Analysis

Huaxin Cement completed its acquisition of a majority stake in Oman Cement this week. The China-based company estimated that the purchase price was around US$193m. Following the transaction with a subsidiary of the Oman Investment Authority, the country’s sovereign wealth fund, the cement producer now controls just under a 60% share in Oman Cement.

A key part of the deal includes Oman Cement’s integrated plant at Ruwi in the north of the country. The three-line unit has clinker and cement production capacities of 2.6Mt/yr and 3.6Mt/yr respectively. With the partial ownership share of 60% taken into account, this places the capacity purchase price at around US$124/t, a lower figure for capacity compared to other international acquisitions.

Oman Cement has a couple of new projects in the pipeline that have been mentioned on and off previously over the last year or so. These include the construction of a new 10,000t/day fourth production line, an upgrade to line 3 to 4000t/day from 3000t/day at present and plans for a new plant at the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) at Duqm. The company said it was looking for a contractor to carry out the upgrades at the Ruwi plant. However, Rashid bin Sultan al Hashmi, the chair of Oman Cement, said in the company’s annual results for 2022 that the Duqm project, operating under the name Al Sahawa Cement, had run into problems with the supply of gas for the proposed unit. Another recent development was the signing of a deal between Omani Environment Services Holding Company (Be’ah) and Oman Cement for the supply of refuse-derived fuel (RDF). As an aside, that last one may also have received a boost this week with the news that the local Environment Authority has suspended licenses for the export of used tyres from the country.

How these existing projects will fare under the new ownership remains to be seen, but Huaxin Cement has a track record for developing new cement production capacity outside of China. The cement producer describes itself as de-facto controlled by Switzerland-based Holcim although Holcim said in its annual report for 2022 that Huaxin Cement is a joint-venture. It currently operates plants in Cambodia, Kyrgyzstan, Malawi, Nepal, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Uzbekistan and Zambia and says that it has 10 additional projects in Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere in preparation for future business expansion. In 2022 it started operating a 3000t/day production line at Nepal Narayani and commenced the second stage of a project to build a 4000t/day clinker line at Maweni in Tanzania. Plus, as mentioned in our recent roundup of China-based producers, 13% of the group’s operating revenue derived from business outside of China in 2022 compared to 8% in 2021.

Other producers from outside of Oman have also been active locally in 2023. In late January 2023 India-based UltraTech Cement agreed a deal to buy a 70% stake in Duqm Cement Project International from Seven Seas for US$2.25m. The agreement covered a limestone mining lease that UltraTech Cement said was important for “raw material security.”

The other big development in the Oman cement market since we last covered the country in September 2021 was an intervention by the Capital Market Authority (CMA) on Raysut Cement. The chief financial officer resigned in November 2022 before the CMA questioned the company’s financial results for the second quarter of 2022. The CMA then replaced the board of Raysut Cement in December 2022 saying it had detected ‘material misrepresentation’ in the company’s third quarter results.

The last four months or so have marked a turning point for the local cement sector with a change in leadership for the two largest producers. Oman Cement reported strong growth in 2022 although it warned of “low priced cement being supplied by competitors.” Raysut Cement, unsurprisingly, recorded a loss in 2022. The construction market in the country is expected to grow as the economy leaves the coronavirus period behind, mounting energy prices boost national revenue and potentially some of this heads into infrastructure development. This puts the new management at both producers in a good position going forward.

Heidelberg Materials’ reaction to changes in the law in Hungary received attention this week in the German press. The government introduced its Act on Hungarian Architecture in March 2023 that will enable it to set production levels and prices upon foreign-owned cement producers when the new legislation takes force in July 2023. An unnamed executive at the Germany-based Heidelberg Materials told Der Spiegel that, "These regulations represent a complete violation of all rules of the European single market.” They added that the Hungarian government appeared to be trying to force the producer to sell up. The report further alleges that the owners of Duna-Dráva Cement, Heidelberg Materials and Schwenk Zement, also received an offer to buy them out in mid-2022 from an individual with links to Prime Minister Victor Orbán.

