Analysis

The news from Mali this week is that a new cement grinding plant is in the works. Ciments et Matériaux du Mali plans to build a 0.5Mt/yr plant near Bamako. Work on the US$34m project is set to start in October 2019 although there has been no word on the equipment supplier. The project is a long-standing one from France’s Vicat.

A new plant is probably very welcome following the last six months in the local market. Prices spiked by a third in May 2019, leading local producer Diamond Cement Mali to arrange a press conference to defend itself. Director Ibrahima Dibo explained that the company had fixed its prices in conjunction with the government at its units at Astro and Dio Gare since 2012. Instead, he blamed importers and traders for the situation, as well as low import rates from Senegal and Ivory Coast. The company proposed that it tackle the situation by importing more cement from one of its plants in Takoradi in Ghana and then transporting it into Mali via Dakar in Senegal. Although it noted that it would need permission from the government to do this.

The country has also been targeted by Nigeria’s Dangote Cement for several years. Back in 2016 the Nigerian cement producer was considering building a 1.5Mt/yr grinding plant. It also wanted to build a second production line at its Pout plant near Dakar in Senegal to export clinker specifically to Mali. It has since scaled back its expansion plans as the Nigerian economy entered a recession but in its 2018 annual report it noted that it had exported 0.43Mt of cement from Senegal and that most of this had gone to Mali, with plans to further increase exports in 2019.

At present Mali has three main grinding plants. Two are run by Diamond Cement and the third by Ciments de l'Afrique (CIMAF). An integrated plant at Guinbané, Diéma in the Kayes region was announced in late 2016 when the government signed a memorandum of understanding with Gaia Equity, a private equity company. This project was going to be built by China’s Sinoma.

Figure 1: Distribution of cement prices in Africa and Location of Plants 2015. Source: World Bank / ECDPM.

The status of that last project is unknown since there has been little news on it since. However, Figure 1 above shows why a private equity firm might sense opportunity. It’s out of date as various countries have become self-sufficient and we’ve covered this plenty of times before but the graphic from the World Bank really brings home the message that moving cement overland is uneconomical. This is mirrored by the mounting price of cement in Mali earlier this year. Africa has been described as the last great cement frontier and Mali is on the frontline.

Forgive the poor image quality but our magazine editor Peter Edwards spotted this provocative graphic (above) at the Federación Interamericana del Cemento (FICEM) technical congress that is taking place in the Dominican Republic this week. It came from a presentation given by Yassine Touahri from On Field Investment Research. The reason this slide raises eyebrows is because it seems to inversely link CO₂ emission regulations with cement grinding capacity growth.

One would expect integrated or clinker production capacity addition to decline in the face of various carbon taxes because the majority of emissions in cement production are process emissions. Yet this graphic suggests that it goes further by affecting the supply of clinker in these regions. If correct then it supports the argument that introducing carbon taxes forces related capacity investment to go elsewhere. In other words, if governments try to control industrial CO₂ emissions, then the market will follow the path of least resistance. The world has a clinker production capacity surplus and the countries with no CO₂ regulations are scooping it up.

The counter argument is that capacity growth and CO₂ legislation is unrelated. The regions with flat or falling grinding capacity additions are the places were this trend is occurring anyway for other reasons. These areas have built their houses and infrastructure and so one would expect no or low capacity growth. In this environment it is easier to introduce CO₂ laws because, rightly or wrongly, it is perceived to be less important to the overall economy. Meanwhile, outside of these zones national economies are growing: they want to build things and new grinding plants to take advantage of a global glut of clinker are helping them to do this.

Other issues with this graphic are the widely different reasons for low cement grinding capacity growth in the areas with CO₂ legislation. Europe, for example, has endured the European Union (EU) Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) for over a decade and it has seen growth in the slag-cement grinding model in some countries in recent years. General trends have also seen a considerable drop in production capacity in Southern Mediterranean countries as their export markets decline. China is actively trying to manage a reduction in production capacity following a period of unparalleled growth. CO₂ legislation is one potential means to do this.

The next step here would be to model the effect of a carbon tax on a developing market, which is genuinely growing its cement consumption, compared to a more mature one. This might help to answer whether economic development can be untangled from carbon emissions. CO₂ regulations are undoubtedly distorting cement markets though. Touahri is right when he says that, “CO₂ management will be the key challenge for the cement industry in the 21st century.” Once it is given a value then it changes the nature of the business.

