Analysis

There have been two developments from ThyssenKrupp’s ongoing restructuring worth noting by the cement sector in recent weeks. The first is that the Germany-based engineering and steel producer has stopped trying to sell its cement plant division. The second is that Denmark-based FLSmidth is holding serious talks about buying its mining division.

ThyssenKrupp first announced plans for a major restructuring in mid-2019 with an anticipated reduction of 6000 jobs across the business. The sale of its elevator business for Euro17.2bn to private equity was announced in February 2020. Later in May 2020 it then revealed plans to divide its previous business areas into core, dual and multi track segments. Core - including Materials Services, Industrial Components (Forged Technologies and Bearings) and Automotive Technology – would be kept as before. Dual-track – including Steel and Marine – would either be kept as before or considered for consolidation. Multi-track - including cement plant engineering, mining and more – would be sold, added to a partnership or closed. By size, core reported sales of Euro16.1bn (53%) in the company’s 2019 - 2020 financial year, dual-track reported Euro8.8bn (29%) and multi-track reported Euro5.5bn (18%).

Volkmar Dinstuhl, formerly in charge of mergers and acquisitions, was put in charge of Multi-track. By October 2020 he was publicly admitting that the division was planning to “find a solution for all our businesses within the next two years” including cement plant engineering. In the same interview he described the Multi-track division as an internal private equity fund. However, the elevator business sale has been seen by several commentators as giving ThyssenKrupp more freedom around how to conduct its restructuring. Three months later and Handelsblatt, a German business newspaper, reported this week that ThyssenKrupp’s cement plant division may have avoided its multi-track fate. It cited internal communication to employees about what’s been happening with the sale. Principally, orders have picked up in the company’s new financial year, since October 2020, and although a sale has not been ruled out, it won’t be pursued until late 2021 at the earliest. This is potentially good news for the sector as a sign that the market may be improving and definitely good news for those employees working for the division.

As a competitor, FLSmidth would have been expected to be potentially interested in buying either ThyssenKrupp’s mining or cement plant division, or both. So, the only question was, when it made a point of saying publicly that it was in non-binding negotiations to buy mining, what about cement?

Looking at the numbers shows that FLSmidth’s mining division did better than its cement one in the first nine months of 2020 with order take up year-on-year and the mining industry described as being relatively resilient during the coronavirus crisis, with the majority of mines operational across regions. By contrast it pointed out that the cement market was still ‘severely’ impacted by the coronavirus pandemic and that future cement demand was dependent on general economic growth. Acquisition activity in mining certainly seems like the safer bet at the moment. Yet the temptation to neutralise a competitor may have been a strong one. With the mining deal still in progress and the cement sale possibly ended for now, we’ll just have to wait and see. Other buyers for both divisions are no doubt waiting in the wings should circumstances allow.

One final fun fact to consider is that the man put in charge of selling both of ThyssenKrupp’s mining and cement plant divisions, Volkmar Dinstuhl, just happens to be a World Chess Federation (FIDE) recognised International Master. Being good at chess doesn’t automatically confer skill at anything else. Just look at former world champion Gary Kasparov’s political ambitions in Russia for example. Yet, ThyssenKrupp’s elevator division sale has been seen as one of the largest leveraged European buyouts in recent years and has appeared to have bought it some time to mull its options over its cement plant division. With this in mind, any potential buyers for the rest of Multi-track may be wondering just how many moves ahead this seller is thinking.

Cement imports were one of the themes in this week’s news, with stories on the topic from South Africa and Ukraine. The former concerned the latest chapter in that industry’s saga on slowing down imports. The International Trade Administration Commission (ITAC) has started a review on tariffs imposed on cement from Pakistan that were introduced in 2015.

Local producers in South Africa have experienced mixed fortunes since 2015, such as PPC and AfriSam’s failed merger attempt or the introduction of a local carbon tax, and were starting to complain again about imports even before the effects of coronavirus in 2020. This led the Concrete Institute to lobby ITAC in 2019 about rising imports from other nations, principally Vietnam and China.

