Analysis

HeidelbergCement confirmed the rumours this week with the announcement that it was selling assets in the western US to Martin Marietta for US$2.3bn. The deal covers subsidiary Lehigh Hanson’s US West region cement, aggregates, ready-mixed concrete and asphalt businesses in California, Arizona, Oregon and Nevada. This includes two of its cement plants, with the exception of the 1.5Mt/yr Permanente cement plant in California, related distribution terminals, 17 active aggregates sites and several downstream operations. The companies expect to conclude the deal by 2022 but naturally it is subject to approval by competition bodies.

Well, this is a big one considering that one of the catalysts for the group’s divestment plan was the reduction of the value of its total assets by Euro3.4bn in July 2020 following a review. Depending on the exchange rate, the value of the divestment to Martin Marietta covers half to two thirds of that amount. Group chairman Dominik von Achten later told the media in February 2021 that the company was planning to sell the first of the five assets in early-to-mid 2021. However, cement isn’t the full story here since Lehigh Hanson operates three integrated plants in California and seven terminals. So, by elimination, the Tehachapi and Redding plants are the ones that are being sold along with some combinations of the terminals. Both of those plant have production capacities of around 0.8Mt/yr. Unless the terminals being sold have been valued highly, then the majority of the deal appears to encompass some or all of the 25-odd aggregate sites, 15 asphalt sites and 30 ready-mix concrete sites the company operates in the four states.

On the cement side it doesn’t seem unreasonable at face value for the authorities to allow Martin Marietta to take over most of Lehigh Hanson’s business in the region since it should broaden competition from a production angle. Instead of five companies in California with integrated plants, there will be six. For Martin Marietta, the deal also carries the feel of unfinished business in the region since it briefly held a cement business there for around a year in the mid-2010s. It acquired Texas Industries (TXI) in July 2014 and then sold the cement business in California to CalPortland in September 2015.

Both companies are pursuing different strategies. HeidelbergCement says it is hunkering down on its other four North American regions – the US Midwest, Northeast and South, plus Canada - through selected ‘bolt-on’ acquisitions and plant upgrades. Martin Marietta says it wants to take advantage of long term demand trends such as increased state infrastructure investment in California and Arizona and private-sector growth. It also reassured shareholders with its version of the acquisition/divestment story by saying it was going to generate value the same way it did previously with TXI. It’s a small thing but the acquisition also sees the US’ largest domestic cement producer increase its production base. The top five North American cement producers will remain controlled by companies headquartered in Europe but it is a step towards regionalism.

As for who’s right, in the short term, the west coast region looks good. The area included some of the best performing states in 2020 in terms of growth in cement consumption year-on-year in 2020 with the exception of Oregon. In its winter forecast the Portland Cement Association (PCA) attributed growth in the Mountain region of the US (including Nevada) to underlying economic fundamentals and favourable demographic trends, although it expected this to slow down in 2021. In the Pacific region it forecast consumption to grow modestly in 2021 due to residential construction. As if to underline the current situation, Cemex decided to recommission a kiln in Mexico in February 2021 to cope with cement shortages and project delays in California, Arizona and Nevada.

In the face of these figures HeidelbergCement’s decision to sell suggests either it dangled a juicy proposition with good short term prospects in front of the buyers or its long term projections are pointing elsewhere. Selling up, yet holding onto its largest cement plant in the region, also smacks of hedging its bets. No doubt it will be holding on to a few terminals too. On the other hand, it would be very interesting indeed to know what part, if any, HeidelbergCement’s internal carbon price played in its decision to divest in the western US. California has the country’s biggest carbon emissions trading scheme (ETS). If say, legislators suddenly decided to follow the price trend of the European Union’s ETS then things might look different.

The UK construction market is in a funny situation right now. As the economy has started to grow in 2021, shortages of building materials have been reported following the relaxation of coronavirus-related restrictions. In April 2021, for example, the Construction Leadership Council (CLC) added cement, aggregates and certain plastics to its existing lists of products in short supply. These commodities joined a slew of other materials, including timber, steel, roof tiles, bricks and imported products such as screws, fixings, plumbing items, sanitaryware, shower enclosures, electrical products and appliances. The CLC advised all users to, “plan for increased demand and longer delays, keep open lines of communication with their suppliers and order early for future projects.”

Skip forward a month to May 2021 and these shortages are on more people’s minds with the announcement by the Office for National Statistics that UK monthly construction output grew by 5.8% month-on-month to around Euro16.5bn in March 2021 due to both new work and to repair and maintenance projects. Quarter-on-quarter output also rose by 2.6%, adding to the impression of a building sector emerging from the fog of lockdown. In the face of this good news Nigel Jackson, the chief executive of the UK mineral Products Association (MPA), was asked about reported shortages of cement. He told local press this week that “it would not be surprising if there were short-term issues of supply as the economy gathers momentum.” He added that the biggest issues had been observed in levels of bagged cement typically used in domestic projects.

