of spare EU allowances (EUAs) for free between 2008 and 2014. As the number of free allowances available to all industry is fixed, over-allocation to cement companies reduces the allowances available to other sectors that might really need protection.

The ETS therefore provides few incentives for these firms to invest in decarbonisation technologies. Given widespread expectations for an over-supplied carbon market well in to the 2020s and, consequently, a low carbon price, the opportunity cost of holding onto allowances is negligible when compared to the high cost of investment in abatement technologies.

Thanks to Alex Luta and Wilf Lytton at Sandbag for letting Global Cement publish this extract of their report. The full version of ‘Cement - The Final Carbon Fatcat: How Europe’s cement sector benefits and the climate suffers from emissions trading flaws’ is available to download from Sanbag’s website.

Ireland: CRH appointed William J Teuber, Jr as a non-executive Director with effect from 3 March 2016.

Teuber, aged 64 years and a US citizen, is the Vice Chairman at EMC Corporation, a global leader in enabling businesses and service providers to transform their operations and deliver IT as a service. In previous roles he was responsible for EMC’s global sales and distribution organisation (2006 – 2012) and served as Chief Financial Officer leading the company’s worldwide finance operation (1996 - 2006). Prior to joining EMC he was a partner in the audit and financial advisory services practice of Coopers & Lybrand.

Teuber is a member of the Board of Directors of Popular, a diversified financial services company, and Inovalon Holdings, a healthcare technology company. He holds an MBA degree from Babson College, a Master of Science in Taxation from Bentley College, and a Bachelors Degree from Holy Cross.

Cemex has taken action towards its debts over the course of the last week. First, it announced that it had amended its credit agreements in order to delay the looming effects of consolidated financial leverage and coverage ratio limits by one year to March 2017 with other similar deadlines also delayed. Then it announced the pricing of US$1bn of Senior Secured Notes due in 2026, a form of secured borrowing. This was followed by confirmation of asset sales in Bangladesh and Thailand. Finally, it announced that it was seeking regulatory permission to sell a minority stake in its subsidiary in the Philippines.

This column has discussed the on-going financial travails at Cemex a few times, notably recently when the group released its fourth quarter results for 2015 and in the wake of HeidelbergCement’s announcement to buy Italcementi. Basically, it all comes down to debt, as the following graph shows.

Figure 1 - Cemex assets, debt and equity, 2006 - 2015

Cemex took on large amounts of debt following its acquisition of Rinker in 2007. Since then the value of its assets have been falling faster than it has been able to reduce its debts. However, its equity (assets minus debts) is looking like it might dip below its debts in 2016. Hence, action needs to be taken. Cemex appears to have attempted to do this over the last week. Will it be enough?

The credit amendment was probably the most pressing issue for the Cemex management given that the terms have been reliant on maintaining a leverage ratio (debt divided by assets) below a set limit. Cemex has extended the terms of the borrowing in its favour so it can keep the leverage ratio higher for longer without penalty from its creditors. Note that the leverage ratio here means the ratio between debt and operating earnings before interest, taxation, depreciation and amortisation (EBIDTA).

Selling assets and shares in Asia is the next step in cutting debt in the window the group has negotiated for itself. It holds minor cement production assets in Thailand and Bangladesh that it is selling to Siam City Cement for US$53m. These include a 0.8Mt/yr integrated cement plant in Saraburi, Thailand and a 0.52Mt/yr cement grinding plant in Madangonj, Bangladesh. Unfortunately for Cemex it purchased the Saraburi plant for US$77m in 2001 from Saraburi Cement making it a loss of at least US$24m.

A minority sale of shares in its Philippines assets is more promising. The group runs two integrated cement plants in the country, the Solid Cement Plant in Rizal and the APO Cement Plant in Cebu with a combined cement production capacity of 6.23Mt/yr and a new 1.5Mt/yr production line on the way at Solid Cement also. Local media estimate that the sale could earn Cemex as much as US$850m from the booming market. The Cement Manufacturer's Association of the Philippines reported that cement sales volumes grew by 14.3% to 24.4Mt in 2015 with more growth predicted for 2016.

