Analysis

Two news stories merit a closer look at Argentina this week. Firstly, Loma Negra fired up the kiln on its new 2.7Mt/yr production line at the L’Amalí cement plant in Olavarría. Work on the US$350m started in 2017 but was delayed due to the coronavirus pandemic. Notably, engineers from China-based Sinoma International Engineering, who built the plant, caused a stir when they arrived in Argentina in full personal protective equipment in late 2020 to continue work on the project. Full commissioning of the second line at the plant is scheduled for July or August 2021.

Almost at the same time, the Argentine government announced it had persuaded local building materials producers to stick to reference prices for construction materials, including cement, in order to control inflation. Loma Negra, Cemento Avellaneda and Petroquímica Comodoro Rivadavia (PCR) were said to be on board with the ‘voluntary’ plan. Building materials prices generally were reported to have risen 85% year-on-year in May 2021 compared to a national inflation rate of 49%. The new arrangement is planned to last until the end of 2021 with revisions to the reference prices every two months.

Graph 1: Cement sales in Argentina including imports and exports, 2016 – 2021. Note that the 2021 figure is an estimate. Source: Asociación de Fabricantes de Cemento Portland (AFCP).

Data from the Asociación de Fabricantes de Cemento Portland (AFCP) doesn’t show any obvious signs of disruption from inflation so far in 2021. Cement sales grew by 50.5% year-on-year to 4.55Mt in the five months to May 2021 from 3.02Mt in the same period in 2020. The cement market in Argentina didn’t shut down but it hit a low of 0.41Mt in April 2020 before compensating with a strong second half of the year, most likely due to pent-up demand as the economy reopened following local coronavirus-related lockdowns. At the time of writing the AFCP has forecast that cement sales will reach 11.3Mt in 2021, a slight rise over the 11.1Mt reported in 2019, when the market was more stable. However, cumulative sales to May 2021 are slightly behind similar sales in 2019.

Loma Negra’s upgrade at its L’Amalí plant follows Holcim Argentina’s inauguration of a new 0.5Mt/yr clinker production line at its Malagueño cement plant in Cordoba in May 2021. This project also added a 0.63Mt/yr cement grinding unit at the site as well as a new 120,000 bag/day despatch unit. Altogether it had a price of US$120m. This followed the announcement in late April 2021 that the subsidiary of LafargeHolcim was planning to open 1000 new branches of its Disensa retail chain in the country by 2024.

Loma Negra reported a 13% drop in sales to US$436m in 2020 from US$500m in 2019. However, its adjusted earnings before interest, taxation, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA) rose by 3% to US$139m from US$136m. This was partly aided by the sales of its Paraguayan operations during 2020. At face value, Cemento Avellaneda had a tougher time of its in 2020 with its sales down by 22% to Euro111m and EBITDA down by 9% to Euro37m. However, once adjusted on a like-for-like basis with constant currencies and without a hyperinflation adjustment, its sales and earnings actually rose by 22% and 45% respectively.

Holcim Argentina’s director Christian Dedeu was interviewed by national news agency Télam in May 2021 around the time of the upgrade at the Malagueño cement plant was officially completed. When asked by the company had made the investment he said that the country had potential for both the residential and infrastructure sectors. He also pointed out that the subsidiary of Switzerland-based LafargeHolcim had been forced to import clinker at times of high demand previously. The announcements for both the Loma Negra and Holcim Argentina new lines were made at the end of 2017 when the market hit a high in sales volumes. Since then the country has faced rocketing inflation, further delays to it debt repayment programme to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the coronavirus pandemic. Producing more commodities, such as clinker, domestically certainly seems enticing with high inflation and unfavourable foreign currency exchange rates. So, the new production lines from Loma Negra and Holcim Argentina are well timed in this sense unless they get hit by any mounting input costs, from imported raw materials for example. On the other hand the government’s measures to curb inflation such as reference prices for cement may constrain the cement producers’ flexibility. As the local construction industry slowly recovers after 2020, continued uncertainty lies ahead.