Back in 2013 cement imports from Pakistan to South Africa were 1.1Mt. This represented the vast majority of all imports to the country. Tariffs of 14 – 77% were imposed on Pakistan-based exporters in mid-2015, initially for six months, but this was then extended. Roughly a year later in mid-to-late 2016, Sephaku Holdings said that imports of cement had ‘significantly’ declined on a year-on-year basis, particularly from Pakistan. By the end of June 2016 approximately 0.16Mt had been imported compared to 0.5Mt in the previous period. However, it noted that 75% of the volume was from China. Since then imports started to creep up. Cement imports reportedly rose by 84% year-on-year in 2018 and then by 11% in 2019. Data from construction industry data company Industry Insight suggests that Vietnam accounted for 70% or 0.47Mt of the 0.68Mt of cement imported into South Africa in the first nine months of 2020. The remaining 30% or 0.20Mt came from Pakistan. In this kind of environment it seems unlikely that ITAC will do anything other than extend tariffs.

Meanwhile in the northern hemisphere, in Ukraine this week a court in Kiev dismissed a challenge by the Belarusian Cement Company to remove cement import tariffs from Russia, Belarus and Moldova that were introduced in mid-2019 for five years. Notably, a law firm representing Dyckerhoff Cement Ukraine, HeidelbergCement Ukraine, Ivano-Frankivsk Ukraine and CRH subsidiary Podilsky Cement commented favourably upon the court’s decision to uphold tariffs. These producers form UKRCEMENT, the association of cement producers of Ukraine. However, the association doesn’t include Russia-based Eurocement, which operates Ukraine’s largest cement plant at Balakleya. Relations have been poor between Russia and Ukraine since a war between the countries that started in 2014. So any trade tariffs implemented upon Russia and/or Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) members will inevitably carry the whiff of geopolitics. Yet, in Ukraine’s defence, it also started an anti-dumping investigation into cement imports from Turkey in September 2020. Nationalism may be relevant but let’s not discount hard-nosed economics just yet.

Turkey’s involvement in Ukraine leads to last week’s presentation at Global Cement Live by Sylvie Doutres, DSG Consultants on cement and clinker trade in and out of the Mediterranean region. Readers can watch the presentation here but the headline story here was the trend of reducing exports away from southern European countries such as Spain, Italy and Greece, to greater exports from North African countries and Turkey over the last decade. Turkey particularly has pushed its share of exports even more in 2020 despite (or perhaps because of) a tough domestic market. The general trend here away from southern Europe has been blamed on European Union-based (EU) producers becoming less competitive often against newer plants in nearby countries.

Battles between producers and government tariff policies are a perennial feature of any market in commodities such as cement. The ebb and flow of import and export markets cover many factors including production costs, distribution networks, tariff structures and more. Distinctive features of cement trading, for example, are the high cost of transporting heavy building materials over land and the world’s chronic cement production overcapacity. In the EU’s case one reason that often gets blamed is the emissions trading system (EU ETS) and the mounting cost it is imposing upon cement production. For example, today’s story that Holcim España wants to convert its integrated Jerez plant into a grinding unit has been blamed on falling exports and a reduction in ETS credits. It is noteworthy then that the EU ETS rate breached the Euro30/t level in December 2020. This may be good news for the sustainability lobby but the exodus of exports away from Southern Europe tells its own story. What form the EU ETS carbon border adjustment mechanism takes as part of the EU Green Deal will be watched closely by producers both inside and outside the EU.

Global Cement Live continues on 21 January 2021 with Kevin Rudd, Independent Cement Consultants, presenting 'Independent or third party factory acceptance testing of major cement plant equipment and critical spare parts and the challenges of Covid’

LafargeHolcim took what appeared to be a surprising decision this week when it announced it was buying roofing and building envelope producer Firestone Building Products (FSBP). The deal raises eyebrows because it seems to be a departure from the building material producer’s previous dedication to its three major pillars: cement, aggregates and ready-mixed concrete. Yet, it follows the logic of sticking to safer markets both geographically and in terms of sustainability.

First some background. Originally, Global Cement was following the auction for FSBP via its sister publication Global Insulation. Reporting from Bloomberg in December 2020 focused on more obvious bidders such as Ireland-based insulation producer Kingspan and roofing products producer Standard Industries. However, Kingspan has been struggling publicly with fallout from the Grenfell Tower fire inquiry in the UK. Despite not formally supplying any of its products for the tower block in London, it has become embroiled in the allegations of a general culture of cheating safety tests for foam board-based insulation products. At the almost the same time that it dropped out of the FSBP bidding, its chief executive officer (CEO) Gene Murtagh apologised for ‘process shortcomings’ that had been highlighted by the ongoing inquiry. Make of this what you will. No word on why Standard Industries left proceedings but it also seems to part of a consortium trying to take over US-based chemical producer WR Grace. All of this is relevant because, from publicly-available sources, LafargeHolcim appeared to emerge out of nowhere to snaffle up FSBP. However, it seems ludicrous that a company with a revenue of around Euro25bn in 2019 could simply pull something like Euro2.8bn out of its pocket at the last minute. It’s likely it was quietly in the bidding process the whole time.