The MPA followed this up with the results of a survey of building materials manufacturers that reported a slow but steady start to 2021 with mounting construction demand month-on-month. Sales volumes of aggregates and concrete were both up quarter-on-quarter but volumes of asphalt and mortar fell. Unfortunately that survey didn’t cover cement volumes but it did have more to say about concrete. In its view ready-mixed concrete sales had been subdued since 2017 due to the UK’s departure from the European Union (Brexit) and a general slowdown in residential building. The market recovery seen so far in 2021 was likely to be merely a return to growth from a subdued level of activity that pre-dates Covid-19.

At the time of writing the UK government faces a decision about whether to continue opening up the economy or exercise caution in the face of the as-yet unknown consequences of the Indian variant of coronavirus. This may delay talk of building materials shortages but it can’t avoid it forever. In the UK, cement shortages appear to be due to the self-build segment and will hopefully soon be resolved.

A shortage of cement in the UK may not mean much to people outside the country, with the exception of exporters. Yet the wider picture here is that the coronavirus pandemic has affected the production of building materials, changed end-user behaviour and distorted markets around the world. Other examples include the row over the price of cement in Nigeria, the boom in cement sales in Brazil in the second half of 2020 or reported shortages in Jamaica this week. A significant number of people, when forced to spend more time at home, appeared to save money and then decided to either move to a different house or make their current one better. Yet at the same time differing government restrictions and market fluctuations have seen building material output levels vary widely. Other reasons are at play both local and international. Brexit in the UK is one example of the former, as importers and exporters have been forced to grapple with new rules and costs. The temporary blockage of the Suez Canal in March 2021 is one example of the latter. No wonder supply chains are struggling. That last point goes wider than building materials though, for example, as anyone trying to buy semiconductors has discovered. One fear behind all of this though is whether these are temporary shortages or whether inflation is on the way for the global economy generally. In this is the case, then it signals the end of the low consumer inflation rate era since the financial crash in 2008 and may herald changes in behaviour from both producers and consumers.

Reporting from Egypt this week suggests that the government may be finally taking action to aid the country’s beleaguered cement sector. Sources quoted by Reuters indicate that a production cut of at least 14% has been proposed. One of the cement industry sources broke it down into a 10.5% baseline reduction with a further 3.7% reduction per production line at a cement plant with an additional cut of 0.7% per year of operation. The Ministry of Trade and Industry has declined to comment on the story.

Graph 1: Cement production and capacity utilisation in Egypt. Source: Cement Division of the Building Materials Chamber of the Federation of Egyptian Industries.

Graph 1 above shows the key problem facing the sector: cement production has fallen each year since 2016. Added to this, local capacity utilisation took a knock when the 13Mt/yr government/army-run El-Arish Cement plant at Beni Suef opened in 2018. Before it opened the natural utilisation rate was around 80%. By 2020 it had sunk to 60%.

The coronavirus pandemic was another problem that the building materials market didn’t need and the last time this column covered Egypt (GCW 475), HeidelbergCement was restructuring its local subsidiaries in the country. Most producers were holding on for better days in the future but hoping for some form of government intervention such as production limits or an export subsidy programme. Meanwhile, analysts have been waiting for divestments. However, the prospect of the situation becoming worse was also present, in the guise of the Egyptian Cement Group’s new integrated 2Mt/yr plant, scheduled to open at Sohag later in 2021. Since then there’s not been much of a change until now.

Some very rough calculations by Global Cement suggest that the alleged government measures could have created an artificial utilisation rate of 78% in 2020 before the age of the plants was taken into account. For example, the El-Arish Cement plant with its six production lines would potentially see its production cut by around 33% and capped at 8.7Mt/yr. In theory a measure like this could better share out the market between the smaller producers or those with less market share. However, how this would play out with actual plant running costs or existing market share is unknown, although, as mentioned above, some of the multinational producers have been publicly calling out for these kinds of controls.

Playing around with the proposed caps could potentially create some absurd situations. For example, if a single line plant had been running for over 120 years (!) then it wouldn’t be allowed to produce any cement at all. It is lucky then that the earliest plant in the country opened in 1911 and it’s likely long gone. It’s a silly example, but the point is, if production limits do come in, there are likely to be winners and losers. The question for the local producers then is whether a system like this would be better than the current situation.

What’s in a name? Well maybe quite a lot when the company in question originally formed as a ‘merger of equals.’ So the news this week that the shareholders of LafargeHolcim have agreed to change its group name to Holcim suggests quite a lot. The name will only apply to the group company name and all market brands will remain as they are. Yet something fundamental appears to have changed.

As readers may remember, the original merger arrangements between Lafarge and Holcim ran into difficulties in early 2015 when Holcim’s shareholders expressed discontent at the perceived difference in value between the two companies in 2014. The deal was saved with a move away from a proposed 1-1 share exchange ratio towards one more in the favour of the Holcim shareholders and the removal of Lafarge’s chief executive Bruno Lafont as the designated chief executive of the new entity. However, from this point onwards the nagging suspicious was that the merger was really a glacial takeover of Lafarge by Holcim. Lafont and LafargeHolcim’s first chief executive officer (CEO) Eric Olsen became embroiled in legal proceedings surrounding Lafarge’s historic conduct in Syria. Then in mid-2018 LafargeHolcim decided to close its Paris headquarters, Lafarge’s old hub. During an extraordinary general meeting in May 2015 held by Holcim it was agreed to rename Holcim Ltd as LafargeHolcim Ltd as part of the merger process. The latest decision by shareholders in 2021 has reversed this.

