Displaying items by tag: Ukraine

Ukraine: Cement companies produced 4.75Mt of cement during the first eight months of 2023, up by 30% year-on-year from eight-month 2022 levels. Interfax-Ukraine News has reported that producers are operating at 60% production capacity.

Liudmyla Kripka, executive director of the Ukrainian cement association, Ukrcement, said “If we compare it with last year, when the country’s economy was in shock from Russia’s treacherous attack on Ukraine and the start of the full-scale war, the situation has improved somewhat. Cement production in the first half of 2023 grew by 26%, and in the first eight months by 30%, compared to last year.” Kripka added “We are still far from the indicators of 2021, but the dynamics are encouraging. Once there was a prospect, work for the future began. Cement producers, even in war conditions, are investing in Ukraine and the economic restoration of the regions. This expands the production capacity of the industry as a whole and contributes to the creation of new jobs.”

The Hungarian government recently enacted Emergency Decree 320/2023, taxing all CO₂ emissions from the country’s 40 or so largest industrial enterprises. The government used emergency powers to set up a new taxation scheme, which undercuts existing free allowances under the EU emissions trading scheme (ETS). The scheme additionally penalises the trade in ETS credits. Cement producers announced that the new regulations will make it impossible for them to keep operating.¹

With regard to Hungary’s six active cement plants, the scheme comprises:

1 – A Euro20/t tax on CO₂ emissions, effective retroactively from 1 January 2023, payable by any large enterprise that uses EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) free allowances to cover the majority of its CO₂ emissions. Plants that decrease their production, or that carry on non-CO₂-emitting activities at over 10% of their operations, will pay a higher rate of Euro40/t of CO₂.

2 – A 10% transaction fee for the sale of free allocations under the EU ETS, payable to the Hungarian Climate Protection Authority.

Less than three years ahead of full implementation of the EU carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM), the Hungarian government has seemingly moved unilaterally against cement production – this in a country surrounded by seven other cement-producing countries. Multiple foreign cement producers connected to the major market of Budapest by rail, river and road will be watching developments with interest. These include CRH, which, besides two smaller plants inside Hungary, operates the 800,000t/yr Cementáreň Turňa nad Bodvou plant, immediately over the border in Slovakia.

This comes at a time when the domestic cement industry is facing historically high costs and low demand, with a 30% year-on-year decline in construction activity in July 2023, following double-digit inflation throughout 2022 and the first half of 2023.

Catastrophising may be a common symptom of environmental regulation in industry associations, but one can understand on this occasion. The Hungarian cement and lime industry association, CeMBeton, backed its members’ gloomy announcement about their future with an estimate for extra annual taxes of ‘several billion forints’ (1bn forint = US$2.84m), in a statement following the decree. Assuming annual CO₂ emissions of 565kg/t across its 5.4Mt/yr cement capacity, the sector might expect to pay US$61m/yr in CO₂ rates alone.^{2, 3} According to analyst ClearBlue, the government will raise additional tax revenues worth US$278m/yr across all of the 40 aforementioned heavy emitters in Hungary.⁴

It may seem surprising that CeMBeton did not even draw up a projected tax bill during consultations over the new tax scheme – but, in fact, no such consultations took place. In its most recent statement, the association said “We do not know the government’s intentions.” Outside of official releases, Hungary’s cement producers have not always been so reserved about the government’s perceived aim.

Global Cement reported in April 2023 that the Hungarian government was allegedly interfering in the cement sector to make producers sell up – as per accusations by an anonymous industry executive.⁵ There is arguably a course of action on the government’s part which, more or less, appears consistent with this aim:

October 2020 – The Hungarian Competition Authority (GVH) starts competition supervision proceedings against CRH, Duna-Dráva Cement and Lafarge Cement Magyarország.

July 2021 – Emergency Decree 2021/404 imposes a 90% tax on producers’ ‘excess’ profits, based on threshold cement sales revenues of Euro56/t. Additionally, producers must report their exports.

September 2021 – GVH finds insufficient evidence to support the initiation of competition supervisory proceedings in the cement industry.

