Analysis

Well, it turns out that the European cement industry wasn’t kidding when it raised the risks of the climate mitigation on the sector. This week three (!) integrated plants have been earmarked for closure.

Cementa in Sweden said that it was considering closing its Degerhamn plant due to increased environmental regulations. Today, local press in Spain is reporting that Cemex España is planning to shut down two of its plants. These are plants in different parts of Europe with different local market dynamics but both are within the European Union (EU). That’s three plants closing out of 219 in the EU, or a loss of around 1% of production capacity.

Last week’s column on the United Nations’ (UN) Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report on Global Warming raised the way the cement sector is tackling climate change and the existing and impending legislation. President of the German Cement Works Association (VDZ) Christian Knell’s opening words at the VDZ Congress in September 2018 seem prescient. He said, “To be able to realise our efforts in terms of climate protection and at the same time not to lose competitiveness, we need research policy-related support for our investment in breakthrough technologies and the corresponding demonstration projects.” The add-on was that the industry needed to focus on how the development of carbon abatement technologies can meet the 2050 climate goals and, specifically, that suitable boundary conditions would have to be created. The press releases accompanying his speech emphasised that, “on-going trends in European emissions trading and the ‘rapidly increasing’ price of CO₂ were already today leading to considerable costs for cement manufacturers.”

These words are similar to the comments Albert Scheuer, a board member of HeidelbergCement, made at the Innovation in Industrial Carbon Capture Conference early in 2018 about dividing the mounting environmental costs of cement and concrete between producers and society in general. Considering how much cementitious building materials most people use throughout their lives compared to the relative low price of cement, this argument carries some weight. In addition, the sustainability credentials of concrete buildings through longer lifespan and durability through extreme weather events is another argument that industry advocates such as the Portland Cement Association (PCA) in the US have been hawking in recent years.

Cementa, a subsidiary of HeidelbergCement, blamed anticipated tightening of environmental regulations for its decision. Although it said that the plant had made improvements over the years, the expected difficulty (read: cost) to make further improvements was becoming too hard. Shifting production to the company’s other two plants in the region, Slite on Gotland and Brevik in Norway, will reduce CO₂ emissions by 260,000t/yr.

In Spain, the news from Cemex follows a half-year report from Oficemen, the local cement association, that predicted growth for the year but not as fast as previously expected. The problem was that continued declines in the export market, the 13th decline month-by-month in a row, offset the domestic growth. Oficement president Jesús Ortiz also took time to blame rising electricity costs, expected to rise by 20% year-on-year by the end of 2018.

Market issues in Spain aren’t in doubt, but the real question for both Sweden and Spain is whether EU CO₂ legislation right now is causing cement producers to shut plants. The CO₂ emissions allowance price hit a high of Euro22/t in September 2018, the highest price in a decade. Allowances have stayed below Euro10/t since 2011 and the price has more than doubled in 2018. Throw in the mood music of the IPCC and the trend seems irresistible. How many more plants in Europe are at risk to shut next? No doubt the European cement producers have charts marking the viability of their plants against the CO₂ price. This would be a very interesting graph to get our hands on.

The 2nd FutureCem Conference on CO₂ reduction strategies for the cement industry will take place in May 2019 in London, UK

One graph the United Nations’ (UN) Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report on Global Warming of 1.5°C didn’t include this week was what happens if the world just doesn’t bother. It’s probably just as well since warming of 1.5°C is likely to happen between 2030 and 2052 at the current rate of climate mitigation efforts. If they had included such as diagram, it likely would have had a ominous red line hurtling skywards like a rollercoaster track just before the screams start.

The giant paper study is really about comparing and contrasting the different impacts and responses to a 1.5°C and a 2°C rise. One taste of what the higher rise threatens is, “limiting global warming to 1.5°C instead of 2°C could result in around 420 million fewer people being frequently exposed to extreme heatwaves, and about 65 million fewer people being exposed to exceptional heatwaves."

The cement industry gets a look-in with an acknowledgment that the sector contributes a ‘small’ amount (5%) of total industrial CO₂ emissions. It then breaks the entire industrial sector’s mitigation strategies down to (a) reductions in the demand, (b) energy efficiency, (c) increased electrification of energy demand, (d) reducing the carbon content of non-electric fuels and (e) deploying innovative processes and application of carbon capture and storage (CCS).

