Analysis

It looks like Cembureau, the European Cement Association, got its own way on the proposal to amend the European Union's (EU) Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) that the European Parliament voted on last week. The system has been tightened but not enough to make the cement industry suffer, for now. Naturally, the environmentalists are outraged.

The key reform was that the carbon credits reduction rate (the linear reduction rate) will increase and the market stability reserve (MSR) will double its capacity to absorb excess allowances on the market. However, the big battle was fought over whether to include an importer inclusion scheme (or Border Adjustment Measure) or not. Lots of political 'horse-trading' took place right up to the vote on 15 February 2017 to adopt the draft proposal, with particular battles over the importer inclusion scheme. Negotiations will now continue with the Council of the European Union before the proposal returns to the European Parliament for a final vote.

Cembureau seemed pleased with the outcome. It supported the proposal principally for maintaining competitiveness and for not ‘deliberately discriminate between sectors.' It also liked the inclusion of dynamic allocation, a benchmark based on what it said was real data, a flexible reserve in relation to the allowances available for free and those designated for auctioning and an impetus towards funding carbon capture and storage. It also singled out its pleasure that an amendment for an importer inclusion scheme had not been accepted.

This last point caused a spat between Cembureau and Bruno Vanderborght, a former executive at Holcim, at the end of January 2017 in the lobbying frenzy before the vote. In robust language Vanderborght accused the European cement industry of using the ETS for negative leakage. His argument was that the free allocation of carbon credits given to the cement industry had been used to 'maximise gross margin.' Instead of spending the money on upgrading inefficient units, the industry had used its same inefficient units to increase exports of clinker to outside the EU, to places like Africa. Cembureau countered that it had been taken out of context by Vanderborght and that arguments he levelled, such as data from the Cement Sustainability Initiative (CSI) suggesting that the EU has the highest share of clinker production in old, energy-intensive installations worldwide, were misleading since CSI reporting may not be as thorough outside of Europe.

Predictably, the proposal didn't please the environmental lobby, which denounced the deal as toothless. Environmental campaign group Sandbag has been on the case of the cement industry for several years, pointing out that its own research shows that cement producers have 'abused' the free allocation scheme for profit and that emissions have actually increased under the ETS so far. Its headline figure in the wake of the vote was that the cement sector was set to rake in a surplus of allowances worth Euro2.8bn by 2030.

Following the vote Sandbag took no time to point out that the ETS carbon price had sunk below Euro5/t. In its assessment, a carbon price of least Euro50/t is required to stimulate low carbon investment. However, the carbon price soon rose back up. Little impartial analysis is available on whether the amended proposal will actually deliver its aims, although a Thomson Reuters analyst did describe the outcome as one that 'significantly tightens the market balance.'

In a final twist, the lead rapporteur for the reforms to the EU ETS is a UK member of the European Parliament (MEP). Depending on how the Brexit negotiations go, the guy marshalling the amendments to the EU ETS won't be subject to its eventual implementation.

The EU ETS is slowly starting to improve through reforms such as those voted on last week but it remains very much in doubt whether it will be able to deliver solid meaningful reductions in carbon emissions. Cembureau is rightly protecting the industry it represents but at present the price of coal appears to be a better driver of measures such as increased use of alternative fuels than the ETS. The ETS has had the misfortune in operating for the last few years throughout a market depression in Europe where it has been propping up some cement producers and now it’s helping them get back on their feet as they export their products out of the continent. In a world awash with excess clinker the policy makers are eventually going to have to decide how much they want to damage industry in order to meet their environmental aims. We need cement and we need to cut carbon emissions. Someone is always going to be unhappy in this situation.

The merger between South Africa’s larger cement producers, PPC and AfriSam, is back on this week. PPC issued a statement advising its shareholders that the board of directors of both companies were about to enter formal talks to thrash out a potential deal. Issues such as the merger ratio, black economic empowerment and local competition concerns are all on the agenda.

The resumption of merger talks follows the cancellation of the previous round in mid-2015. No reason for the breakdown was publicly released but possible factors may have included the fallout at PPC from the resignation of its chief executive officer (CEO) Ketso Gordhan and competition concerns. Given the investigations by the South African Competition Commission from around 2008 to 2012 these may have been very real concerns. At this time the two companies held about a 60% share of the country’s cement production capacity.

