Analysis

The Global Cement and Concrete Association (GCCA) announced this week that it intends to take over the work done by the Cement Sustainability Initiative (CSI). This marks a change in how the cement industry as a whole approaches sustainability and in the wider context how the sector manages itself on the world stage.

The CSI was set up in 1999 with the aim of advancing a sustainability agenda for the cement industry. It has done this by laying out strategy for the industry to follow in the form of technology roadmaps and publishing its ‘Getting the Numbers Right’ (GNR) data on CO₂ and energy performance information. By 2018 it had 24 cement company members composed of nine core members, 14 participating members and one affiliate member. It represents around 2.4Bnt/yr of global cement production capacity or over half of the world production, according to Global Cement Directory 2018 data.

The idea behind the membership was that the core members are all members of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) and that the members would contribute ‘modest’ funds to run the organisation. That last point about WBCSD membership is worth noting because members need to stick to conditions such as publishing an annual sustainability report and agree to have the sustainability report reviewed and benchmarked by the WBCSD.

Figure 1: Outline of selected current global cement organisations with a sustainability remit. Source: Association websites, Global Cement Directory 2018.

The GCCA, which formed in early 2018, says it had formed a ‘strategic’ partnership with the WBCSD and that it will take over the work previously done by the CSI from the start of 2019. Although there’s no mention so far whether GCCA members have to actually become WBCSD members with all that this entails. At present the GCCA consists of nine major international cement producers, including over half of the world’s top 10 producers by production capacity, with a production base in every inhabited continent except Antarctica. Roughly speaking it represents just under 2Bnt/yr of global cement production capacity or about half of the world’s total.

Now where this starts to get confusing is that other cement associations exist with their own established advocacy roles and sustainability agendas. The established players include the various regional associations such as the Portland Cement Association in the US, Cembureau in Europe and so forth. The multinational ones also often represent national bodies.

Then there is the World Cement Association (WCA), which formed in 2016. This independent body is a private company run out of an office in London, UK with non-profit aims. It has 45 members but only three quarters are actual cement producers. Of these most are single-country cement manufacturers. The glaring standout is China National Building Material (CNBM) and its subsidiaries, representing over half of the association’s member’s cement production capacity. The production capacity of the WCA’s members is around 1Bnt/yr or a quarter of the global total. More than half of this comes from CNBM and its subsidiaries. Unsurprisingly then that Song Zhi Ping, the head of CNBM, is the president of the WCA. It too supports a sustainability agenda, saying that it, “seeks to co-operate with the WBCSD, CSI and regional and national Cement Associations.” What is noteworthy is how few of the current members of the WCA joined the CSI previously.

There is definitely a need for a global organisation advocating sustainability issues for the cement industry and by taking over the work of the CSI and the GCCA has cornered this part of what a global cement association might do. However, the GCCA represents less cement production capacity than the CSI did. The main omissions are the Indian producers, led by UltraTech Cement, as well as others. It seems likely that they will join the GCCA following the end of the CSI but there is no guarantee.

The other point arises when looking at these various cement associations is: who does what exactly? The CSI’s focus on sustainability gave it a purpose that it did well with a genuine appearance of independence. Its narrow focus also gave it a complimentary role to the existing national and regional associations. Global bodies like the GCCA and the WCA are clearly more into advocacy territory for their members. Also, a more general association approach like the GCCA and the WCA may clash with regional bodies like the PCA and Cembureau. Regional bodies seem better suited to the way governance works globally with regional groups such as the European Union (EU) or government departments in continental sized countries such as the US, China and India. However, a truly global cement body could respond better to coordinated environmental lobbying and fill in the gaps around the world in places with looser regional representation.

Sustainability is the immediate link between the CSI, the GCCA and the WCA. Indeed the WCA recently held a ‘Global Climate Change’ forum in Paris to discuss its own climate action plan. Yet, with the GCCA taking over the work the CSI does and the WCA saying it wants to cooperate with the CSI, the obvious outcome is that the GCCA will become the world’s apex cement association. It will represent the companies with the most cement production capacity, have a presence in every inhabited continent and take the lead on WBCSD issues. Beyond this though it will be interesting to see what, if anything else, the GCCA chooses to do.

Cemex joined the divestment party this week with the news that it plans to sell up to US$2bn worth of assets by the end of 2020. Put that together with LafargeHolcim’s own divestment plan of selected assets worth up to US$2bn as part of its Strategy 2022 and there is potentially a lot of cement production infrastructure going on sale over the next few years.