The credit amendment and asset sales of US$0.9bn may give Cemex the breathing room it requires to keep the creditors at bay for a while longer. It originally refinanced its debts in 2009 at the height of the financial crisis to keep the business running until the markets picked up again. They haven’t. A question that might be legitimately asked at Cemex’s analyst day later this week, on 17 March 2016, is this: when is Cemex going to seriously tackle its debts? As the situation continues the group may end up devoting more time to managing its debts than it will to actually making cement and other building products.

Germany: Johan Cnossen has resigned as the Chief Executive Officer and a member of the Management Board of KHD with immediate effect from 11 March 2016. He cited personal reasons. Other Management Board members will take over his responsibilities for an interim period.

India: Burnpur Cement has signed an agreement with Saurabh Ganguly as a brand ambassador for the company for three years from 11 March 2016. Ganguly was the former captain of the Indian cricket team. As the brand ambassador for the company he will endorse the product and brand of the cement producer to help increase of sales.

Dangote Cement released its financial results for 2015 this week and certain numbers are more interesting than others. The headline that the company would probably like us to look at is a 14% rise in profit from significantly higher revenues. However, we would like to look at Dangote’s capacity and production figures. We have spoken about Dangote’s ambitions in this column in recent years and it is very likely that the topic will come up again in the future. But Dangote’s ambitions are increasingly becoming a reality for markets all around Africa. How are its pan-African expansion plans turning out?

Dangote Cement reported that cement production volumes were up by 35% in 2015 compared to 2014. This was due almost entirely to Dangote’s new plants outside of its native Nigeria. While its Nigerian cement production volumes rose from 12.9Mt in 2014 to 13.3Mt in 2015, production elsewhere came in at 5.6Mt, more than five times the amount that Dangote produced outside of Nigeria in 2014. This rapid rise was the result of the first cement being produced at its plants in South Africa, Senegal, Cameroon, Ethiopia and Zambia.

As Dangote has expanded into these new markets, we have heard much about the effects of its new capacity from other producers. In South Africa, long-established players have had to deal with falling cement prices due to the inauguration of Dangote’s Sephaku Cement subsidiary. In Zambia, Zambezi Cement was forced to lay off workers in 2015, citing the opening of Dangote’s new facility as a significant contributing factor. More recently, in February 2016, Ghana announced an investigation into Dangote’s operations in the country following accusations of ‘predatory pricing’ by its competitor Diamond Cement. The investigation is ongoing.

However, the complaints heard to date could really start to ramp up over the course of 2016 as Dangote starts to realise its full potential across Africa. Its cement production volumes may have risen by 35% in 2015 relative to 2014 but its capacity rose by an incredible 87%, with Dangote now claiming a capacity of 44Mt/yr! The capacity utilisation rate is just 43% and the inference is that the ex-Nigerian plants have not yet realised anything like their full potential. Local producers the length and breadth of Africa may well be looking at this situation with dread.

And ramping up its production in 2016 is by no means the end of Dangote’s pan-African vision, with new plants under construction in Nepal, Kenya and Zimbabwe. As well as new plants outside of Nigeria, Dangote cement capacity within Nigeria is also set to rise. It recently announced a further 9Mt/yr of capacity at two new plants. With exports to its smaller neighbours already causing consternation, this will surely add fuel to the fire for local producers like Diamond Cement.

So far in 2016, the news continues to be promising for Dangote. January 2016 sales volumes rose by 77.6% to 2.0Mt, with Nigerian sales up by 46.4% to 1.4Mt. February 2016 sales volumes were 38% better than a year earlier, with Nigerian sales up by more than 60% year-on-year to more than 1.5Mt.

At the end of its report, Dangote says that it expects to have around 77Mt/yr of cement capacity by the end of 2019. If realised, this capacity would be enough to put it up to sixth on the Global Cement Top 100 list by 2016 standards. It would have around 28% of Africa’s entire cement capacity, according to the Global Cement Directory 2016 and would be only 10Mt/yr behind the 87Mt/yr of cement capacity currently held by the established multinational player Cemex. That is truly a number to pay attention to!

India: Ravi Kirpalani will join ThyssenKrupp India on the 14 March 2016 and take charge as the CEO of the Regional Headquarters of ThyssenKrupp India effective from 1 July 2016.