January 2023 – (Retroactive) entry into force of CO₂ emissions tax.

May 2023 – The government of Hungary reportedly initiates negotiations to acquire Duna Dráva Cement and Holcim Magyarország, according to the Hungarian builders’ association, National Professional Association of Construction Contractors (ÉVOSZ). Duna Dráva Cement owners Heidelberg Materials and Schwenk Zement state that they have entered into no such negotiations, while Holcim declines to comment.

July 2023 – The Act on Hungarian Architecture lets the government dictate producers' volumes and prices and require them to supply cement to National Building Materials Stores (a proposed state-owned construction materials retail monopoly).⁶ Additionally, the government gains a right of first refusal over the divestment of any asset by the cement industry’s foreign owners.

20 July 2023 – The government enacts Emergency Decree 320/2023. ETS transaction fees enter into force.

The government can now expect a legal challenge to its latest move. CeMBeton’s first ally may be the font of all emissions legislation – the EU itself. Within the EU ETS framework, tax rates are down to member states to determine. However, the introduction of a transaction fee may constitute an illegal restriction to free allowances, OPIS News has reported. The association has also indicated its readiness to mount a constitutional challenge, specifically with regard to the legislative retrofit involved in the CO₂ emissions tax. The Fundamental Law of Hungary does not generally permit legislation to apply retroactively, though how courts will balance this consideration against the rights of the government is untested.

The government amended the constitution to provide for new emergency powers, and subsequently adopted them in May 2022, in response to the ‘state of danger’ created by Russia’s war in Ukraine – though its actions on the international stage suggest careful neutrality, if not ambivalence. At home, the war has brought a consolidation of the government’s control over various areas of life, including the economy, according to Human Rights Watch.⁷

Climate protestors around the world might be glad to see governments wield emergency powers against their own heavy industries. In Hungary, however, the wider sustainability goals are not yet clear with regard to a policy that seems, at least partly, politically motivated.

References

1. CeMBeton, Sajtónyilatkozat, 21 August 2023, https://www.cembeton.hu/hirlevel/2023-08-21/202308-mozgalmas-osz-ele-nezunk/116/sajtonyilatkozat/668

2. Heidelberg Materials, ‘Energy and climate protection,’ 2022, https://www.heidelbergmaterials.com/en/energy-and-climate-protection

3. Global Cement, Global Cement Directory 2023, https://www.globalcement.com/directory

4. OPIS News, ‘Hungary's New Carbon Tax Unlikely to Set EU Precedent, Say Analysts,’ 16 August 2023

5. Global Cement, 'Update on Hungary,' April 2023, https://www.globalcement.com/news/item/15572-update-on-hungary-april-2023#:~:text=Heidelberg%20Materials'%20subsidiary%20Duna%2DDr%C3%A1va,the%20country's%20active%20national%20capacity.

6. Daily News Hungary, ‘Hungarian government’s new nationalising plan could violate EU law,’ 27 February 2023, https://dailynewshungary.com/hungarian-govts-new-nationalizing-plan-could-violate-eu-law/

7. Human Rights Watch, ‘Hungary’s New 'State of Danger',’ 8 June 2022, https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/06/08/hungarys-new-state-danger

Ukraine: CRH subsidiary Cemark completed the 'main stage' of construction of a US$37.3m, 450,000t/yr cement shipping complex in Ukraine in July 2023. The Sunday Independent newspaper has reported that complex will be equipped with an automated packing and palletising line. When operational, the site will provide 80 jobs.

Ireland-based CRH agreed to acquire Italy-based Buzzi's Ukrainian business in June 2023, for US$109m.

Ukraine: Buzzi has agreed to sell its business in Ukraine to Ireland-based CRH for US$109m. The assets additionally include Buzzi’s Slovakian ready-mix concrete business. The Ukrainian business is comprised of the 2Mt/yr Volyn cement plant and 1Mt/yr Nikolajev cement plants, as well as ready-mix concrete operations in Kiev, Nikolajev and Odessa.