There will be a full review of the FICEM technical congress 2019 in a future issue of Global Cement Magazine

The publication of CNBM’s financial results presents a good opportunity to take stock of the Chinese cement industry in the first half of 2019. Looking at the big picture first, cement sales rose by 5% year-on-year to 1.03Bnt in the first half of 2019 from 0.98Bnt in the same period in 2018. Graph 1 below shows the sales over the last five years since 2014. Generally, sales are decreasing each year but there has been some variation in the half-year periods.

Graph 1: Cement sales in China, 2014 – 2019. Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China.

As the China Cement Association (CCA) pointed out in its summary for the first half of 2019, the cement industry ‘swelled in volume and price’ as industry efficiency grew but that the growth rate dropped ‘significantly’ compared in 2018. By region, as Graph 2 shows, variation can be seen between the south-east of the country where growth was slow or even fell compared to stronger performance elsewhere. Cement production increased by above 20% in Jilin, Shanxi, Shandong, Tibet and Heilongjiang and by over 10% in Hebei, Gansu, Tianjin, and Liaoning. However, it fell in Hainan, Beijing, Qinghai, Guizhou, Guangxi, Hunan, Guangdong and Ningxia. Most of these changes were attributed to either rising or falling demand for cement, except for Jilin where reduced imports from neighbouring provinces pushed up its demand. In most of these latter regions it attribute the decline to falling demand for cement.

Graph 2: Cement production growth by province in first half of 2019. Source: China Cement Association.

Other points of note from the CCA include the surge in imports to China. Imports of cement and clinker rose by 149% year-on-year to 8.97Mt in the five months from January to May 2019. Vietnam supplied 68% of this followed by 11% from Thailand. On the production side, 10 new production lines with a total capacity of 15.5Mt/yr were commissioned in the period. These were fairly scattered across nine provinces, in Shanxi, Anhui, Hubei, Fujian, Guangxi, Hunan, Guizhou, Gansu and Yunnan respectively.

Sales and profits were supported by growing demand and prices on the corporate side. CNBM’s operating income for its cement businesses grew by 16% to US$8.14bn from US$7.04bn. Its adjusted profit increased by 40% to US$2.76bn from US$1.98bn. Anhui Conch’s sales rose by 17.9% to US$2.15bn from US$2.11bn. It blamed poorer profits in the south of the country on adverse weather leading to weakened demand.

The weaker sales in the south could be seen in China Resources Cement’s (CRC) results with its turnover down by 6% to US$2.22bn from US$2.36bn. Likewise, its earnings before interest, taxation, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA) dropped by 8.5% to US$820m from US$896m. The majority of its cement plants are based in Guangxi, Guangdong and Fujian. Jidong Cement was also reported as having received US$30m in subsidies from the government during the first half of 2019 in relation to its ‘daily activities.’

As is usual for these kinds of roundups the dynamic in China is between government industrial policies, like peak shifting and pollution mitigation, and local demand and price trends. One of the latest spins on peak shifting, for example, is a rating system that is being considered to decide which companies should be subject to production limits and for how long. General cement sales are slowly falling each year but the rise of imports into the word’s biggest cement producing nation (!) mark an interesting trend. Also, it may not be connected, but lots of those provinces with falling demand so far in 2019 are those on the south coast facing the heavy clinker exporting nations of South-East Asia. Given the decisiveness with which the Chinese government dispensed with imports of waste materials under its National Sword initiative since 2017, those countries importing cement to China should beware. It could change very quickly. The Chinese cement market is never dull.

Predictably, the recent investigation by the Tariff Commission in the Philippines on whether to maintain duties on imported cement recommended that the safeguard duty be kept. It even suggested raising the rate to nearly US$6/t from US$4/t at present. The report has been passed to the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), which will make the final decision on the matter.

Graph 1: Market share of the Philippines cement industry between local producers and traders, 2013 - 2018. Source: Tariff Commission of the Philippines.

As the commission built its argument it released a great snapshot of the local cement industry and it’s well worth a read for anyone who is interested. One key graph here was the speed at which the market share of cement sold by local producers fell compared to importers from 2013 to 2018. As Graph 1 shows above, traders imported 0.29Mt in 2015 and this rose to 4.66Mt 2018. Imports by local producers also grew during this time but at a far slower rate. They were 0.45Mt in 2015, grew to a high of 1.65Mt in 2016 and then stabilised at around 1Mt/yr since then. Seven of the top 10 cement exporters were Vietnamese companies followed by two from China and one from Thailand. However, the local producers were importing clinker on a far larger scale during this period. 16.8Mt of clinker was imported from 2013 to 2018 led by Holcim Philippines with 5.54Mt or a 33% share. In Holcim’s case this was coming from China, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam.