Indian-born, Kirpalani's last role was the Managing Director of Castrol India. Prior to joining ThyssenKrupp, he spent over 16 years at BP where he held a number of roles in India and in the UK. He will provide on-going support for the strategic development of all ThyssenKrupp’s business in India. He succeeds Michael Thiemann, who has been responsible for the region since 1 May 2013 and previously held various management functions at ThyssenKrupp Uhde GmbH over a period of more than 35 years, including member of the Management Board and CEO.

India is currently the third most important market in Asia for ThyssenKrupp. In the 2014 - 15 financial year the group generated sales of around Euro560m in the country and employed almost 6000 people at local companies.

Small print can cause large consequences. Billion US Dollar consequences. Take the 2015 amendment to India’s Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) (MMDR) Act from 1957. Ambiguous wording in the legislation may have held up two prominent cement industry acquisitions in 2015. It also hangs over the recently announced purchase by UltraTech Cement of Jaiprakash Associates’ cement plants.

The MMDR was amended in January 2015. As the Times of India explained in mid-2015, a clause in the amendment said, “The transfer of mineral concessions shall be allowed only for concessions which are granted through auction.” However, it was unclear whether this meant historically allocated mines given via nominations or only newly allocated ones. Given the reliance of clinker plants on reliable mineral reserves this caused havoc. Cue confusion and large legal budgets.

LafargeHolcim’s divestment of two cement plants to Birla Corporation was one casualty. As a condition of the merger between Lafarge and Holcim the Competition Commission of India (CCI) required that the Jojobera and Sonadih cement plants in Eastern India be sold in 2015. Together the plants have a combined cement production capacity of 5.1Mt/yr. However the ambiguity over the 2015 MMDR Act clause on transfer of mining rights held the deal up. By February 2016 Birla Corporation had endured enough. It publicly complained about Lafarge India’s ‘inability’ to complete the deal and threatened legal action. LafargeHolcim retorted by asking the CCI if it could sell all of Lafarge India instead. It received the revised clearance and a new buyer is yet to be announced.

Another victim was UltraTech Cement in a previous attempt to buy Jaiprakash Associates’ cement assets. That time it was down to buy two integrated cement plants in Madhya Pradesh with a combined clinker production capacity of 5.2Mt/yr with associated mineral rights. The deal was agreed in December 2014 and then reported delayed in mid-2015. Finally, on 28 February 2016 the Bombay High Court rejected the deal, citing the MMDR Act as the prime cause.

Luckily for UltraTech Cement the story has a happy ending (so far) as it then announced that it was purchasing the majority of Jaiprakash Associates’ 22.4Mt/yr cement portfolio instead for US$2.4bn. It is hoped that the deal will be finalised by June 2017 but this partly depends on the MMDR Act being amended. Although UltraTech Cement have said they are looking at alternative routes to the deal in case the act isn’t amended.

Poor legal wording kiboshed at least two cement industry deals for over 10Mt/yr production capacity. Roughly, at the price UltraTech Cement is paying for its latest deal, that’s over US$1bn worth of Indian cement assets. Given the hard time the Indian cement industry had in 2015 the question should be asked regarding how much damage the MMDR Act amendment has done. One option for the beleaguered industry is to consolidate and cut its costs. This was massively delayed in 2015.

The proposed 2016 amendment to the MMDR Act reads as follows:

“Provided that where a mining lease has been granted otherwise than through auction and where mineral from such mining lease is being used for captive purpose, such mining lease will be permitted to be transferred subject to compliance with the terms and conditions as prescribed by the Central Government in this behalf.”

Let’s hope it does the trick this time.

India: Shailendra Chouksey, a director of JK Lakshmi Cement, has been appointed as the new president of the Cement Manufacturers' Association (CMA) for a two year term. He replaces OP Puranmalka, the managing director of Ultratech Cement. Previously Chouksey was the vice-president of the association.

"As the newly elected president of the CMA, my priority is to device methods to work with different stakeholders, including the government of India to spur the cement demand," said Chouksey.

Chouksey holds a PhD in managerial economics, an MBA in marketing from the Faculty of Management Studies, Delhi and a post-graduate degree in physics. He has worked in the cement industry for nearly 40 years.