Events have changed since then with the opening and ramp-up of Sephaku Cement’s cement plant at Aganang and its grinding plant at Delmas since late 2014. Today, PPC and AfriSam control just under 50% of the cement production capacity in South Africa and PPC’s current CEO Daryll Castle remains in post since early 2014. What a difference a year or so can make.

PPC moved its financial year end from September to March in 2016 making it hard to compare like with like. However, its revenue appears to have grown by 10% year-on-year to US$396m for the six months to 30 September 2016. Its earnings before interest, taxation, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA), a measure of operating performance, fell by 7.5% to US$80m at the same time. Since then PPC notified markets with a trading statement saying that its sales volumes in South Africa had risen by 4% in the nine months to the end of December 2016 but that its prices had fallen by 4%. It also noted that its local cement sales volumes declined marginally when compared to the same quarter in the previous year, with the exception of the Western Cape region.

PPC also has various projects underway in sub-Saharan Africa, including plant builds in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Ethiopia. Of note to any potential merger with AfriSam are its plans to build a new 3000t/day production line at its Slurry plant in Lichtenburg. The project was reported 54% complete in early February 2017 with first clinker production scheduled for the first half of 2018. CBMI Construction, a subsidiary of China’s Sinoma, is the main contractor for the upgrade project. Once complete the new line will add about 1Mt/yr to the plant’s cement production capacity. One implication of this project is that it will push PPC and AfriSam’s market share over 50% that may have consequences with the local competition body.

For its part AfriSam appears to be suffering financial problems according to local press. The Public Investment Corporation (PIC), a government investment body, revealed in late 2016 that it had invested over US$100m in the cement producer since 2008. The PIC holds a controlling share of AfriSam with a 66% stake in the group. Other than this, solid facts about the state of AfriSam’s business are thin on the ground. However, competition in South Africa’s cement sector has certainly increased in recent years both within and without, from the import market.

As this column has said a few times merger and acquisitions seem to be the way to go for cement producers in weak markets. However, as annual results from Cementir and HeidelbergCement show this week, the initial boost from new asset and business purchases may not be so rosy when viewed in a pro-forma basis or when taking into account new units’ past performance. A lot here rides on these companies being able to take advantage of synergy effects and to make crucial savings. The big example of this in the global cement sector is LafargeHolcim. It will announce its financial results for 2016 on 2 March 2017. It also operates a cement plant in South Africa and the results may have implications for the PPC and AfriSam merger.

In other news, the European Union parliament has voted today, on 15 February 2017, to amend its Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) in line with a proposal made by the European Commission. This is unlikely to impress the environmental lobby or users of secondary cementitious materials in cement production, amongst other parties. More on this topic next week.

Last week’s Global CemFuels Conference in Barcelona raised a considerable amount of information about the state of the alternative fuels market for the cement industry and recent technical advances. One particular facet that stuck out were reports from cement and waste producers, from their perspective, about Morocco’s decision to ban imports of waste from Italy in mid-2016. The debacle raises prickly questions about how decisive attempts to reduce carbon emissions can be.

Public outcry broke out in Morocco in July 2016 over imports of refuse derived fuel (RDF) imported from Italy for use at a cement plant in the country. At the time a ship carrying 2500t of RDF was stopped at the Jorf Lasfar port. Local media and activists presented the shipment in terms of a dangerous waste, ‘too toxic’ for a European country, which was being dumped on a developing one. Public outcry followed and despite attempts to calm the situation the government soon banned imports of ‘waste’.

What wasn’t much reported at the time was that RDF usage rates in Europe have been rising in recent years and that the product is viewed as a commodity. As Michele Graffigna from HeidelbergCement explained at the conference in his presentation, its subsidiary Italcementi runs seven cement plants in Italy but only two of them have the permits to use alternative fuels like RDF. Italy also has amongst the lowest rates of alternative fuels usage in Europe, in part due to issues with legislation. This is changing slowly but the company has an export strategy for waste fuels from the country at the moment. Italy’s largest cement producer wants to use waste fuels in Italy but it can’t fully, so it is exporting them so it (and others) is exporting them to countries where it can.