Italy-based Buzzi retains its operations in Russia, including the 3.6Mt/yr Suchoi Log cement plant in Irkutsk Oblast and the 700,000t/yr Korkino cement plant in Chelyabinsk Oblast.

Bangladesh: The Bangladesh Cement Manufacturers Association (BCMA) has called for a 60% cut to duties on clinker imports, to US$1.84/t from US$4.61/t. The Financial Express newspaper has reported that BCMA members are struggling with high shipping costs and supply issues due to Russia’s war in Ukraine.

The Bangladesh government published plans to raise the duty on imports of clinker by 40% to US$6.46/t in its 2023 budget on 13 June 2023.

Lithuania: Akmenes Cementas has benefitted from a European Union (EU) ban on cement exports from Belarus in response to the Russian-led invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The subsidiary of Germany-based Schwenk Zement reported a profit of Euro16m in 2022, according to the Baltic News Service. This is its first recorded profit since 2013. Artūras Zaremba, the head of Akmenes Cementas, added that higher cement prices, further borrowing from its parent company and fixed electricity prices also helped it make a profit.

The company’s income grew by 53% year-on-year to Euro134m in 2022 from Euro87.5m in 2021. Its cement sales volumes increased by 6% to 1.5Mt and cement production rose by 8% to 1.1Mt. Around 1.1Mt of cement was sold domestically with the remainder exported to other countries within the EU. Cement sales are expected to fall in 2023 due to changes in the local market.

Italy: Buzzi Unicem reported first-quarter sales of Euro956m in 2023, up by 20% year-on-year from Euro800m in the first quarter of 2022. The producer's cement volumes dropped by 8.8% to 5.8Mt from 6.36Mt. It attributed this to a general slowdown of the construction sector across its markets. Local low demand from the residential market and adverse weather compounded the regional sales contraction in Central Europe. On the other hand, the group recorded volumes growth in Mexico and Russia and stability in Brazil. Both Mexico and Brazil produced revenues growth, while Buzzi Unicem's revenues fell in Russia due to the effect of the appreciation of the ruble against the comparison period in 2022, when the start of the on-going Russian invasion of Ukraine devalued it.

Overall, the group expects to 'easily' match its 2022 full-year earnings before interest, taxation, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA) in 2023. It said that that it could not currently delineate a 'clearly different picture,' but added "The stabilisation of energy prices, albeit at higher levels than in 2022, if confirmed, will allow us to have better visibility on the unfolding of the production costs from spring onwards."

Italy: Buzzi Unicem reduced its specific gross scope 1 CO₂ emissions by 4% year-on-year to 664kg/t cementitious product in 2022 from 689kg/t in 2021. As part of its Sustainability Report for 2022 it revealed that specific CO₂ emissions varied from a low of 500kg/t in Luxembourg to a high of 812kg/t in Ukraine. Its specific thermal consumption fell slightly to 4084MJ/t clinker and its thermal substitution rate was 29.9%.

The company’s Lost Time Injury Frequency Rate (LITFR) was 4.9 and two fatalities were reported. It also noted that six employees – five Ukrainian and one Russian – died as a result of the war between Ukraine and Russia that started in February 2022. In addition, six staff were wounded, one taken prisoner and two were reported missing from its Ukrainian workforce.

The building materials producer noted that it had met some of its five-year sustainability targets set in 2017, including a 5% reduction in specific CO2 emissions, the implementation of structural engagement projects at all of its production sites with a high economic, environmental and social impact and the achievement of increasingly safe working conditions.

After the initial shocking coverage of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which began in February 2022, came announcements of the most extensive sanctions in history by the EU, G7 nations and others against Russia. In the EU, this effectively deconsolidated companies' Russian subsidiaries, leaving decision makers with the choice whether to sell up or hold out for better times.¹ Four Russian-facing EU cement producers - Buzzi Unicem, CRH, Heidelberg Materials and Holcim - finalised their strategic responses in March 2022.