Both companies say that they will start announcing the latest round of divestments in the second half of 2018. Prices vary considerably around the world - and remember this is not only cement - but at, say, US$250m per integrated plant that could amount to 16 units. That’s a big enough manufacturing base to build your very own cement production empire! So, which markets might the two companies be considering leaving?

Cemex’s weaker areas in its half-year report were its South, Central America and the Caribbean region and, to a lesser extent, its European region. The former reported falling sales, cement volumes and earnings. The latter reported falling earnings on a like-for-like basis with issues noted across cement, ready-mix concrete and aggregate business lines in the UK. Back in Central and South America, problems were noted in Colombia due to a 10% fall in cement sales in the first half. An important point to make here is that despatch figures from the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE) out this week suggest that Colombia’s overall cement market has picked up since April 2018 (see Graph 1), in contrast to Cemex’s experience. Panama, meanwhile, saw cement volumes wither by 22% due to the 30-day strike by construction workers. Other operations to consider for the chop might include Cemex Croatia, which the company attempted to sell to HeidelbergCement and Schwenk Zement in 2017, before the European Commission put an end to that idea.

Graph 1: Annual change of cement despatches in Columbia in 2017 and 2018. Source: DANE.

When asked directly during its second quarter results call which assets it was intending to sell, chief executive officer (CEO) Fernando Gonzalez didn’t answer on commercial grounds. What he did say though was that the company had faced ‘headwinds’ in the Philippines, Egypt and Colombia, particularly in relation to fuel prices. He also said that Cemex had finished its market analysis, that it knew exactly which assets it would like to sell already and that it was in ‘execution’ mode. In Gonzalez’s own words, “we do have a number of assets to be divested, either because they are low growth, or because they are not necessarily integrated to other business lines.”

As covered a couple of week ago, the obvious location for LafargeHolcim to exit is Indonesia. CEO Jan Jenisch continued to refuse to comment on rumours that the company was leaving the country during its second quarter results call. Yet, local production overcapacity, falling earnings and profits and an underperforming but still sparky market make it the ideal candidate. What Jenisch did reveal was that the country had ‘positive momentum.’ Perhaps more importantly he added, “We are not selling because we want to sell. We are selling for high valuations only.”

Other potential locations for LafargeHolcim to leave might include Brazil and parts of the Middle East and Africa. Brazil’s cement market recovery has been a few years coming and was delayed again by a truck drivers’ strike in May 2018. The Middle East Africa area was the worst performing region in LafargeHolcim’s mid-year results with problems noted in South Africa.

With all of this in mind we have a rough idea of what Cemex and LafargeHolcim might be considering selling. The obvious candidates for both companies seem to be solid markets that promise growth after a period of underperformance. Just like Colombia and Indonesia in fact. Looking at the track record for both of them in recent years Cemex has seemed to be more ready to sell individual plants such as the Odessa and Fairborn plants in the US to different buyers. LafargeHolcim for its part has generally gone for larger more complete sales of regional or country-based chunks of its business such as in Chile or Sri Lanka.

Finally, don’t forget that Cemex’s Fernando Gonzalez said in March 2018 that the company was considering acquisitions again after a decade of austerity. He mentioned an interest in India and in Brazil. If he meant that last one then maybe he should give LafargeHolcim’s Jan Jenisch a call.

Earlier this year South Africa’s PPC commented on the drought facing Cape Town. It said that cement manufacturing was not water intensive, that its operations were ‘totally’ self-sufficient from its own surface water sources with capacity for several months and that it was working with the local government which viewed construction as an important economic sector. Point made!

Water conservation is an established part of the sustainability toolkit for cement producers. Yet recent weather patterns in the Northern Hemisphere may also test how well companies are doing. Above average temperatures have been recorded this summer, in some places accompanied by unusually dry conditions. A news story this week about Cemex Colombia being fined for using water from a river shows one aspect of the problems that can face industrial users. Another story that we’ve covered previously has been the legal action taken against producers using water from a site near to the Katas Raj Temples in Pakistan.

Wet process cement manufacturing uses more water than dry process but even modern plants use water for cooling equipment and exhaust gases, in emission control systems such as wet scrubbers. In addition, quarrying and aggregate production may require water, and concrete production also needs water. Issues also arise with quarry dewatering and discharging water into rivers and the like. Global Cement Directory 2018 data indicates that, where known, about 10% of integrated cement plants still use a wet production method.

Graph 1: Specific water consumption by selected cement producers in 2017. Source: Corporate sustainability reports.