The latest piece of China-based Huaxin Cement’s global ambitions slotted into place this week with the news that it is preparing to buy plants in Zambia and Malawi. Its board of directors has approved plans to spend US$150m towards acquiring a 75% stake in Lafarge Zambia and US$10m on a 100% stake in Lafarge Cement Malawi. The move will gain it two integrated plants with a combined production capacity of 1.5Mt/yr in Zambia, and a 0.25Mt/yr grinding plant in Malawi.

This latest proposed acquisition represents the next step for Huaxin Cement in Africa following its purchase of African Tanzanian Maweni Limestone from ARM Cement in mid-2020. The company has also been busy along the more traditional Belt and Road Initiative land routes in Asia. It started up the kiln at its new 2Mt/yr Jizzakh cement plant in mid-2020. Elsewhere in Central Asia it runs two plants in Tajikistan and one plant in Kyrgyzstan via various indirectly-owned subsidiaries. While in South Asia it runs a plant in Nepal and in South-East Asia it runs one in Cambodia. If the plans in Zambia and Malawi pay off then it will give the Chinese producer a growing presence in East Africa, with plants in three countries.

The China Cement Association ranked Huaxin Cement as the country’s fifth largest clinker producer in 2021 with an integrated capacity base of just under 63Mt/yr. Domestically, the company operates 57 cement plants and most of these are based in the Yangtze River Economic Belt region. In 2020 it reported cement and clinker sales of 76Mt, a small decrease from 2019. Its operating income fell by 6.6% year-on-year to US$4.58bn and profit dropped by 12% to US$1.2bn. This performance was blamed on the emergence of Covid-19 at the start of 2020 and then floods later in the year.

Compared to the other larger Chinese cement producers, Huaxin Cement roughly appears to be holding rank with its overseas expansions. The leaders, CNBM and Anhui Conch, hold subsidiaries with plants in South-East and Central Asia and CNBM’s engineering wing, Sinoma, has a far bigger reach, building plants all over the place. Information has been scarce since mid-2020 on the long heralded 7Mt/yr plant in Tanzania due to be built by Sinoma and local subsidiary Hengya Cement. At that time local residents in Mtimbwani, Mkinga District were reportedly being compensated for their land. Other than this, one of the other big players internationally is Taiwan Cement. In 2018 it invested around US$1.1bn for a 40% stake in Turkey-based Oyak Cement. As well as a presence in Turkey this also gave it a share of plants in Portugal in 2019 when Oyak completed its acquisition of Cimpor.

Elsewhere this week, carrying some of the themes above with expansion in Central Asia, two new integrated cement plant projects were announced in Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan respectively. Meanwhile, Italcementi said it will invest Euro5.0m to restart clinker production at its Trentino cement plant in Sarche di Madruzzo, Italy. The unit has been operating as a grinding plant since 2015. This might be viewed as an unexpected decision considering the high local CO2 price but it shows some level of confidence in the local market by Italcementi and its parent company, HeidelbergCement. The next step will be when or if a European producer decides to build a brand new integrated plant in Italy or elsewhere.

Little trickles of detail about the European Union’s (EU) proposed carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) started to emerge last week. The key bit of information that Bloomberg managed to squeeze out of their source was that a transition period with a simplified system is being considered from 2023 and then a full version could turn up in 2026. Cement importers, and those in selected other heavy industries, would be required to buy electronic emission certificates at prices corresponding to those in the EU emissions trading scheme (ETS). Other titbits include: that the prices will be set on a weekly basis based on the average carbon permit price within the EU that week; a default value will be devised for importers who can’t back up their emissions data; and imports from a country with its own carbon pricing scheme will be entitled to a discount. The plans are due to be made public in mid-July 2021. Debate is then expected to follow before approval will be required from the European Parliament and member states.

The detail isn’t out there yet but the CBAM is set to collide with trade agreement territory. For example, how the draft agreement tackles issues such as exports from Europe and whether importers should be compensated for not receiving a free allocation of carbon credits could be seen to offer competitive advantage to one party or another. Climate policy will clash with trade policy once or if the CBAM makes in into law. At this point countries that import cement into the EU may start trying to negotiate or complaining to the World Trade Organisation. One previous example of climate policy bashing into trade agreements is when the EU tried and failed to apply the ETS to aviation in the early 2010s. The experience from this incident is expected to inform the European Commission’s approach on the CBAM.