This latest move to corral the cement sector in Hungary follows a number of recent changes in legislation. Notably, Decree 404 was introduced in July 2021. This set a 90% tax on the ‘excess’ profits of cement, plaster, chalk, gravel, sand, clay, lime and gypsum producers with the stated intention of wanting to prevent rising prices. The government set a threshold price for cement of Euro56/t at the time. At the same time it also blocked exports of cement and other raw materials of declared strategic importance unless affected companies had registered with the Ministry of the Interior. The European Commission (EC) responded to a parliamentary question on the matter in November 2021 saying that it had sent a formal letter to Hungary informing it that it was breaching some parts of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (EU) on the free movement of goods. Although it noted that the new law also affected exports outside the EU, which was beyond the EC's remit. It added that the so-called ‘mining royalties’ did not seem to breach EU tax law.

Concerns over these issues between Hungary and Germany also surfaced in October 2022 when Orbán met with the German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. At this time Thomas Spannagl, the head of Schwenk Zement, said that the windfall profit tax in Hungary had a "serious negative" impact on business and that importers were not affected in the same way.

Heidelberg Materials’ subsidiary Duna-Dráva Cement is the largest cement producer by production capacity in Hungary with two integrated plants at Beremend and Vác. Together they have a production capacity of 2.8Mt/yr, according to the Global Cement Directory 2023, or about 70% of the country’s active national capacity. Heidelberg Materials reported that its result from equity accounted investments fell by 27% year-on-year to Euro262m in 2022 from Euro356m in 2023 due to a decline in earnings particularly in China and Hungary. This compares to a 4% drop to Euro3.74bn in its result from current operations before depreciation and amortisation across the whole business. Despite this it also noted that Hungary’s overall economic output had grown by 5% in 2022.

Just before the new laws affecting cement companies starting arriving in mid-July 2021, the Hungarian Competition Authority started an investigation into a “drastic” increase in raw material prices. This followed a warning a year earlier in 2020 that it had started competition supervision proceedings against the three main market participants: Duna-Dráva Cement, Lafarge Cement and CRH. All three are foreign-owned companies.

Lafarge Cement Hungary operates the Kiralyegyháza plant and it is due to change its name to Holcim in May 2023. Its predecessor companies, Holcim and Lafarge, also used to run plants at Hejocsaba and Lábatlan before the merger in 2015. However, the Hejocsaba plant ran into legal problems between Holcim and another investor, shut in 2011 and was later forcibly taken over by the other party in 2014. Today the plant operates as Hejőcsabai Cement- és Mészipari (HCM) but cement production is reportedly yet to restart nearly a decade later and Holcim says that legal proceedings are still ongoing. The Lábatlan plant, meanwhile, closed for good in the early 2010s. CRH took over some of Holcim’s other operations in Hungary in 2015 at the same time as the formation of LafargeHolcim but does not run any cement plants in the country at present. It does own cement plants in nearby countries that are able to supply the Hungarian market as well as running 19 concrete units. It describes itself as the “number two player” in the local market. It wasn’t specific on Hungary in its financial results for 2022 but it did describe sales in its Europe East region as being ahead of 2021, “due to a strong focus on commercial actions to offset significant cost inflation.”

Construction costs in Hungary do appear to have grown faster than other European countries in the second half of 2021 as the country came out of the coronavirus pandemic. However, the country's anti-immigrant labour stance may have also contributed to the situation, in addition to the high-energy prices and supply chain bottlenecks experienced elsewhere. In addition, cement companies are also capable of monopolistic behaviour. For example, Duna-Dráva Cement’s proposed acquisition of Cemex Croatia was blocked by the EC back in 2017 on competition grounds. However, given how international the cement industry has become, it is surprising to see this kind of treatment from a government within the European Union.

The Chinese cement sector had a tough time in 2022. This was confirmed this week as the large domestic cement producers released their financial results. Revenue was down, profits fell and cement sales volumes tumbled. The key causes included the continuation of the country’s zero-coronavirus policy, the declining real estate market and rising input costs for raw materials such as coal. Demand for cement withered and so did the fortunes of the cement companies.

Graph 1: Cement output in China, 2018 to 2022. Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China.