One year on, on 15 March 2023, 666 (21%) of 3110 eligible multinationals have withdrawn from Russia, according to the KSE Institute.² Ireland-based CRH led the cement sector exit. It abandoned its Finland-based subsidiary Rudus' ready-mix concrete joint venture, LujaBetomix, on 2 March 2022. Switzerland-based Holcim took longer, but affected its exit on 14 December 2022, agreeing to sell Holcim Russia to local management. One condition of the sale was a rebrand (to Cementum, in February 2023) to withdraw the Holcim name from Russia. Unlike CRH, Holcim's Russian business included multiple cement plants - though the producer stated that it contributed less than 1% of group sales during 2021.

The KSE Institute uses the equivocal label of 'waiting' for companies which have paused investments, or scaled back operations, in Russia, while retaining their subsidiaries. This applies to 500 companies globally (16% of the pre-war total). Germany-based Heidelberg Materials acted swiftly to freeze further investments in HeidelbergCement Russia on 10 March 2022. At that time, its three cement plants were in winter shutdown. In terms of capacity, the 4.7Mt/yr-capacity Heidelberg Materials Russia constitutes 2.8% of Heidelberg Materials. In 2022, Heidelberg Materials suffered a Euro102m impairment on account of its Russian business. CEO Dominik von Achten, announcing the freeze, had described the subsidiary as a 'pure local business with no imports or exports.' Its website has since come offline, but the corporate structure presumably maintains in its frozen isolation.

1220 global multinationals - 39% of all those previously operating in Russia - are still 'continuing operations.' Among these is Buzzi Unicem. Having decided that 12 months was long enough, the Ukrainian National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption (NAPC) placed Italy-based Buzzi Unicem on its list of Russian war sponsors on 8 March 2023 for the actions of its subsidiary SLK Cement. A scathing denouncement accompanied the listing, in which the NAPC set out its main charges. It accused Buzzi Unicem of:

1. Expanding its business in Russia since the invasion;

2. Supplying its products to Russian state-owned businesses, including energy suppliers Rosatom and Rosneft;

3. Voicing support for the invasion via its social media presence.

The NAPC concluded “Buzzi Unicem's continued business in Russia means direct support and sponsorship of terrorism by Russia.”

Buzzi Unicem responded in no uncertain terms that these allegations are untrue: it has no business in Russia, and the entity bearing its logo on its (SLK Cement's) website is entirely independent in its decision-making and commercial actions.

This goes to the root of what it means to be a subsidiary of a corporation. Buzzi Unicem seeks to define the relationship as beginning and ending in operational involvement. Yet Buzzi Unicem and other corporations have invested large sums in businesses like SLK Cement. According to the NAPC, Buzzi Unicem paid Euro62m in taxes alone in Russia between 2016 and 2021. Whether they have elected to 'continue operations,' 'wait' or write in favourable buy-back options into sales contracts, as has happened in other industries, companies can be expected to seek to return to their investment.

As such, it is not entirely surprising that Buzzi Unicem should have followed up its rebuttal with a defence of SLK Cement. It stated "SLK Cement is a Russian domiciled entity operating exclusively in that country and therefore subject to domestic legislation. Payment of taxes and having employees being mobilised to the army are not discretionary decisions, rather legal obligations within the Russian jurisdiction."

In the decision to sell or hold, multinationals face the usual considerations: can they afford to yield their market share to other - less conscientious - competitors? Or, in this instance, those from Türkiye, India and China, whose potential investments are unrestrained by sanctions? Even as Holcim thrashed out its exit deal in October 2022, China-based West China Cement announced plans for a new US$260m, 1.2Mt/yr cement plant in Tatarstan, Volga Federal District. Meanwhile, Cemros (formerly Eurocement) is carrying out a Euro3m mill upgrade at its Lipetsk integrated cement plant in Central Federal District, which will increase the plant's capacity by 20% upon commissioning in early 2023. Between them, Central Federal District and Volga Federal District host four former Holcim cement plants.