As Graph 1 shows there is some variation between the major cement producers with regards to how much water they use. They all operate with different types of equipment and production methods in different geographical locations so the difference between the companies is to be expected. A cement plant in northern Europe that normally experiences high levels of rainfall will have a different approach to water conservation than one, say, in a water stressed area like the Middle East. Incidentally, the definition used to define a water-stressed or scarce area is one where there is less than 1000m³/yr per person. One other point to note here is that each of the companies has a higher consumption figure than the 100 – 200L/t that the Cement Manufacturers' Association of the Philippines (CeMAP) reckoned that an average dry-process cement plant used when it was promoting water conservation back in 2013.

Looking at specific recent success stories, India’s UltraTech Cement reported a specific water consumption of 54L/t of clinker at its Star Cement plant in Dubai, UAE in 2016 – 2017 following a dedicated initiative at the site. An another milestone that UltraTech Cement was keen to point out in its last sustainability report was that three of 13 integrated plants had achieved water sufficiency though the use of the company’s 360° Water Management Model with its use of rainwater harvesting and recharging groundwater. These plants are not dependent on any groundwater or fresh water sources. The other larger cement producers all have similar water management schemes with reduction targets in place.

Climate change models generally predict hotter and wetter weather but changing weather patterns and growing populations are likely to impact upon water management and consumption. Given the integral nature of water in the cement production process, many cement producers have realised the importance of it and treat it as an input material like fuel or limestone. Hence the highlighting of water conservation in company sustainability reports over the last decade. The test for the success of these initiatives will be how producers cope in drought situations where they may be seen as being in competition with domestic users. Thankfully in PPC’s case, Cape Town avoided having to ration water to the general public, as the rains returned in the spring.

The US government proposed placing tariffs on cement this week as part of its slowly-escalating trade war against China. The latest list will face a 10% tariff from the end of August 2018 following a consultation period. Of relevance to the cement industry, it will include limestone flux, quicklime, slaked lime, gypsum, anhydrite, clinkers of Portland, aluminous, slag, supersulfate and similar hydraulic cements, white Portland cement, Portland cement, aluminous cement, slag cement, refractory cements, additives for cement, cement based building materials and more.

Graph 1: Imports of hydraulic cement and clinker to the US from China, 2012 – 2017. Source: United States Geologic Survey (USGS).

Graph 2: Major exporters of hydraulic cement and clinker (Mt) to the US in 2017. Source: United States Geologic Survey (USGS).

At face value it seems unlikely that the tariffs will do much direct damage to the cement sectors in either China or the US. United States Geological Survey (USGS) data reports that the US imported 2Mt of cement and clinker from China in 2017 out of a total of 13.6Mt of imports. China was the third-largest exporter of cement to the US after Canada and Greece. Given the mammoth size of the Chinese cement industry - it sold 2.3Bnt in 2017 according to National Bureau of Statistics of China - it is unlikely that losing this export stream will cause the sector to lose much sleep. If the exports are coming from smaller producers though it might well impact upon them disproportionally. Any potential shortfall in the US is likely to be met by any number of the world’s overproducing cement nations. Vietnam, Iran (!) and Indonesia are the first few candidates that spring to mind.

The other point to consider from the USGS data is that the value of the cement imported from China in 2017 was on the cheaper side. Altogether the value of Chinese imported cement came to US$132m in 2017. Yet it was the fifth cheapest for cost, insurance and freight per tonne out of 32 importing countries. Add a 10% tariff to that and it is still only the eighth cheapest. If these figures represent reality then it seems unlikely that tariffs will cause the Chinese imports to slow down much.

All of this pretty much fits the general impression of China as a country that produces the most cement in the world but it actually exports very little of it. Consultancies like Ad and Marcia Ligthart’s Cement Distribution Consultants have made a point of downplaying China’s export market in recent years due to a lack of deep water terminals for plants and a general inward focus. Yet the sheer amount of production capacity could have big implications if it ever does get properly connected to the sea.

Other products facing the new tariffs that have relevance for the cement industry include input materials like gypsum or secondary cementitious materials (SCM) like slag and fly ash. Gypsum isn’t likely to be a concern given the presence of established exporters in Canada, Spain, Thailand, Oman and the like. SCMs are more mercurial but don’t appear to be too intrinsic to the US market. Ferrous slag imports grew to 2Mt in 2015 according to USGS data but the main sources were Japan, Canada, Spain and Germany. Charles Zeynel of ZAG International at the Global Slag Conference 2018 posited that Chinese exports comprised up to 6Mt or 25% of the world market of traded international slag.

All of this suggests a symbolic nature to the US tariffs on Chinese cement and related products. Perhaps the real news story to have noted this week was the framework agreement signed between Denmark’s FLSmidth and China’s China National Building Material (CNBM), the world’s largest cement producer and one of its larger cement equipment manufacturers.