Data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China shows that cement output fell by 9.8% year-on-year to 2.13Bnt in 2022 from 2.36Bnt in 2021. The greater decrease was in the first half of the year rather than the second. The China Cement Association (CCA) said that this was nearly the lowest output in the last decade and the largest decline since 1969 ! The National Bureau of Statistics of China also pointed out in a release that, despite investment in fixed assets increasing by around 5% in 2022 and national infrastructure spending growing by 9%, real estate development investment dropped by 10% to US$1.46Tn.

Graph 2: Sales revenue from selected Chinese cement producers. Source: Company financial reports.

Graph 3: Sales volumes of cement and clinker from selected Chinese cement producers. Source: Company financial reports.

The cement producers warned in their forecasts that the results for 2022 were going to be rough and so it came to pass. China National Building Material (CNBM)’s revenue fell by 16% year-on-year to US$33.4bn in 2022 and Anhui Conch’s sales fell by 21% to US$19.2bn in 2022. Although, Tangshang Jidong Cement and Huaxin Cement reported declines of income or revenue in single digits. Profits halved for all of the companies covered here. Various combinations of the reasons covered above were cited for the situation.

What is more interesting are the responses some of the producers are making and what has gone well. CNBM, for example, is pinning its hopes on better staggered peak production and infrastructure projects. Anhui Conch, meanwhile, appears to have been diversifying its business by increasing both its concrete and solar power production capacity significantly in 2022. It was also announced that it plans to spend US$2.81bn on capital expenditure projects in 2023. China Resources Cement (CRC) said it had optimised its presence in South China through selected acquisition and divestments. Huaxin Cement has continued its focus on overseas markets with its share of operating revenue originating from outside China rising to 13% of the group’s total in 2022 compared to 8% in 2021. It also mentioned a number of unnamed projects around the world steadily drawing nearer to action. Sure enough, the group announced earlier in March 2023 that it was buying a majority stake in Oman Cement.

As for 2023, the CCA forecast in January 2023 that cement demand would be flat or slightly down. However, at the same time, provincial changes to the real estate market are expected to improve market conditions and infrastructure development will further drive demand for cement. The CCA identified that the cement sector’s production overcapacity could become an issue with lower demand. In 2022 the national clinker production utilisation rate was 65%, a fall of 10% from that in 2021. It also pointed out that peak-staggered production had actually helped cement producers generally to cope with smaller declines in profits compared to less well regulated industries.

Problems such as the zero-coronavirus policy, the real estate market and rising raw material costs have made the country’s production overcapacity issue worse. Changes are being made such as the national abandonment of the coronavirus lockdowns in late 2022, and, as mentioned above, the real estate market is being modified. In addition to this, various environmental changes are on the way, as the government works towards its sustainability goals. The country remains the largest cement producer in the world. Yet the message here is that we should expect more of the same for the cement sector in China in 2023.

A dispute between Cemex and Vulcan Materials over the use of a terminal in Quintana Roo state heated up this week as the two companies publicly argued over the situation. US-based Vulcan Materials went to the press to say that the Mexican police had forced entry into the facility south of Cancun, run by its subsidiary Calica, with orders to allow a Cemex ship to discharge cement. Vulcan denied that the authorities had any legal basis for the action and said that it was an illegal occupation. Cemex then responded with a press release explaining that the two companies had held a previous contractual relationship for joint-usage of the terminal until the agreement broke down in late 2022. It says it was granted an injunction by a local court to continue using the terminal while legal proceedings carry on.

The disagreement over the use of the Punta Venado terminal dates back to at least 2018 when Vulcan initiated a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) arbitration claim over alleged planning and environmental issues in relation to a nearby quarry. Dialogue continued, but Calica’s operations in the area were shut down by the government in May 2022. Subsequently, Vulcan’s total volumes of shipped aggregates fell by 6% year-on-year to 54Mt in the fourth quarter of 2022, partly due to the closure.

Unfortunately, the argument has become increasingly politicised with Mexican president Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador criticising Vulcan for its environmental record and US senators using the Vulcan case as an alleged example of Mexico treating US companies unfairly. Some media commentators have also noted that the Mexican government is promoting a number of large-scale infrastructure schemes in the region, including the Tren Maya project, a new 1500km train line around the Yucatan peninsula, which would link tourist towns such as Cancún with historical sites like Palenque.

Graph 1: Grey cement production in Mexico, 2018 - 2022. Source: National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI).