Speaking generally, phasing out coal, electrification and saving energy in mechanisms like waste heat recovery is predicted to get industry only so far. Yet from here even skirting over 1.5°C but below 2°C is ‘difficult to achieve’ without the, “major deployment of new sustainability-oriented low-carbon industrial processes.” Such new process include full oxy-fuelling kilns for clinker production, which have not been tested at the industrial scale yet. Likewise, CCS is seen as a major part of keeping warming below 2°C with a target of 3 Gt CO₂/yr by 2050. Some reality is present though when the report says that the development of such projects has been slow, since only two large-scale industrial CCS projects outside of oil and gas processing are in operation and that cost is high. It even posits a value of up to US$188t/CO₂ (!) for the cost of CO₂ avoided from a Global CCS Institute report.

None of this is new to cement producers. The real debate is how to get there without wiping out the industry. In his address to the recent VDZ conference, Christian Knell, the president of the German Cement Works Association (VDZ), highlighted that meeting climate change goals was leading to ‘considerable’ costs for the cement industry. He then called for policy-related support to on-going research projects into CO₂ mitigation technology.

The bit that the IPCC doesn’t go into is how much those five steps to the industrial sector will cost cement producers and, vitally, who will pay for it. For example, taking a cement plant’s co-processing rate to 70% and building a waste-heat recovery system, might cost around US$30m. The Low Emissions Intensity Lime And Cement (LEILAC) Consortium’s Calix’s direct CO₂ separation process pilot at the Lixhe cement plant in Belgium has funding of about Euro20m. Rolling all three of these measures out to the world’s 2300 cement plants would cost over US$100bn and it would take more than a decade. Beware, the financial figures here are rough estimates and may be way out. The point remains that the implementation costs will not be trivial.

Industry advocates have started in recent years to push back against the climate lobby by highlighting the essential nature of concrete to the modern world. The IPCC barely mentioned this aspect of cement’s contribution to society suggesting recycling, using more renewable materials, like wood, and resorting to the mitigation strategies detailed above. Building new cities out of wood is not inconceivable but CCS seems more likely to solve the climate problem at this stage. Manufacturing the cement that becomes concrete may create CO₂ emissions but it has also built the modern world and raised living standards universally. No cement means no civilisation. There is, at present, no alternative.

Instead of leaving this discussion at an impasse, it is worth reflecting on the last week in the industry’s news. An Indian cement company is importing fly ash, several companies are opening or preparing cement grinding plants, a coal ash extraction pilot project is running, a waste heat recovery unit has opened at a plant in Turkey and a producer is getting ready to co-process tyres as a fuel in Oman. All of these stories are proof that change is happening. The trick for policymakers is to keep prodding the cement sector in this direction without disrupting the good things the industry does for people’s lives through sustainable housing and infrastructure.

The November 2018 issue of Global Cement Magazine will include an exclusive article by Mahendra Singhi, the CEO of Dalmia Cement, about his company’s CO₂ mitigation efforts.

The 2nd FutureCem Conference on CO₂ reduction strategies for the cement industry will take place in May 2019 in London, UK.

Cementos Fortaleza started building its new grinding plant in Merida this week. The 0.25Mt/yr unit is expected to open in July 2019. It marks the first new plant in the country in a while and it will be only the second in the south-eastern state of Yucatan, joining Cemex’s integrated plant. It follows a number of upgrades at existing plants over the last two years, such as various mill orders by Cruz Azul from European suppliers (as part of an upgrade at two of its plants) and Elementia’s upgrade to its Tula plant.

Note that Cementos Fortaleza is a subsidiary of Elementia, the building materials company partly-owned by ‘Mexico’s richest man’ Carlos Slim. The group has steadily been expanding with its purchase of the remaining share in Cementos Fortaleza in 2015, acquiring a controlling stake in Giant Cement in the US in 2016 and a project to build a grinding plant in Costa Rica in early 2018.