In the Waste Hierarchy, using waste as energy fits in the ‘other recovery’ section near the bottom of the inverted pyramid, but it is still preferable to disposal. Waste fuels may be smelly, unsightly and have other concerns but they are a better environmental option than burning fossil fuels. HeidelbergCement engaged locally with media and local authorities to try and convey this. It also arranged visits to RDF production sites in Italy and German cement plant that use RDF to present its message. Looking to the future, HeidelbergCement now plans to focus on local waste production in Morocco with projects for a tyre shredder at a cement plant and an RDF production site at a Marrakesh landfill site in the pipeline. Graffigna didn’t say so directly, but the decision to focus on local waste supplies clearly dispenses with historical and cultural baggage of moving ‘dirty’ products between countries.

In another talk, at the conference Andy Hill of Suez then mentioned the Morocco situation from his company’s angle. His point was that moving waste fuels around can carry risks and that a waste management company, like Suez, knows how to handle them. It is worth pointing out here that Suez UK has supplied solid recovered fuel (SRF) to the country so it has a commercial interest here. He also suggested that despatching a bulk vessel of waste to a sensitive market did not help the situation and that it heightened negative publicity.

Morocco’s decision to ban the import of waste fuels in mid-2016 is an unfortunate speed bump along the highway to a more sustainable cement industry. It raises all sorts of issues about public perceptions of environmental efforts to clean up the cement industry and where they clash with commercially minded attempts to do so by the cement producers. A similar battle is playing out in Ireland between locals in Limerick and Irish Cement, as it tries to start burning tyres and RDF. These are not new issues. Meanwhile in the background the amendment to the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme draws close with a vote set for mid-February 2017. It could have implications for all of this depending on what happens. More on this later in the month.

Last month’s prize for the most clichéd phrases in the cement news nearly went to UK technology firm Hanhaa and its ‘internet of packaging.’ At first glance the phrase seems like a hackneyed marketing play on the ‘internet of things,’ where objects outside of normal computers start to get networked, allowing for ‘added value.’ Silly wording maybe, but the intent is serious. Tracking is a vital part of logistics for industries like cement. The investors in Hanhaa, BillerudKorsnäs, may be on to something. Indeed, in 10 years time we may be kicking ourselves that we didn’t see it.

One drawback with networking everything though is that all sorts of items start to become vulnerable to computer hacking. The famous industrial example in recent years was the so-called Stuxnet virus, an alleged attempt by US and Israeli intelligence services to physically damage parts of the Iranian nuclear industry. It was intended to damage centrifuges by looking for Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) made by Siemens in very particular circumstances. A good overview on Stuxnet can be gained by watching Alex Gibney’s documentary ‘Zero Days.’

The problem for cement plants is that they also use PLCs for process control in common with other heavy industry. Effectively, whoever built Stuxnet has shown criminals how to attack any industrial plants that uses PLCs. Unsurprisingly, given the drip-drip of bad publicity, Siemens made a point of saying that it had gained a cybersecurity certification from TÜV SÜD, a German inspection and certification organisation, for some of its related products in late 2016.

Actual examples of cement plants being attacked are hard to find. Low-level cyber intrusions are likely to be treated akin to, say, individuals trespassing on a plant grounds and more serious incidents are probably kept quiet. ThyssenKrupp’s Industrial Solutions division, that builds cement plants amongst other things, reported that it had data stolen in an online attack from somewhere in Southeast Asia in 2016. Data espionage is one thing. Physical damage to an industrial plant is quite another. Previous to this, an unnamed German steel plant was reported to have been damaged by a systematically planned attack in 2014. Another way hackers can mess up your day is via extortion attempts or so-called ransonware attacks where systems are shut down until a ransom is paid. Recent examples of this in the wider public sphere include attempts to extort the San Francisco Municipal Railway in November 2016 and the St Louis Public Library system in January 2017. Despite shutting down their systems neither organisation paid up.

From our perspective, the Global Cement website runs using a common content management system (CMS) that runs on commonly used server software. Due to this we constantly receive low-level hacking and exploit attempts from automated scripts attempting to find weaknesses in the setup. New exploits are found, hacking attempts occur, software is updated and the cycle continues. However, the key difference between the Global Cement website and a cement producer is the turnover. A cement plant operates in millions or hundreds of millions. In this way, for hackers the return on investment of hacking an industrial plant is far higher. even if it is using limited-run proprietary software and equipment. And even if critical parts of a plant’s system are security hardened, hackers may be able to find a way in via less secure areas and then work their way across. Staff smartphones accessing a local wifi network, contractors using insecure USB drives, and hackers using social engineering techniques such as confidence tricks to gain system logins by phone are just some methods that could grant intruders digital access.