Data from the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) shows that rolling annual cement production in Mexico peaked at around 43Mt in late 2018 before falling to 39Mt in mid-2020. It later recovered to a peak of just under 46Mt in mid-2021. It has since dropped a little to mid-2022 and then started to trend upwards again. The nominal cement production capacity in Mexico is 60Mt/yr according to the Global Cement Directory 2023. Yet, the actual production capacity has been reported in local press as being 42Mt/yr, lower than the annual cement production of 43.9Mt in 2022. In February 2023 it was reported that the Mexican government was taking steps to 'implement import facilities' to support more cement being imported. This was due to shortages in certain states particular in the south-west of the country.

Cemex’s net sales in Mexico grew by 11% to US$3.84bn in 2022 and this was attributed partly to tourism-related construction in ‘the peninsulas.’ Holcim noted ‘market softness’ for cement in the country but reported growth for concrete due to infrastructure projects such as the Tren Maya. Cemento Moctezuma’s net sales rose by 2.6% to US$878m. Despite rising sales, both Cemex and Cemento Moctezuma reported falling earnings in 2022.

The dispute between Cemex and Vulcan Materials overlaps with wider trends on how and where the Mexican cement market is developing following a lull in the late 2010s. Production is growing in certain parts of the country, particularly in the Yucatan peninsula due to various infrastructure projects and tourism-related demand. However, the overall economic environment appears to have decreased earnings for some producers. However Cemex said that this was starting to correct itself in late 2022, as prices caught up with inflation. Portraying the Cemex - Vulcan situation in nationalistic terms is unhelpful, especially since Cemex made more money in the US than Mexico in 2022! However, this may be yet another example of more isolationist economic policies along the same lines as the US Inflation Reduction Act.

After the initial shocking coverage of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which began in February 2022, came announcements of the most extensive sanctions in history by the EU, G7 nations and others against Russia. In the EU, this effectively deconsolidated companies' Russian subsidiaries, leaving decision makers with the choice whether to sell up or hold out for better times.¹ Four Russian-facing EU cement producers - Buzzi Unicem, CRH, Heidelberg Materials and Holcim - finalised their strategic responses in March 2022.

One year on, on 15 March 2023, 666 (21%) of 3110 eligible multinationals have withdrawn from Russia, according to the KSE Institute.² Ireland-based CRH led the cement sector exit. It abandoned its Finland-based subsidiary Rudus' ready-mix concrete joint venture, LujaBetomix, on 2 March 2022. Switzerland-based Holcim took longer, but affected its exit on 14 December 2022, agreeing to sell Holcim Russia to local management. One condition of the sale was a rebrand (to Cementum, in February 2023) to withdraw the Holcim name from Russia. Unlike CRH, Holcim's Russian business included multiple cement plants - though the producer stated that it contributed less than 1% of group sales during 2021.

The KSE Institute uses the equivocal label of 'waiting' for companies which have paused investments, or scaled back operations, in Russia, while retaining their subsidiaries. This applies to 500 companies globally (16% of the pre-war total). Germany-based Heidelberg Materials acted swiftly to freeze further investments in HeidelbergCement Russia on 10 March 2022. At that time, its three cement plants were in winter shutdown. In terms of capacity, the 4.7Mt/yr-capacity Heidelberg Materials Russia constitutes 2.8% of Heidelberg Materials. In 2022, Heidelberg Materials suffered a Euro102m impairment on account of its Russian business. CEO Dominik von Achten, announcing the freeze, had described the subsidiary as a 'pure local business with no imports or exports.' Its website has since come offline, but the corporate structure presumably maintains in its frozen isolation.

1220 global multinationals - 39% of all those previously operating in Russia - are still 'continuing operations.' Among these is Buzzi Unicem. Having decided that 12 months was long enough, the Ukrainian National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption (NAPC) placed Italy-based Buzzi Unicem on its list of Russian war sponsors on 8 March 2023 for the actions of its subsidiary SLK Cement. A scathing denouncement accompanied the listing, in which the NAPC set out its main charges. It accused Buzzi Unicem of:

1. Expanding its business in Russia since the invasion;

2. Supplying its products to Russian state-owned businesses, including energy suppliers Rosatom and Rosneft;

3. Voicing support for the invasion via its social media presence.

The NAPC concluded “Buzzi Unicem's continued business in Russia means direct support and sponsorship of terrorism by Russia.”