Back in the early 2010s Lafarge was busy selling off its major ‘non-core’ assets like its gypsum business in the wake of picking up debts from acquisitions like cement-producer Orascom in the Middle East. This then turned into a string of divestments following the merger with Holcim to try and shore up the business along with a general pivot towards concrete as the key end-product as sustainability concerns gathered pace. Producing cement remains a major part of LafargeHolcim’s business but a focus on the whole lifecycle of concrete is vital as a hedge against the high process emissions associated with making clinker. Cement factories run the risk of becoming so-called stranded assets depending on future government regulations.

In its acquisition statement LafargeHolcim played up the sustainability credentials of buying FSBP. It noted that up to 60% of buildings’ energy is lost through roofs and that FSBP’s products help to reduce this. Then it made the link that FSBP’s technologies and products complement LafargeHolcim’s sustainable building solutions like its ECOPact green concrete and its EcoLabel sustainable product range. Later, when LafargeHolcim CEO Jan Jenisch spoke to US broadcaster CNBC he described the move as a ‘perfect fit’ for his company’s goal, “to be the most sustainable and most innovative building materials supplier in the future.” The geographical point of the acquisition hasn’t been dwelt on as much as sustainability but no doubt buying a business based in the US with revenue of US$1.8bn is seen as being far safer than buying, say, a similar concern in East Asia.

Investing in a business that sells products that reduce energy loss in the building envelope follows the trend of the moving sustainability-related risk along the supply chain from cement to concrete and beyond. Ultimately consumers will have to pick up the true carbon price of their buildings, but if building materials producers buy more of the envelope they can spread this cost more thinly and hopefully build up the market in the process. One can also imagine it fitting with the mindset of CEO Jan Jenisch, the former boss of Sika, a company that sells speciality chemicals across a wide range of markets. The real test here is whether LafargeHolcim will buy more companies in the wider building materials sector or if other heavy building materials producers will copy them. If so then the days of heavy building material producers sticking to the three pillars of cement, aggregates and concrete may be numbered.

One of the last news stories we covered before the Christmas break was that Lafarge Poland had selected China-based Nanjing Kisen International Engineering as the general contractor for a Euro100m-plus upgrade to its Małogoszcz cement plant. This appears to be the first major European cement plant upgrade project to be publicly run by a Chinese contractor. There may be other European projects in the sector run by Chinese companies ‘on the down-low.’

If it is the first then this is a significant milestone for the growth of the Chinese industry. It is a noteworthy first for Nanjing Kisen in the European Union. Europe is the home, after all, of a number of locally-based contractors and companies that can build or upgrade cement plants including FLSmidth, Fives, ThyssenKrupp, IKN and others. Indeed, all of the work on this project might actually be conducted by local companies, selected by the general contractor. For example, Lafarge Poland says that the general contractor will select a subcontractor on the Polish market.

It’s easy to fall into jingoistic nostalgia but should we really be surprised that China can competitively build cement plants given the ferocious growth of its own industry over the last few decades? Arguments by Western critics against growing Chinese dominance in industry have tended to home in on excuses why they might be ‘cheating’ such as intellectual property theft, unfair state aid or the use of low-cost infrastructure loans to countries along its Belt and Road Initiative. That last one carries some irony given that not so long ago discussions about developing world debt were framed in the context of the Cold War and the oil crisis in the 1970s. Western countries were seen as the bogeymen depending on one’s political outlook. With this in mind, the Financial Times recently reported on data released in December 2020 that suggested that China might be heading into its own overseas debt crisis. The takeaway message here is that attempting to apply China’s whopping infrastructure boom elsewhere might not work so well without the same level of control. Exporting production overcapacity abroad may simply turn out to be something like a giant Ponzi scheme! For the cement industry this may mean a pause or wind-down in the number of new plants backed by Chinese money, often with Chinese contractors tied in, and that the rise of Chinese engineering firms might not seem as unassailable as all that after all.