The other big news story this week with implications for the cement sector was the arrangement of the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), the successor to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Although the exact details of the deal are still emerging, the consensus is that the cement industry in Mexico is unlikely to be affected much. The two points that might have implications for the cement industry are changes to rules of origin regulations and tariffs on imports made by low-wage workers. Both clauses are targeted at the automotive sector to protect US industry so it is unlikely that cement will be affected. In addition it is worth remembering that Mexico was the fifth largest exporter of cement and clinker to the US in 2017 after Canada, Greece, China and Turkey. And, all the major Mexican cement producers operate plants in the US, further protecting them from any potential negative consequences of the USMCA.

Graph 1: Mexican cement production, 2009 – 2017. Source: Camara Nacional del Cemento (CANCEM).

Back in Mexico, the graph above shows that production has been growing in fits and starts over the last decade. The last growth trend started in 2013 but it stalled in 2017. However, the Camara Nacional del Cemento (CANCEM) was forecasting growth of 2.5% year-on-year for 2018 in April 2018. The last time this column covered Mexico, back in early 2017, we produced a breakdown of the industry by company and production capacity. This is worth looking at for an overview of the production base.

Cemex, the largest local producer, reported Ordinary Portland Cement sales volume growth of 3% year-on-year in the second quarter of 2018 but flat growth for the first half of the year. This growth was supported by good activity in the formal residential sector with support from the industrial and commercial sector. LafargeHolcim released less detailed figures for the first half of 2018 but it attributed its strong performance in Latin America to Mexico. Overall cement sales for the region grew by 12.1% to 12.6Mt, in part due to large infrastructure projects in Mexico, such as the new Mexico City International airport. The third biggest producer, Grupo Cementos de Chihuahua, said that its cement sales volumes rose by 2.5% in the first half of the year, supported by rising prices.

As reported in early 2017, the Mexican cement industry is moving ahead with confidence. A modest amount of production capacity is being built, the steady market growth since 2013 looks set to continue after a minor blip in 2017 and the main producers are all reporting good performance so far in 2018. Finally, the USMCA looks unlikely to trouble Mexican producers much and their diversified holdings will certainly help them if it does. For the moment - bravo!

More positive news emerged from the UK cement industry this week with the news that Cemex is planning to restart the second kiln at its South Ferriby plant later in 2018. This marks the full recovery of the plant after a disastrous flood in late 2013 and it is an all round good news story. Around the same time the local government in Scotland approved the planning application for an upgrade to Tarmac’s Dunbar cement plant. That project involves installing a new cement grinding mill, a new cement storage silo and a rail loading facility.

Graph 1: Domestic cement, imported cement and other cementitious sales in the UK, 2001 - 2017. Source: Mineral Products Association.

The timing is interesting given the general uncertainty in the UK economy ahead of the UK exit from the European Union (EU). However, data from the Mineral Products Association (MPA) shows that total cementitious material sales (cement plus products made from fly ash and ground granulated blast furnace slag (GGBS)) reached 15.3Mt in 2017 from a low of 10.3Mt in 2009 following the financial crash. This isn’t as high as the 15.8Mt figures recorded in 2007 but it does mark a recovery. This masks to an extent the change in the market since 2007. Cement sales in 2017 at 10.2Mt were still below a high of 11.9Mt in 2008. The recovery has been driven by higher imports, 1.9Mt in 2017, and higher use of fly ash and GGBS products, which reached 3.2Mt in 2017.

Cemex and Tarmac are not alone in announcing projects. HeidelbergCement’s local subsidiary Hanson is upgrading its Padeswood plant with a new Euro22m mill. Irish slag cement grinding company Ecocem opened its import terminal at Sheerness in mid-2017 and French grinding firm, Cem'In'Eu, has also expressed interest in building a plant, in this case in London.

As discussed earlier in the year, new upgrade projects in the UK appear to carry an element of risk given the unknown status of its departure from the EU. Supply chains may be affected, companies are delaying investment and the value of Pound Sterling is falling. The collapse of construction services company Carillion also had a knock-on effect in the industry and, with major work on the Crossrail infrastructure project finishing, the industry has no major infrastructure projects in support. A quarterly graph of UK construction industry output volume by Arcadis shows almost uniform growth since mid-2012 although this started to flatten in 2017. A badly-handled Brexit (UK exit from the EU) could undo this growth.