Buzzi Unicem responded in no uncertain terms that these allegations are untrue: it has no business in Russia, and the entity bearing its logo on its (SLK Cement's) website is entirely independent in its decision-making and commercial actions.

This goes to the root of what it means to be a subsidiary of a corporation. Buzzi Unicem seeks to define the relationship as beginning and ending in operational involvement. Yet Buzzi Unicem and other corporations have invested large sums in businesses like SLK Cement. According to the NAPC, Buzzi Unicem paid Euro62m in taxes alone in Russia between 2016 and 2021. Whether they have elected to 'continue operations,' 'wait' or write in favourable buy-back options into sales contracts, as has happened in other industries, companies can be expected to seek to return to their investment.

As such, it is not entirely surprising that Buzzi Unicem should have followed up its rebuttal with a defence of SLK Cement. It stated "SLK Cement is a Russian domiciled entity operating exclusively in that country and therefore subject to domestic legislation. Payment of taxes and having employees being mobilised to the army are not discretionary decisions, rather legal obligations within the Russian jurisdiction."

In the decision to sell or hold, multinationals face the usual considerations: can they afford to yield their market share to other - less conscientious - competitors? Or, in this instance, those from Türkiye, India and China, whose potential investments are unrestrained by sanctions? Even as Holcim thrashed out its exit deal in October 2022, China-based West China Cement announced plans for a new US$260m, 1.2Mt/yr cement plant in Tatarstan, Volga Federal District. Meanwhile, Cemros (formerly Eurocement) is carrying out a Euro3m mill upgrade at its Lipetsk integrated cement plant in Central Federal District, which will increase the plant's capacity by 20% upon commissioning in early 2023. Between them, Central Federal District and Volga Federal District host four former Holcim cement plants.

12 months into the Russian invasion of Ukraine, an onslaught of withdrawals has shrunk, but not collapsed, the Russian economy.³ The Russian government insists that cement demand remains high (up by 2.1% year-on-year to 58.3Mt during the first 11 months of 2022, according to the Russian cement association Soyuzcement).⁴ The country has substituted new sources of imports for those lost since the beginning of the invasion, the government claims. It is even preparing for a cement shortage from 2024 onward by 'further developing domestic production capacities.'

Far from shrinking, Russian cement production rose by approximately 2.5% year-on-year to 60.7Mt in 2022.^{4, 5} The two aforementioned districts - Central Federal District and Volga Federal District - contributed a healthy 15.3Mt (25%) and 13.4Mt (22%) respectively. If the statistics are to be believed, the EU's recalled producers are missing out on a bonanza.

At the same time, all four EU-based producers face the parallel burden of increased costs in their key markets, as sanctions keep energy prices at an all-time high, and nowhere more so than in Europe. These sanctions purport to target Russian businesses and individuals, but their bite is far less discriminating. Companies may well wonder why they are being penalised by governments whose policies failed to prevent a Russian invasion of Ukraine in the first place.

We have no idea what will happen in Ukraine and Russia in the rest of 2023, but we can be sure it will be uncertain territory for the two countries’ cement producers. Those with (former) assets in the Russian market will have to continue their delicate balancing act.

1. European Commission, 'Frequently Asked Questions,' 16 March 2022, https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2022/march/tradoc_160079.pdf

2. KSE Institute, 'Stop Doing Business with Russia,' 15 March 2023, https://leave-russia.org/leaving-companies?flt%5B147%5D%5Beq%5D%5B%5D=9062

3. European Council, 'Infographic - Impact of sanctions on the Russian economy ,' 9 March 2023, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/impact-sanctions-russian-economy/

4. Soyuzcement, 'Cement Review,' December 2022, https://soyuzcem.ru/documents/%D0%A6%D0%B5%D0%BC%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%82%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B5_%D0%BE%D0%B1%D0%BE%D0%B7%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B5_%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BA%D0%B0%D0%B1%D1%80%D1%8C%202022.pdf

5. BusinessStat, 'In 2022, 60.7 million tons of cement were produced in Russia,' 21 February 2023, https://marketing.rbc.ru/articles/14025/