This leads into another noteworthy story that we also published before Christmas on China’s latest proposal to further reduce production capacity at home. The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) wants to tighten the ratio of production capacity that has to be closed before new capacity can be built from 1.25:1 to 1.5:1. The kicker is that the new rules also include a clause intended to restrict the use of so-called ‘zombie’ capacity in the swapping process by limiting eligibility to productions lines that have been operated for two or more consecutive years since 2013. These rules seem targeted at the present day but they could potentially push Chinese cement production capacity per capita to rates more similar to those found in developed economies elsewhere (i.e. halve existing Chinese production capacity). Many of the country’s kilns were built in the early 2000s and the average lifespan of a clinker kiln is 50 years. This suggests that the ministry is thinking seriously about culling capacity by the administration’s carbon neutrality target of 2060.

Chinese penetration in the European cement plant market is more of an after-thought given the pace of projects in Asia and Africa over the last decade and the maturity of the sector. It can also be misleading given that some very-European-sounding engineering companies are actually owned by Chinese concerns. Yet no doubt local contractors and suppliers would like to keep any business they can. On the other hand, more market share may be found in Europe over the coming decades from retrofitting CO₂ mitigating equipment or building the anticipated hydrogen revolution once the regulatory and financial framework starts to favour it. Or maybe shifts to service and/or machine intelligence-style packages are the way forward. Nanjing Kisen may be the first Chinese company to upgrade a European cement plant but the market focus may quickly move on. Time will tell.

Answers by email for when readers think the first cement plant or production line in the US will be built by a Chinese company.

Happy New Year from Global Cement

Could the fairy tale of McInnis Cement have ended any other way? The saga of the frequently frozen cement plant in Quebec collided with reality this week when it emerged that the pension fund Caisse de depot et placement du Québec (CDPQ) and the provincial government are poised to let it go. The new buyer, Votorantim Cimentos, plans to form a new 83%-owned subsidiary based in Toronto to combine the assets of McInnis Cement and St Marys Cement. The proposed change in management marks a transition to a large multinational building materials producer.

Normally, Global Cement Weekly would end on a summary for its last outing of the year but the government involvement in the McInnis Cement’s ownership has created a very public tale of hope and hubris. Attempting to build a brand new integrated cement plant in rural Quebec might not seem exciting but this story has it all, from corporate competition to sustainability issues to clinker export markets. Readers looking for a global recap of 2020 should refer to the December 2020 issue of Global Cement Magazine with news and cement producer round-ups.

The McInnis story began in early 2014 when the Quebec provincial government announced that it would invest US$350m in a new 2.2Mt/yr cement plant and port facility to be operated by McInnis Cement at Port-Daniel. The project was championed by the Beaudoin-Bombardier family, which was to foot the larger share of the US$1bn total bill. Local press compared the gambit of entering a new market with established players as being similar to Bombardier's approach to its C Series airliner that was eventually bought out by Airbus: risky but potentially lucrative.

As the plan developed, competitors in both Canada and the US took exception to an export-focused cement plant being propped up by government money, political parties got involved over how public money was being spent and environmentalists became upset. The concerns of the latter were partially bypassed in order to get the project started. Then, when the cost over-ran by US$350m, the provincial government said it wasn’t spending any more and the CDPQ took over. The plant was inaugurated in September 2017 and the CDPQ started looking for a buyer or new investors at the start of 2018. It rowed back from this position in early 2019 when its chief executive officer told local press that the pension and insurance fund was ‘convinced’ of the potential of McInnis Cement. Votorantim was publicly linked to the company in September 2020 and the agreement followed this week.

It’s unknown how much Votorantim has paid to buy control of McInnis Cement but its presence in the Great Lakes region and the east coast will be augmented by this deal. Following the acquisition it will control two integrated plants and two grinding plants in the Midwest US, two integrated plants in Ontario, and now the McInnis integrated plant in Quebec. The combined integrated production capacity will rise to around 7Mt/yr. Things are looking up for the company with the Brazilian market recovering despite coronavirus and the US market holding steady so far in 2020.

The drama of McInnis Cement highlights the perils of state investment in heavy industry and the pitfalls of making a risky entry into a saturated market. The bit the Votorantim press release neglected to mention was the loss that the provincial government of Quebec is expected to make on its involvement with the cement plant. Instead it was left to Economy Minister Pierre Fitzgibbon to admit to journalists that the province is prepared to lose up to US$370m on the affair if it can’t recoup its costs after other creditors take their slices over the next decade or so. One consolation that was reported in the local press was that jobs and facilities at the McInnis plant would be supported until at least 2029. The story of the cement plant at Port-Daniel continues for now but it’s likely to be far less public as private companies take it into the unknown.

Global Cement Weekly will return on 6 January 2020