Outside the EU, new carbon pricing schemes have been popping up all over the place and various cement associations are creating or refining their own carbon neutral plans. Last week in North America, for example, the Cement Association of Canada said it was working with the government on launching a roadmap by the end of 2021. In the US, the Portland Cement Association (PCA) has also been hard at work to publish its own roadmap by the end of 2021. Meanwhile, over in the oil sector there were a couple of victories for activist shareholders in May 2021 with Shell, Exxon Mobil and Chevron all being forced to make changes to their climate change polices by courts and activist investors. This makes one wonder how long it will be before the same thing happens to cement companies.

All this increases the pressure between trading agreements and climate legislation. One of the questions that has popped up at Global Cement’s webinar series has been whether attendees thought that a global carbon pricing and/or trading scheme might be a realistic position or not (the majority said ‘yes’ within 20 years). Yet the EU CBAM, all these sustainability plans and continued pressure by investor activist don’t happen in isolation. They occur in an interconnected world.

So it was both non-surprising and eye-popping to discover recently that a private carbon exchange is being prepared in Singapore for a launch by the end of 2021. Climate Impact X (CIX) is being backed by DBS Bank, Singapore Exchange, Standard Chartered and the Singapore-government owned investment company Temasek. As for which companies would actually voluntarily enter into a scheme that would actively reduce profits, the answer lies above. Any organisation looking to trade between carbon pricing jurisdictions might well have an economic incentive to find a truly international scheme that was reputable. Or, perhaps, a publicly owned company dealing in carbon-intensive products might be bullied into one by its activist investors. The focus on such an exchange being reputable is essential here, given the potentially large amounts of money that could be involved and the mixed views on existing carbon offsetting schemes. CIX says it will use satellite monitoring, machine learning and blockchain technology to ensure the integrity of its carbon credits and this is certainly thinking in the right direction. Until it arrives though, we wait to see the detail on the EU CBAM.

Another week and it’s another commodity story related to the effects of coronavirus. This time the Indian press and financial analysts have started to notice a shift in the fuel mix of some of the major producers from petcoke to coal. UltraTech Cement moved to 30% petcoke and 60% imported coal in the fourth quarter of its 2021 financial year that ended on 31 March 2021. This compares to a reported mix of 77% and 10% in the previous year according to Mint. Dalmia Bharat reduced its share of petcoke to 52% in the fourth quarter from 70% in the third quarter, while its coal mix was 35 - 40% in the fourth quarter.

Price is the driver here. UltraTech Cement’s chief financial officer Atul Daga summed the situation up in an earnings call in late January 2021. Essentially, he said that fuel represented about 13% of total costs for cement producers in India and that both the cost of coal and petcoke nearly doubled from June 2020 to January 2021. However, coal is seen as the cheaper option, hence the move towards it in the fuels mix ratio. The petcoke market meanwhile has suffered due to reduced oil refinery output due to, you guessed it, the effect of coronavirus on global markets in 2020. Scarcity in the US market has particularly affected the decisions on buyers for Indian cement companies since this is the key source of their imports. Demand for petcoke from Latin America and the Mediterranean hasn’t helped either. Both petcoke and coal markets are expected to stabilise in the second half of 2021. Diesel prices have also risen recently causing UltraTech Cement’s power and fuel costs to increase by 28% year-on-year to US$356m and logistics costs, including freight expenses, to rise by 25% to US$449m in the fourth quarter of its 2021 financial year.

With this in mind it’s interesting then, that for some analysts at least, fuel prices have been seen as more worrying for cement producer profits than the latest round of coronavirus-related lockdowns from India’s second wave of infection. Fitch Ratings for example, warned that the impact of mounting fuel costs would continue to be seen in the quarter to June 2021 but that it would subside due to the switch in fuel mix and price rises passed to end consumers. On the lockdowns, it forecast that localised restrictions, with cement plants being allowed to continue operating in most states, would cause a far less pronounced drop in cement demand than during the first national lockdown.

Graph 1: Monthly cement production in India, January 2019 – April 2021. Source: Office of the Economic Adviser.