12 months into the Russian invasion of Ukraine, an onslaught of withdrawals has shrunk, but not collapsed, the Russian economy.³ The Russian government insists that cement demand remains high (up by 2.1% year-on-year to 58.3Mt during the first 11 months of 2022, according to the Russian cement association Soyuzcement).⁴ The country has substituted new sources of imports for those lost since the beginning of the invasion, the government claims. It is even preparing for a cement shortage from 2024 onward by 'further developing domestic production capacities.'

Far from shrinking, Russian cement production rose by approximately 2.5% year-on-year to 60.7Mt in 2022.^{4, 5} The two aforementioned districts - Central Federal District and Volga Federal District - contributed a healthy 15.3Mt (25%) and 13.4Mt (22%) respectively. If the statistics are to be believed, the EU's recalled producers are missing out on a bonanza.

At the same time, all four EU-based producers face the parallel burden of increased costs in their key markets, as sanctions keep energy prices at an all-time high, and nowhere more so than in Europe. These sanctions purport to target Russian businesses and individuals, but their bite is far less discriminating. Companies may well wonder why they are being penalised by governments whose policies failed to prevent a Russian invasion of Ukraine in the first place.

We have no idea what will happen in Ukraine and Russia in the rest of 2023, but we can be sure it will be uncertain territory for the two countries’ cement producers. Those with (former) assets in the Russian market will have to continue their delicate balancing act.

1. European Commission, 'Frequently Asked Questions,' 16 March 2022, https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2022/march/tradoc_160079.pdf

2. KSE Institute, 'Stop Doing Business with Russia,' 15 March 2023, https://leave-russia.org/leaving-companies?flt%5B147%5D%5Beq%5D%5B%5D=9062

3. European Council, 'Infographic - Impact of sanctions on the Russian economy ,' 9 March 2023, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/impact-sanctions-russian-economy/

4. Soyuzcement, 'Cement Review,' December 2022, https://soyuzcem.ru/documents/%D0%A6%D0%B5%D0%BC%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%82%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B5_%D0%BE%D0%B1%D0%BE%D0%B7%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B5_%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BA%D0%B0%D0%B1%D1%80%D1%8C%202022.pdf

5. BusinessStat, 'In 2022, 60.7 million tons of cement were produced in Russia,' 21 February 2023, https://marketing.rbc.ru/articles/14025/

Ukraine/Italy: The Ukrainian National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption (NAPC) has placed Italy-based Buzzi Unicem on its list of Russian war sponsors. Ukrinform has reported that the NAPC accuses Buzzi Unicem of expanding its business in Russia since the country's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, of supplying its products to Russian state-owned businesses including energy suppliers Rosatom and Rosneft, and of voicing support for the on-going invasion via its social media presence.

Between 2016 and 2021, Buzzi Unicem reportedly paid Euro62m-worth of taxes to Russia. In a statement, the NAPC said "For comparison, this is the cost of 206 Tochka U missiles." It concluded “Buzzi Unicem's continued business in Russia means direct support and sponsorship of terrorism by Russia.”

On 10 March 2023, Buzzi Unicem clarified that it has no business in Russia, calling the NAPC's listing 'defamatory.' The group explained that it has 'no involvement' in its Russian subsidiary SLK Cement's decision-making process related to local initiatives and commercial actions.

Buzzi Unicem said "Buzzi Unicem already clarified in its press release dated 12 May 2022 the decision to cease with immediate effect any operational involvement in the activities carried out by the subsidiary SLK Cement in Russia and to suspend all strategic initiatives and investments in the country." It defended the subsidiary, saying "SLK Cement is a Russian domiciled entity operating exclusively in that country and therefore subject to domestic legislation. Payment of taxes and having employees being mobilised to the army are not discretionary decisions, rather legal obligations within the Russian jurisdiction."

The group also voiced its support for Ukraine, saying "Despite significant financial losses incurred as a consequence of the Russian invasion, Buzzi Unicem did not stop operations in Ukraine, keeps supplying products to Ukrainian customers, paying taxes in Ukraine and providing job and humanitarian aid to its nearly 1000 employees and families in the country."

The English language release may be found here.