Typically many of the new cement plant projects Global Cement has reported upon recently involve a Chinese contractor that may or may not be using European engineering from companies like FLSmidth who previously would have been managing the build themselves. The point here is that new plants, production lines and upgrades at US cement plants might well be built by a Chinese company through its European partners. The new upgrade to Lehigh Hanson’s Mitchell plant in Indiana has been budgeted at US$600m. This is far more than the value of Chinese cement imported into the US in 2017.

Holcim Indonesia was forced to refuse to comment on rumours this week that it might be selling up. Local business press in the country was running stories that parent company LafargeHolcim was in the early stages of a possible divestment. Although the stories seemed pretty spurious, Holcim Indonesia’s share price rose on the news.

The situation is reminiscent of an anecdote attributed to the former US president Lyndon Johnson by Hunter S Thompson about making a political opponent deny a ridiculous rumour. If they don’t respond then it looks like they have something to hide and if they do engage with a denial then they look silly anyway. In Holcim Indonesia’s case, as soon as the cement producer actually refused to comment the story gained more credence.

Part of the reason why the Holcim Indonesia story has legs is because LafargeHolcim has said it plans to make divestments of Euro1.7bn in 2019. There is rampant production overcapacity in Indonesia. The territory is exactly the kind of place you might expect LafargeHolcim to consider leaving. As recently as early in 2017 Semen Indonesia, the main producer, was showing the gaping production capacity – consumption gap in its investor presentations with no catch-up until at least 2020. Romauli Panggabean, an analyst for Bank Mandiri, was even more blunt in a forecast for the Jakarta Post in mid-2016. She ran a model predicting that if production capacity doubled to 150Mt/yr by 2017 then it would take the market until 2032 to catch up with an assumed 7% construction growth rate. Panggabean’s simulation seems to massively overstate capacity growth in the country as Global Cement Directory 2018 data places integrated (clinker) plant capacity at 79.3Mt/yr. By comparison the Indonesia Cement Association (ASI) placed cement production capacity at 108Mt/yr in 2017. Both of these figures are far below 150Mt/yr.

Graph 1: Domestic and export sales in Indonesia, 2013 – 2017. Source: Indonesia Cement Association.

The graph above sets the scene for the capacity wobble worries in 2016 and 2017 as sales growth faltered. It picked up in 2017 with domestic sales rising by 7.6% year-on-year to 66.4Mt. Sales so far in 2018 support this trend, with domestic sales growing by 6.4% to 21.06Mt for January to April 2018. The other trend to note here has been the explosion in exports in recent years with a near doubling to 2.93Mt in 2017 and an accelerated continuation of this trend so far in 2018.

Holcim Indonesia operates four integrated cement plants at Narogong in West Java, Cilacap in Central Java, Tuban in East Java and Lhoknga in Aceh with a production capacity of 15Mt/yr. In addition it runs two cement grinding plants at Ciwandan in West Java and Kuala Indah in North Sumatra respectively, although this last unit is currently mothballed. It also owns cement terminals in Lampung and a new one in Palembang in Sumatra.

LafargeHolcim owns an 80% share of Holcim Indonesia, its main subsidiary in the country. In 2017 Holcim Indonesia described the local situation as one of ‘hyper competition’ due to market overcapacity. Production capacity was over 100Mt/yr but consumption was only 70Mt/yr. Its overall cement sales volumes including exports rose by 7.8% year-on-year to 11.1Mt in 2017 from 9.6Mt in 2016. But despite this its net sales fell slightly to US$953m due to falling prices as new competitors entered the market. Its earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA) also fell. The positioning of its production units is relevant in Indonesia given the concentration of sales in Java but the faster growth in sales rates and higher competition in other regions.

Both of the other market leaders, Semen Indonesia and Indocement, reported similar problems in 2017 but they don’t appear to be looking to make cuts. Put it all together in LafargeHolcim’s case and you have a group-level desire to sell off parts of the business, overcapacity locally with no end in sight in the short to medium term, falling earnings and profits and some hope that consumption is heading back to its normal brisk rate. All of this seems to suggest that now would be the perfect time for it to exit Indonesia if it decided to. So, if LafargeHolcim isn’t already soliciting offers then maybe it should be. The tough call would be deciding whether to leave the country altogether or to just sell a share of the business. Leaving totally would significantly reduce the group’s presence in South-East Asia and reduce its profile as a truly global player. However pride and money-making are not the same thing. In the meantime though, the only people making a fortune will be the speculators.