A report by Ponemon placed the average annualised cost of cyber crime to the industrial sector worldwide at US$8.05m. Although the authors point out sample size issues with their calculation, industry is the fifth most affected sector in terms of losses after finance, utilities, technology and services. Networking innovations in industry such as the ‘internet of packaging’ are potential game changers as added value from the network effect and suchlike becomes factored in. The risk though is that these kind of innovations also offer opportunities to criminals and anarchists. It’s likely only a matter of time until a serious hacking attack at a cement plant becomes public knowledge.

If any readers have anything to add to this topic please email us at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.

“One of the worst moments in its history.” That’s how Paulo Camillo Penna, the newly appointed president of SNIC - the Brazilian National Union of Cement Industry - described his industry last week. Few people are likely to be envying his position at the moment. As Camillo Penna went on to explain, domestic sales of cement fell by 11.7% year-on-year to 57.2Mt in 2016. He added that following capacity utilisation rates of 70% in 2015 and 57% in 2016 that he expected the rate to fall below 50% in 2017. When he said it was bad he wasn’t kidding.

Graph 1: Brazilian cement sales from 2011 to 2016. Source: SNIC.

Graph 2: Regional Brazilian cement production from 2014 to 2016. Source: SNIC.

Graph 1 illustrates how stark the decline in cement sales has been since the growth period at the start of the 2010s. Sales have fallen by 15Mt since 2014 in a country that has a production capacity of 88Mt/yr. Graph 2 presents a regional picture of sales. Note in this graph the sharp drops in sales (21%) in the southeast region of Brazil, an area that contains the key cement producing states of Minas Gerais and Rio De Janeiro. The decline in the northeast region including the state of Bahia, another key cement producing state, has been less extreme but it is still over 15%.

Votorantim, the country’s largest cement producer by production capacity, reported that its cement sale volumes fell by 6% to 26Mt in the first nine months of 2016, with declines in Brazil offset by business in other countries like the US. Its sales revenue also fell, by 7% to US$3.03bn. InterCement’s cement and clinker sales volumes fell by 16% to 11.8Mt in the first half of 2016 and its sales fell by 31% to Euro898m. As it described it, ‘the political and economic instability in Brazil in the first half, impacting on unemployment, investment and government spending, ultimately retracted the construction activity, compressing cement consumption.’ To compound these problems newly opened production capacity also ‘intensified’ competition. Later in 2016 InterCement’s parent company Camargo Corrêa was reported to be in talks to sell a minority stake in Argentina’s Loma Negra to pay off its debts from the cement business in Brazil. Finally, from an international perspective, LafargeHolcim’s global results for the first nine months of 2016 were negatively impacted by ‘challenging’ conditions in Brazil amongst other countries. It laid out an environment of reduced sales volumes and falling prices, although it said that it had used cost cutting to fight this.

Politically, the fallout from the Petrobras bribery scandal is continuing to shake out in the construction industry. In October 2016 it was revealed that the Brazilian Development Bank BNDES had frozen loan payments to construction firms involved in overseas projects worth up to US$7bn, including Camargo Corrêa. The Brazilian economy is expected to grow modestly, at a rise of 0.5% gross domestic product (GDP) in 2017 after dropping in 2016 although this forecast was falling towards the end of 2016. More hopeful news came from the São Paulo state construction union, SindusCon-SP, that in December 2016 released a report forecasting that the construction industry’s output could rise by 0.5%. However, this was dependent on economic reforms.

The question for Camillo Penna and the rest of the Brazilian cement industry is: where exactly is the bottom of the curve? SNIC forecast that cement sales will contract by a further 5 – 7% in 2017 and this is below the 11.7% drop experienced in 2016. So, does SNIC think that the industry is starting to hit against a bedrock of demand that economic headwinds can’t shift? In this kind of environment it seems likely to expect increased merger and acquisition activity. The merger of Brazil’s Magnesita and Austria’s RHI refractory companies that was announced in the autumn of 2016 may just be the start.