Elsewhere, the report established the various production capacity upgrades the local cement producers had invested in or were planning to in the near future. Taiheiyo Cement Philippines, for example, was reported as planning an expansion to its Cebu plant production line from 2022 to 2025. It then looked at kiln capacity utilisation rates, prices and how profits have changed amongst much else. It concluded that the import surge from 2015 to 2018 had depressed prices and decreased the profitability of the local producers. This fitted its definition of ‘serious injury’ as one reason to impose a safeguard duty on imports.

Importers presented a different scenario to the commission during its investigation and afterwards. Phinma, for example, told local press that the commission’s comparison calculation of the costs behind local and imported cement didn’t take into all the costs the importers endured such as a local distribution and handling once in the country. The Philippines Cement Importers Association reiterated the view of its members that they were simply meeting market demand, that local producers had caused their own problems through overcapacity and that profits varied considerably amongst local producers, amongst other arguments. This has been borne out by some of the half-year results amongst the local producers. Eagle Cement, for example, saw its earnings before interest, taxation, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA) grow by 21% year-on-year to US$80.6m.

With the publication of the commission’s report the DTI has been handed the impetus to hold up or even raise the duty on imported cement. Based on its actions in recent years the ministry seems likely to do so. This presents a contrast to Trinidad & Tobago where importer Rock Hard Cement won a legal battle earlier in August 2019 against competitor and Cemex-subsidiary Trinidad Cement over the classification of imported cement products. These kinds of trade conflicts are likely to proliferate whilst global production capacity outstrips demand but the outcomes may vary.

One of the summer news stories in the UK has been the drama surrounding the near-failure of dam near Whaley Bridge in Derbyshire. Concrete slabs on an overflow spillway fell away after a period of heavy rain leading to fears that the dam could fail inundating the area. Around 1500 local residents were evacuated for about a week as a precaution until the reservoir’s water level could be pumped down low enough for inspection.

No one was hurt in the incident but it has raised questions about the maintenance and renewal of infrastructure and how this fits with changing weather patterns caused by anthropogenic climate change. A sadder example of this is the collapse of the Morandi Bridge in Genoa, Italy in August 2018 that killed 43 people. This was later blamed on decaying steel rods in the structure. There have been similar debates in the US with President Donald Trump’s on-going attempts to push through a US$2tn infrastructure bill to repair the country’s structures. Although, predictably, it is floundering on the question of who is actually going to pay for it all.

In the UK, for example, cement production hit a high of over 15Mt in the late 1980s before declining to a low of 7.6Mt in 2009 and eventually climbing to above 9Mt/yr since 2015. A big cause of that decline was the 2008 financial crash and the subsequent government austerity policies. Yet, even with this taken into account, production was at around 11Mt/yr in the 2000s. How much, if any, of this production capacity gap of at least 4Mt between the late 1980s and the 2000s might be needed to maintain the country’s infrastructure? Southern Mediterranean countries like Spain and Italy offer even starker examples. Italy’s cement production fell to 19.3Mt in 2017 from nearly 40Mt in 2001. Spain’s production hit a high of around 50Mt/yr in 2007 with apparent production (local consumption and exports) falling to around 20Mt in 2018. Much of these declines are due to loss of export markets but the same basic questions remain about how much capacity will be required in the future to maintain and repair existing structures in developed nations. This could be imported but the usual constraints about moving heavy building materials around inland mean than at least some of this cement will need to manufactured locally.

The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimated in 2010 that the world would need 50Bnt of cement between 2015 and 2030. The global cement industry was already producing around 3.5Bnt/yr in 2015 according to the Global Cement Directory 2015 giving it overcapacity even then towards the estimated target. Global production capacity is just under 4Bnt/yr today. Estimates for the cost of global infrastructure requirements in this period range from US$1Tnr/yr to US$6Tnr/yr. The majority of this will go towards new infrastructure in developing countries but a minority portion will be required for maintenance. One study by the Brookings Institution and the Global Commission on the Economy and Climate estimated that developed countries would need around US$2Tn/yr for their infrastructure bills.

A study by management consultants McKinsey & Company in late 2017 reckoned that there was a worldwide US$55Tn spending gap between then and 2035 for infrastructure spending. It estimated that countries like the UK, Germany and the US needed to increase their annual spending on infrastructure as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) by 0.5%. Although Italy only needed to improve by 0.2%. Looking at the change in infrastructure investment rates suggests that the European Union (EU) actually started to improve its investment from 2013 to 2015 by 0.2% but that the US did not.

All of this goes to show that the show is definitely not over for building materials producers in developed countries. These industries may be mature but they should not be complacent. Roads need patching up, bridges need replacing and all sorts of other infrastructure projects are required even in places that have them already.