For consumers of building products the bit about market brands staying as they are, as LafargeHolcim changes its name, is probably more important than the corporate wrangling over whatever the faraway parent company may or may not be called. So, Holcim Argentina’s plans this week to open 1000 new branches of its Disensa retail chain by 2024 may be far more important for existing and potential customers in that country. This is an enormous number of hardware stores for just one country by most reckonings and its gives one an idea of LafargeHolcim’s ambitions in the sector. It also carries echoes of the trend of business chains taking over the previously independent convenience store sector in the food sector in other parts of the world in recent decades. The Disensa franchise already operates over 2500 stories in eight countries - Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua and El Salvador – and it holds claim to being the largest building materials network in Latin America. And they aren’t stopping with just selling building materials. One innovation announced in April 2021 was the introduction of financial services to small businesses wanting to buy building products at its stores.

LafargeHolcim isn’t saying how much its retail chains contribute to the bottom line but no doubt it’s helping in a variety of ways. During an earnings call for its fourth quarter results in 2020, for example, its chief financial officer Geraldine Picaud noted that growth in Latin America in the second half of 2020 was driven by branded product in all distribution channels, including the Disensa chain. She also added that the region had the highest margin in the group at the time. Another thing to consider is, if the rumours about LafargeHolcim preparing to sell its operations in Brazil are true, what will it do with the local Disensa chain? Divesting carbon-intensive heavy industries, such as cement production, but migrating outwards and upwards in the building materials supply chain would certainly suggest that the company is preparing for its place in a low-carbon future.

Yet with all this talk of what LafargeHolcim or Holcim wants to call itself it is interesting to note that it was under Holcim in 2005 that Disensa was turned into a franchise network in its original home of Ecuador. A similar version of this model called Binastore was expanded and launched by LafargeHolcim in 2018 for Africa and the Middle East. ‘Joe Public’ or rather ‘José Public’ may not care what LafargeHolcim is called when they are buying cement from their local Disensa store. Other hardware stories are of course available.

For those not following the news in Nigeria, a nationwide row has broken out about the cost of cement in the country. Two of the three main local producers have been forced to publicly defend their pricing. Alongside this, the Senate of Nigeria has implored the federal government to encourage further local investment in cement production with the goal of keeping the end price down.

The current debacle started to take form in the autumn of 2020 when the price of cement leapt up by 35%. Builders and those immediately affected started complaining then but the argument really heated up in April 2021 when the local press started comparing the price of cement in Nigeria unfavourably against neighbouring countries. Dangote Cement, one of Africa’s largest cement producing companies and a Nigerian-based one at that, immediately defended itself by pointing out that its ex-factory price was the same or lower than in other African countries. It added that it could not control the price of cement between its factory and the end-consumer with dealers and middlemen benefiting from the gap. A week later the Senate of Nigeria intervened with its members discussing the issue in relation to a bill intended to liberalise the sector. This week, BUA Cement said publicly that it had no plans to raise the ex-factory price of its cement at the present time or in the future, “…barring any material, unforeseen circumstances.”

The roots of the current crisis go back to the mid-2010s when Nigeria declared itself ‘self-sufficient’ in cement after building up its domestic production capacity. At the same time it discouraged imports and embraced exports. Today, the country’s cement production capacity is around 49Mt/yr and annual demand is around 21Mt. This self-sufficiency path reached one milestone for Dangote Cement in 2020 with clinker exports starting from its Apapa terminal and the commissioning of its Onne Export Terminal in Port Harcourt. Under the old narrative for the sector this was a moment for congratulation. Suddenly though, instead of being seen as the saviour of the industry, members of the legislature were asking whether it was a good thing for Dangote Cement to hold a 60% share of the local market with most of the rest shared between Lafarge Africa and BUA Cement.

The price row has seen Dangote Cement promptly suspend exports from those new terminals. It also said it had reactivated its 4.5Mt/yr Gboko plant in Benue State, which was reportedly mothballed in 2018. It is worth noting here that the Gboko plant was part of that national capacity total above despite being mothballed until fairly recently. Aside from the middleman argument, the producer said that its production costs had risen over the past 15 months due to negative currency effects but that it hadn’t increased its ex-factory prices since December 2019.

A survey by the News Agency of Nigeria in the north-east of the country revealed all sorts of speculation about why the price was so high but few facts. Some of the opinions expressed included: the coronavirus outbreak; low production rates at the plants; market middlemen; and transport costs. What is clearer is that the country’s cement production capacity is more than double that of its demand. On paper at least the nation should be able to satisfy its own needs and then export the same again with plenty spare. Yet somehow this isn’t happening. If the government really believes in self-sufficiency it may be time to take another look at the cement sector, the challenges it faces and the needs of the end consumers.