All of this presents a picture of risk-adverse capital projects in the UK. The MPA figures help to explain the focus on grinding at Padeswood and Dunbar. The market has changed since 2007, with a growing focus on imports and secondary cementitious materials. Hence spending money on equipment to process these inputs makes sense. The decision to increase production at South Ferriby meanwhile depends on reviving existing equipment. Regional cement sales figures to 2016 from the MPA appear to indicate static demand in counties close to the plant (Yorkshire and Humberside) but sales have increased in the East Midlands and the East of England.

Just compare the current UK approach to the situation in Egypt. This week the head of the cement division of the Chamber of Building Materials described the decision to build the Beni Suef cement plant to local media as “not based on precise information” and that it had harmed local production. In case you had forgotten, that plant is one of the biggest in the world with six lines. The commentator may well have been representing smaller local producers but opening a 12Mt/yr plant in Egypt in these turbulent economic times marks a different approach to risk than the modest plant upgrades in the UK. Let’s wait and see who has the best approach.

Nigerian financial analysts Cordros Securities concluded this week that the merger of some of Lafarge’s Sub-Saharan African businesses had reduced earnings at Lafarge Africa. The report is interesting because it explicitly points out a situation where the consolidation of some of Lafarge’s various companies have failed in the wake of the formation of LafargeHolcim.

Cordros Securities’ criticism is that Nigeria’s Lafarge WAPCO performed better in 2013 alone before it became part of Lafarge Africa, with a higher standalone earnings before interest, taxation, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA) margin. Lafarge Africa formed in 2014, a year before the LafargeHolcim merger was completed, through the consolidation of Lafarge South Africa, United Cement Company of Nigeria, Ashakacem and Atlas Cement into Lafarge WAPCO. Since the formation of Lafarge Africa, Cordros maintains that its earnings per share have consistently fallen, its share price has dropped, its debt has risen, its margins have decreased and its sales volumes of cement have also withered.

Cordros mainly focuses on the Nigerian parts of Lafarge Africa’s business, given its interest in that market and the fact that about three quarters of the company is based in the country. It blames the current situation on growing operating costs since the merger, skyrocketing financing costs for debts and efficiency issues. In Nigeria, Lafarge Africa has had to cope with disruptions to gas supplies. Nigeria’s Dangote Cement had similar problems domestically in 2017 with falling cement sales volumes in a market reeling from an economic recession but Cordros reckoned that Dangote is picking up market share in the South West due to an ‘aggressive retail penetration’ strategy. Finally, Lafarge Africa faced a US$9m impairment in 2017 due to its abandoned pre-heater upgrade project at AshakaCem. The project has been suspended since 2009 due to security concerns in the North-East region. The plant faced an attack by the Boko Haram militant group in 2014 and the group has seemed reluctant to invest further in the site subsequently.

Cordros’ final word on the matter is that with the Nigerian cement market performing slower than it has previously, the local market has become a battleground between the established players of Dangote Cement, BUA Group and Lafarge Africa. What little the report does have on South Africa covers problems with old and inefficient hardware, labour disputes, low prices due to weak demand, high competition and a negative product mix.

Lafarge Africa itself presents a more mixed picture, with market growth picking up in Nigeria following end of the recession but continued market problems in South Africa. Overall, its reported sales grew by 4.8% to US$448m in the first half of 2018 but its EBITDA fell by 25% to US$76.4m. Overall cement sales volumes were reported as up by 5.4% to 2.6Mt in the first half but volumes were still falling in South Africa in the second quarter.

Part of the backdrop to all of this is the intention of Lafarge Africa to cut its debt. In May 2018 its chairman Mobolaji Balogun said that the company wanted to cut its debts by 2020 before continuing with its expansion programme. Part of this process will include a new rights issue later in 2018 to allow shareholders to buy stock at a discount.

It must have made sense, on paper at least, to merge the Lafarge subsidiaries in the two largest economies in Sub-Saharan Africa. Once the merger had settled in, with synergies generating extra revenue, the group could have considered adding extra territories such as Kenya. However, it’s not turned out like that. Two recessions in Nigeria and South Africa respectively, old equipment, debt and serious competition from locally owned producers have piled on the pressure instead. From a stockholder perspective, Cordros is not impressed by the performance of Lafarge Africa. The wider question is: what else did Lafarge and Holcim get wrong when they joined to form LafargeHolcim?