Graph 1 above shows that the crisis the Indian cement sector faced during the first lockdown, when production crumbled by 85% year-on-year to 4.3Mt in April 2020. The following recovery saw production reach its second highest ever figure at 32.9Mt in March 2021. It’s too soon to tell what’s happening from the national figure but that dip in April 2021 is not looking good so far.

One benefit from unstable fuel prices is that it builds the economic case for cement producers to raise their alternative fuels substitution rates. UltraTech Cement, for example, reported that its ‘green’ energy rate grew to 13% in its 2021 financial year from 11% in 2020. With a target of 34% by its 2024 financial year, this is an ideal opportunity for a change for both UltraTech Cement and other producers.

HeidelbergCement confirmed the rumours this week with the announcement that it was selling assets in the western US to Martin Marietta for US$2.3bn. The deal covers subsidiary Lehigh Hanson’s US West region cement, aggregates, ready-mixed concrete and asphalt businesses in California, Arizona, Oregon and Nevada. This includes two of its cement plants, with the exception of the 1.5Mt/yr Permanente cement plant in California, related distribution terminals, 17 active aggregates sites and several downstream operations. The companies expect to conclude the deal by 2022 but naturally it is subject to approval by competition bodies.

Well, this is a big one considering that one of the catalysts for the group’s divestment plan was the reduction of the value of its total assets by Euro3.4bn in July 2020 following a review. Depending on the exchange rate, the value of the divestment to Martin Marietta covers half to two thirds of that amount. Group chairman Dominik von Achten later told the media in February 2021 that the company was planning to sell the first of the five assets in early-to-mid 2021. However, cement isn’t the full story here since Lehigh Hanson operates three integrated plants in California and seven terminals. So, by elimination, the Tehachapi and Redding plants are the ones that are being sold along with some combinations of the terminals. Both of those plant have production capacities of around 0.8Mt/yr. Unless the terminals being sold have been valued highly, then the majority of the deal appears to encompass some or all of the 25-odd aggregate sites, 15 asphalt sites and 30 ready-mix concrete sites the company operates in the four states.

On the cement side it doesn’t seem unreasonable at face value for the authorities to allow Martin Marietta to take over most of Lehigh Hanson’s business in the region since it should broaden competition from a production angle. Instead of five companies in California with integrated plants, there will be six. For Martin Marietta, the deal also carries the feel of unfinished business in the region since it briefly held a cement business there for around a year in the mid-2010s. It acquired Texas Industries (TXI) in July 2014 and then sold the cement business in California to CalPortland in September 2015.

Both companies are pursuing different strategies. HeidelbergCement says it is hunkering down on its other four North American regions – the US Midwest, Northeast and South, plus Canada - through selected ‘bolt-on’ acquisitions and plant upgrades. Martin Marietta says it wants to take advantage of long term demand trends such as increased state infrastructure investment in California and Arizona and private-sector growth. It also reassured shareholders with its version of the acquisition/divestment story by saying it was going to generate value the same way it did previously with TXI. It’s a small thing but the acquisition also sees the US’ largest domestic cement producer increase its production base. The top five North American cement producers will remain controlled by companies headquartered in Europe but it is a step towards regionalism.

As for who’s right, in the short term, the west coast region looks good. The area included some of the best performing states in 2020 in terms of growth in cement consumption year-on-year in 2020 with the exception of Oregon. In its winter forecast the Portland Cement Association (PCA) attributed growth in the Mountain region of the US (including Nevada) to underlying economic fundamentals and favourable demographic trends, although it expected this to slow down in 2021. In the Pacific region it forecast consumption to grow modestly in 2021 due to residential construction. As if to underline the current situation, Cemex decided to recommission a kiln in Mexico in February 2021 to cope with cement shortages and project delays in California, Arizona and Nevada.

In the face of these figures HeidelbergCement’s decision to sell suggests either it dangled a juicy proposition with good short term prospects in front of the buyers or its long term projections are pointing elsewhere. Selling up, yet holding onto its largest cement plant in the region, also smacks of hedging its bets. No doubt it will be holding on to a few terminals too. On the other hand, it would be very interesting indeed to know what part, if any, HeidelbergCement’s internal carbon price played in its decision to divest in the western US. California has the country’s biggest carbon emissions trading scheme (ETS). If say, legislators suddenly decided to follow the price trend of the European Union’s ETS then things might look different.